Opinion
2018–13939
07-21-2021
PEOPLE of State of New York, respondent, v. Webster DANIEL, appellant.
Janet E. Sabel, New York, N.Y. (Robin Richardson of counsel), for appellant. Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Morgan J. Dennehy, and Daniel Berman of counsel), for respondent.
Janet E. Sabel, New York, N.Y. (Robin Richardson of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Morgan J. Dennehy, and Daniel Berman of counsel), for respondent.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., LEONARD B. AUSTIN, BETSY BARROS, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Deborah A. Dowling, J.), dated October 17, 2018, which, after a hearing, designated him a level two sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6–C.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
On January 23, 2018, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted luring a child ( Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.70 ). He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one to three years. Prior to a hearing pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law art 6–C; hereinafter SORA), the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders (hereinafter the Board) prepared a risk assessment instrument (hereinafter RAI) in which it assessed the defendant 30 points under risk factor 5 (age of victim: 10 years old or less), 20 points under risk factor 7 (relationship with victim: stranger), 15 points under risk factor 9 (number and nature of prior crimes: prior history/non-violent felony), 15 points under risk factor 11 (history of drug or alcohol abuse), and 20 points under risk factor 13 (conduct while confined/supervised: unsatisfactory with sexual misconduct). This scoring resulted in a total risk factor score of 100 and a presumptive risk level two designation. The People also prepared an RAI, in which it assessed the defendant 10 points under risk factor 1 (use of violence: used forcible compulsion) and 30 points under risk factor 9 (number and nature of prior crimes: prior sex offense), in addition to those points assessed by the Board under risk factors, 5, 7, 11, and 13, which resulted in a total risk factor score of 125 and a presumptive risk level three designation. After a SORA hearing, the Supreme Court essentially agreed with the scoring set forth in the People's RAI except that the court assessed the defendant 10 points under risk factor 1 and reduced the amount of points assessed under risk factor 9 to 5 points, finding that the People failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was previously convicted of a sex offense or non-violent felony. The court assessed the defendant a total of 100 points and designated him a level two sex offender. On appeal, the defendant contends that the court, in determining his risk level, improperly assessed points under risk factors 11 and 13.
In establishing a defendant's risk level pursuant to SORA, the People bear the burden of establishing the facts supporting the determinations sought by clear and convincing evidence (see Correction Law § 168–n[3] ; see also SORA: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 5 [2006] [hereinafter Guidelines]; People v. Hewitt, 73 A.D.3d 880, 900 N.Y.S.2d 438 ; People v. Chambers, 66 A.D.3d 748, 748, 887 N.Y.S.2d 220 ; People v. Bright, 63 A.D.3d 1133, 1134, 883 N.Y.S.2d 79 ). In assessing points, evidence may be derived from the defendant's admissions, the victim's statements, evaluative reports completed by the supervising probation officer, parole officer, or corrections counselor, case summaries prepared by the Board, or any other reliable source, including reliable hearsay (see Guidelines at 5; People v. Mabee, 69 A.D.3d 820, 820, 893 N.Y.S.2d 585 ; People v. Bright, 63 A.D.3d at 1134, 883 N.Y.S.2d 79 ; see also People v. Mingo, 12 N.Y.3d 563, 883 N.Y.S.2d 154, 910 N.E.2d 983 ). Here, the Supreme Court should not have assessed the defendant 15 points under risk factor 11 for history of drug or alcohol abuse. Assessment of points under risk factor 11 may be appropriate if the offender has a "history" (Guidelines at 15) of substance abuse or if the offender "was abusing drugs and or alcohol at the time of the offense" (id.; see People v. Palmer, 20 N.Y.3d 373, 379–380, 960 N.Y.S.2d 719, 984 N.E.2d 917 ; People v. Santogual, 157 A.D.3d 737, 737, 66 N.Y.S.3d 616 ; People v. Madison, 153 A.D.3d 737, 737–738, 59 N.Y.S.3d 755 ). The commentary to the Guidelines indicates that points should be assessed under this category where, among other situations, the offender "was abusing ... alcohol [or drugs] at the time of the offense" (Guidelines at 15; see People v. Palmer, 20 N.Y.3d at 378, 960 N.Y.S.2d 719, 984 N.E.2d 917 ). The People can establish that an offender was abusing alcohol or drugs at the time of the offense by demonstrating, through clear and convincing evidence, that the offender used drugs or drank alcohol in excess either at the time of the crime or repeatedly in the past (see People v. Palmer, 20 N.Y.3d at 378, 960 N.Y.S.2d 719, 984 N.E.2d 917 ; People v. Perry, 165 A.D.3d 990, 84 N.Y.S.3d 567 ).
The People did not meet their burden of proving the facts underlying the disputed points assessment with respect to risk factor 11 by clear and convincing evidence (see People v. Santogual, 157 A.D.3d at 737, 66 N.Y.S.3d 616 ). The presentence investigation report contained ambiguous information about the defendant's marijuana use between the ages of 19 and 25, at least 16 years before the subject sex offense occurred, and, as of the date of the SORA hearing, the defendant had maintained a 19–year period of abstinence such that any history of substance abuse was too remote in time (see People v. Trotter, 163 A.D.3d 729, 730, 81 N.Y.S.3d 410 ; People v. Abdullah, 31 A.D.3d 515, 516, 818 N.Y.S.2d 267 ). Moreover, the evidence at the hearing did not establish that the defendant abused or was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the offense (see People v. Madison, 153 A.D.3d at 737–738, 59 N.Y.S.3d 755 ; cf. People v. Villanueva, 143 A.D.3d 794, 794, 38 N.Y.S.3d 805 ).
However, the defendant's contention that he should not have been assessed 20 points for unsatisfactory conduct while confined is without merit. The case summary demonstrated that the defendant committed a tier II disciplinary infraction for asking an employee of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision for oral sex while confined. The details of a prison disciplinary infraction in a case summary constitutes clear and convincing evidence that the infraction occurred (see People v. Marquez, 165 A.D.3d 986, 987, 84 N.Y.S.3d 572 ; People v. Williams, 100 A.D.3d 610, 611, 953 N.Y.S.2d 298 ).
Even considering the deduction of 15 points related to risk factor 11 from the total points assessed against the defendant, this deduction does not alter his presumptive risk level (see People v. Velazquez, 130 A.D.3d 997, 998, 13 N.Y.S.3d 574 ).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly designated the defendant a level two sex offender.
DILLON, J.P., AUSTIN, BARROS, BRATHWAITE NELSON and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.