Opinion
2011NY070415
01-19-2012
The People of the State of New York v. Juan Cruz, Defendant.
For the Motion: The Legal Aid Society, Attorney for defendant Cruz Kashif Forbes, Esq., Of Counsel Opposing the Motion: Honorable Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney New York County One Hogan Place Jamie Kleidman, Esq., Of Counsel
For the Motion:
The Legal Aid Society, Attorney for defendant Cruz
Kashif Forbes, Esq., Of Counsel
Opposing the Motion:
Honorable Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney New York County
One Hogan Place
Jamie Kleidman, Esq., Of Counsel
, J.
The defendant is charged, under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1196(7)(f), with one count of operating a motor vehicle outside the conditions of a conditional license.
The defendant, in an omnibus motion, seeks: (1) dismissal of the information for facial insufficiency, (2) a Huntley/Dunaway hearing, (3) an order precluding statement and identification testimony, (4) a Sandoval hearing, and (5) reservation of rights.
The defendant's omnibus motion is decided as follows:
DISMISSAL OF THE INFORMATION FOR FACIAL INSUFFICIENCY
The defendant moves to dismiss the information for facial insufficiency pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law §§ 170.30 (1)(a) and 170.35. For the reasons stated herein, the defendant's motion is denied.
Pursuant to CPL § 100.40(1), an information is sufficient on its face when it substantially conforms with the requirements of CPL § 100.15, when the allegations provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged, and when the non-hearsay allegations establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof. " Reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense' exists when evidence or information which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonably likely that such offense was committed and that such person committed it." CPL § 70.10(2). Importantly, this "prima facie case requirement is not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial." People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 680 (1999). That is, "[s]o long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading." People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 (2000); People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225 (2009).
The factual portion of the instant accusatory instrument alleges that on September 26, 2011 at about 9:11 p.m. at 281 East Broadway in the County and State of New York:
Deponent [Police Officer Daniel Anfang] states that he observed the defendant operating a motor vehicle (the key was in the ignition, the engine was running and defendant was behind the wheel) on a public highway, to wit the above location. Deponent further states that he conducted a computer check of the records of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles which revealed that defendant's license was a conditional license. Deponent further states that a conditional license allows the defendant to drive to or from work, school or a hospital.
Deponent further states that his basis for believing that the defendant had reason to know his license was a conditional one and that the defendant was driving in violation of his conditions is as follows: Deponent states that defendant stated in substance: YES I HAVE A CONDITIONAL LICENSE. I WAS GOING TO A PARTY. Deponent further states that defendant's conditional license does not allow the defendant to drive for the purpose of going to a party.
The People also filed and served the defendant's driving abstract from the NYS Department of Motor Vehicles, which was printed on September 26, 2011 and states that the defendant's license class is "D-Conditional."
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1196(7)(f) provides that "[i]t shall be a traffic infraction for the holder of a conditional license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle upon a public highway for any use other than those authorized pursuant to paragraph (a) of [VTL § 1196(7)]." Vehicle and Traffic Law 1196(7)(a) sets forth that a conditional license allows the holder to drive in connection with his employment, schooling, participation in an alcohol or drug rehabilitation program, and court-ordered probation activities, for specifically delineated visits to Department of Motor Vehicles offices, child care facilities, or medical service providers, as well as for a designated three-hour consecutive daytime period. In support of his motion, the defendant contends that the accusatory instrument lacks corroboration of his alleged statement and thus, the allegations are insufficient to establish that he was operating a motor vehicle for a reason other than one of these authorized purposes. The court finds this argument to be unavailing.
While a person may not be convicted of any offense solely upon evidence of a confession or admission by him, he may be convicted upon such evidence if it is supported by additional proof that the offense has been committed. CPL § 60.50. Importantly, CPL § 60.50 "does not require corroboration of confessions or admissions in every detail, but only some proof, of whatever weight', that the offense charged has in fact been committed by someone." People v Booden, 69 NY2d 185, 187 (1987), quoting People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624, 629 (1975). As such, the allegations set forth in the instant information, taken as a whole in a light most favorable to the People, support a finding that the defendant operated a motor vehicle in violation of VTL § 1196(7)(f). Specifically, the accusatory instrument alleges that, at approximately 9:11 p.m. at 281 East Broadway, Officer Anfang observed the defendant behind the wheel of the vehicle while the key was in the ignition and the engine was running and that a computer check showed that the defendant had a conditional license permitting him to drive to and from work, school or a hospital. These allegations, if true, serve to corroborate the defendant's statement by offering "some proof, of whatever weight" that the defendant operated a motor vehicle for an unauthorized purpose. People v Daniels, 37 NY2d at 629. In further support, this court notes the Court of Appeals' finding that a defendant with a conditional license who operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated and informed the arresting officer that he was coming from "the bars" had "clearly violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1196(7)(f)." People v Rivera, 16 NY3d 654, 656 (2011).
Accordingly, this court finds that the allegations, if true, are sufficient at the pleading stage to support each essential element of the offense charged. As such, the defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument for facial insufficiency is denied.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS
The branch of the defendant's motion that is to suppress evidence of statements allegedly made by the defendant to law enforcement personnel (CPL § 710.20[3]) is granted to the extent that a Huntley/Dunaway hearing is ordered to be held before trial. CPL § 710.60(4). The motion to suppress such statements is otherwise held in abeyance pending this hearing and is referred to the hearing judge for determination.
MOTION TO PRECLUDE STATEMENT AND IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE
The branch of the defendant's motion that is to preclude evidence of unnoticed statements or identification procedures (CPL § 710.30[3]) is denied, with leave granted for the defendant to renew this branch of the motion upon learning that the People intend to introduce any such evidence at the defendant's trial.
MOTION FOR A SANDOVAL HEARING
The branch of the defendant's motion that is to preclude the People from introducing, for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's credibility at trial, evidence of the defendant's prior uncharged criminal, vicious or immoral acts is granted to the extent that the People are directed to provide written notice to the defendant of all such acts, if any, that they intend to introduce at the defendant's trial (CPL § 240.43) no later than three days prior to jury selection (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and court holidays). The defendant is granted leave to renew the branch of this motion that is for a Sandoval hearing upon receiving such notice.
RESERVATION OF RIGHTS
The branch of the defendant's motion seeking the right to make further motions is granted to the extent provided for by CPL § 255.20(3).
The foregoing constitutes the opinion, decision and order of the court.
Dated:January 19, 2012
New York, New York
E N T E R:
______________________________
Tamiko Amaker, J.C.C.