Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BA322251, Luis A. Lavin, Judge.
Rachel Lederman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Daniel Ike Crutchfield.
Kathleen M. Redmond, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Dewyan Williams.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson and Laura J. Hartquist, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ALDRICH, J.
Defendants and appellants Daniel Ike Crutchfield and Dewyan Williams appeal from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in Crutchfield’s convictions for sale of cocaine base and possession of cocaine base for sale, and Williams’s conviction for sale of cocaine base. Crutchfield and Williams were sentenced to 14 and 16 years in prison, respectively.
Crutchfield, joined by Williams, contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 224 and 401. Williams contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his Pitchess motion for discovery of peace officer records and his Romero motion to strike prior conviction allegations. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Facts.
On May 4, 2007, Los Angeles Police Department Officers Jose Calderon, Hector Diaz, Michael Simon, Sylvia Ruiz, and Obaidee, along with other officers, were conducting undercover drug operations in downtown Los Angeles. At approximately 7:00 p.m., a police supervisor dropped Officer Calderon off near 6th Street and Gladys Avenue, an area known for drug activity. Officer Calderon, who was to make an undercover drug buy, was wearing street clothes and a “wire,” i.e., a one-way listening device that transmitted vocal communications to the officers who were supervising the operation. Officer Diaz, who was likewise wearing plainclothes, was equipped with a two-way police transmitter. His role was to follow Officer Calderon, observe the sale, and relay information to other officers participating in the operation.
As Officer Calderon walked, he heard a male voice call out, “ ‘dimes and dubs,’ ” street vernacular for $10 and $20 pieces of rock cocaine. Officer Calderon looked up and observed Williams and Crutchfield standing approximately five feet apart. Officer Calderon approached Williams and said, “ ‘Let me get a dub.’ ” Williams asked Officer Calderon for cash, and Calderon handed him a prerecorded $20 bill. Williams took the $20 bill and walked over to Crutchfield. Crutchfield reached into a black bindle, removed a rock of cocaine, and handed it to Williams. Williams walked back to Officer Calderon and handed the rock of cocaine to him. Officer Calderon walked away.
Officer Diaz observed the drug sale. After Officer Calderon walked off, Officer Diaz observed Williams walk back to Crutchfield and hand something to him. Upon receiving a predetermined signal from Officer Calderon indicating that a narcotics transaction had taken place, Officer Simon arrested appellants. Simon found the prerecorded $20 bill in Crutchfield’s pants pocket. No narcotics pipe or other paraphernalia was found on Crutchfield’s person.
Meanwhile, Officer Ruiz had arrived on the scene. Both she and Officer Diaz observed Crutchfield attempt to throw the black bindle over a fence. However, the bindle struck the top of the fence, causing it to split open and spill rock cocaine on the sidewalk. Ruiz collected the bindle, which bore cocaine residue, and 13 rocks of cocaine from the ground. Officer Obaidee recovered two additional rocks from the ground.
Subsequent testing confirmed that the rock sold to Officer Calderon and the rocks recovered from the ground contained cocaine base. The rock sold to Officer Calderon weighed approximately.31 grams, a usable quantity. The rocks recovered from the ground by Officer Ruiz weighed a total of 2.65 grams, and those recovered by Officer Obaidee weighed.31 grams.
Officer Calderon opined, when given a hypothetical based on the facts of the case, that the cocaine was possessed for sale. Calderon also testified that it is common for drug dealers to work in concert, with one individual holding the money and/or narcotics, while the other attempts to attract buyers.
2. Procedure.
Williams and Crutchfield were tried together by a jury. Crutchfield was convicted of selling, transporting, or giving away a controlled substance, cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)) and possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5). Crutchfield admitted suffering a prior “strike” conviction for robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), one prior drug-related conviction within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a), and serving seven prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced Crutchfield to 14 years in prison. It imposed a restitution fine, a suspended parole restitution fine, and a court security assessment.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Williams was convicted of selling, transporting, or giving away a controlled substance, cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)). He admitted suffering a prior “strike” conviction for robbery (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) and a prior drug-related conviction within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a), as well as serving five prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court denied Williams’s Romero motion and sentenced him to a term of 16 years in prison. It imposed a restitution fine, a suspended parole restitution fine, and a court security assessment.
Crutchfield and Williams appeal.
DISCUSSION
1. The trial court did not commit instructional error.
Appellants challenge the trial court’s use of two standard instructions, CALCRIM No. 224, regarding circumstantial evidence, and CALCRIM No. 401, regarding aiding and abetting. We discern no error.
a. Applicable legal principles.
When considering a claim of instructional error, we determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury understood the instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1028; People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 848; People v. Smith (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 7, 13.) We determine the correctness of jury instructions from the entire charge of the court, not by judging an instruction or portion of an instruction in artificial isolation. (People v. Richardson, supra, at p. 1028; People v. Smith, supra, at p. 13; People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 252.) We assume that jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all instructions given to them. (People v. Richardson, supra, at p. 1028; People v. Smith, supra, at p. 13.) The absence of an essential element from one instruction may be cured by another instruction, or by the instructions viewed as a whole. (People v. Smith, supra, at p. 13.)
b. CALCRIM No. 224.
The trial court instructed the jury with the standard version of CALCRIM No. 224, as follows: “Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that a fact necessary to find the defendant guilty has been proved, you must be convinced that the People have proved each fact essential to that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to find the defendant guilty, you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant is guilty. If you can draw two or more reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial evidence, and one of those reasonable conclusions points to innocence and another to guilt, you must accept the one that points to innocence. However, when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable.”
Appellants argue that CALCRIM No. 224 directed the jury to apply the prosecution’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence to circumstantial, but not direct, evidence, erroneously implying that direct evidence should be considered under some other, lesser standard. We disagree.
The People are correct that CALCRIM No. 224 was a correct statement of law and therefore appellants’ challenge has been forfeited by their failure to object to or request modification of the instruction below. (People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 570 [a party generally may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was incomplete unless the party requested clarifying or amplifying language]; People v. Palmer (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1156; People v. Spurlock (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1130.)
In any event, appellants’ contention fails on the merits. People v. Anderson (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 919, considered and rejected the identical contention made by appellants here. Anderson explained: “Defendant misreads the instruction. CALCRIM No. 224 does not set out basic reasonable doubt and burden of proof principles; these are described elsewhere. Although the instruction reiterates that each fact necessary for conviction must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the obvious purpose of the instruction is to limit the use of circumstantial evidence in establishing such proof. It cautions the jury not to rely on circumstantial evidence to find the defendant guilty unless the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from it points to the defendant’s guilt.... [¶] The same limitation does not apply to direct evidence. Circumstantial evidence involves a two-step process: presentation of the evidence followed by a determination of what reasonable inference or inferences may be drawn from it. By contrast, direct evidence stands on its own. It is evidence that does not require an inference. Thus, as to direct evidence, there is no need to decide whether there is an opposing inference that suggests innocence.” (Id. at p. 931; see also People v. Ibarra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1186-1187; People v. Smith, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 18-19; cf. People v. Golde (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 101, 118; People v. Felix (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 849, 862.)
We agree with Anderson’s reasoning and apply it here. The jury in the instant case was properly instructed on the prosecution’s burden of proof and the presumption of innocence (CALCRIM No. 220). Reasonable jurors would not have construed the instructions, taken as a whole, to require a lesser standard when considering direct evidence. For the reasons stated in Anderson, appellants are not assisted by their citation to cases holding that if two reasonable interpretations of evidence exist, the one favoring the defendant must be applied. (See, e.g., People v. Bender (1945) 27 Cal.2d 164, 175-177; People v. Naumcheff (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 278, 281-282.) There was no instructional error.
c. CALCRIM No. 401.
The trial court instructed with the standard version of CALCRIM No. 401, as follows: “To prove that the defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding and abetting that crime, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The perpetrator committed the crime; [¶] 2. The defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to commit the crime; [¶] 3. Before or during the commission of the crime, the defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime; [¶] AND [¶] 4. The defendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission of the crime. [¶] Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that crime. [¶] If all of these requirements are proved, the defendant does not need to actually have been present when the crime was committed to be guilty as an aider and abettor. [¶] If you conclude that defendant was present at the scene of the crime or failed to prevent the crime, you may consider that fact in determining whether the defendant was an aider and abettor. However, the fact that a person is present at the scene of a crime or fails to prevent the crime does not, by itself, make him or her an aider and abettor.” (Italics added.)
Again, we agree with the People that appellants have forfeited their challenge to the instruction because they failed to object to it below. (People v. Guiuan, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 570; People v. Palmer, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1156.)
Appellants’ claim is meritless in any event. Appellants argue that “aid” means to assist, whereas “abet” means to incite or encourage. Therefore, they reason, aiding requires more than “ ‘mere encouragement or incitement.’ ” To “aid” a perpetrator, they urge, a defendant must “render ‘overt or affirmative assistance....’ ” Appellants contend CALCRIM No. 401 does not adequately convey these principles. Although CALCRIM No. 401 states, as the fourth element, that “[t]he defendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission of the crime,” appellants argue that the further definition of aiding and abetting contained in the instruction, italicized above, incorrectly informs jurors that mere encouragement is enough. They suggest that the instruction should specify a defendant is guilty as an aider and abettor only if he or she “actually aids or assists” the commission of the crime.
Appellants are incorrect. CALCRIM No. 401 is an accurate statement of the law. It is well settled that a person may aid and abet by giving encouragement to the principal. Penal Code section 31 provides in pertinent part: “All persons concerned in the commission of a crime... whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and encouraged its commission,” are principals. Accordingly, it has long been the law that an “ ‘aider and abettor is a person who, “acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.” ’ ” (People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 136; see also, e.g., People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 40; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164; People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560; People v. Garcia (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 261, 274 [jury could reasonably find that the defendant aided and abetted by encouraging the principal to shoot the victim].) CALJIC No. 3.01, which contains the principles challenged here, has been held to be a correct statement of law. (E.g., People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1234; People v. Tillotson (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 517, 532.) Indeed, the challenged language was expressly suggested by our Supreme Court in People v. Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d at page 561.
Appellants’ contrary argument is largely derived from People v. Elliott (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1633, 1641, and has been expressly rejected in People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402 and People v. Booth (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1247. In Elliott, the defendant, a participant in a robbery, contended that the trial court had erred by refusing to instruct on the lesser related offense of being an accessory to the theft. (Elliott, at p. 1636.) The appellate court, rejecting the claim, held that no evidence supported such an instruction. An accessory is one who, “after a felony has been committed, harbors, conceals or aids a principal in such felony.” (§ 32, italics added.) The evidence showed the defendant either participated in the robbery, or was not guilty; there was no evidence he was only an accessory. He had not harbored, concealed or aided the perpetrator. In this context, Elliott explained that the word “aid” means to assist, unlike the word “abet,” which means merely to encourage or incite. (Elliott, at pp. 1641-1642.) Elliott reasoned that, to be an accessory within the meaning of section 32, a defendant had to have offered overt or affirmative assistance. (Id. at p. 1641.) Because the defendant had at most encouraged the perpetrator, he could not have been an accessory. (Id. at p. 1642.)
In People v. Campbell, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th 402, as here, the defendant contended the standard instruction on aiding and abetting was defective. Relying on Elliott’s analysis that “aid” means to assist while “abet” means to incite or encourage, the Cambpell defendant argued that in order to be convicted as an aider and abettor, the jury must find he “ ‘both assisted and encouraged the actual perpetrator.’ ” (People v. Campbell, supra, at p. 410.) As in the instant case, the defendant urged that the standard aiding and abetting instruction, at that time CALJIC No. 3.01, erroneously allowed the jury to convict if he only encouraged, but did not “aid,” the perpetrator.
Campbell concluded the instruction was correct and the defendant’s reliance on Elliott was misplaced. (People v. Campbell, supra, 25 Cal.App.4that p. 412.) Elliott did not purport to construe section 31, or the phrase “ ‘aid and abet.’ ” (People v. Campbell, supra, at p. 412.) No case law held or suggested that “aid and abet” required separate findings concerning two distinct types of acts, i.e., assisting and encouraging, before a defendant could be found to have aided and abetted a crime. (Id. at p. 411.) Instead, the test is whether the accused, in any way, directly or indirectly, aided the perpetrator by acts or encouraged him by words or gestures. (Ibid.) The distinction between “aid” and “abet” is not “the difference in specific conduct signified by each term but rather the difference in mental state implied by each term.” (Id. at p. 413.) The word “aid” does not necessarily imply guilty knowledge or felonious intent, but “abet” does. (Ibid.) Inclusion of both terms was not intended to require two types of conduct, but instead is to ensure a defendant has the requisite mental state. (Ibid.) “In other words, the phrase ‘aid and abet’ represents a legal theory. Each term therein performs a function necessary to justify the imposition of criminal liability. ‘Aid’ requires some conduct by which one becomes ‘concerned in the commission of a crime’ [citation], whether it be to aid (i.e., assist or supplement), promote, encourage, or instigate. [Citation.] ‘Abet,’ on the other hand, requires that this conduct be accompanied by the requisite criminal state of mind, i.e., knowledge of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and with the intent that it be facilitated.” (Id. at pp. 413-414, fn. omitted.) Thus, CALJIC No. 3.01 was a proper statement of the law. (Id. at p. 414; accord People v. Booth, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1254-1256 [trial court properly refused to instruct that to be found guilty as an aider and abettor, the defendant must have actually aided or assisted the perpetrator].)
We agree with the analysis in Campbell and Booth. We discern no deficiency in CALCRIM No. 401.
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant Williams’s Pitchess motion without conducting an in camera review of personnel records.
a. Additional facts.
Prior to trial, Williams filed a Pitchess motion seeking personnel records of Officers Calderon, Diaz, Saragueta, and Ruiz. The motion sought the “complete personnel files” of the named officers, including “complaints of misconduct relating to dishonesty (including the fabrication of police reports, false accusation of crime, perjury or lying, or false arrest),” as well as information regarding “false arrests, illegal searches and seizures, fabricated charges and/or evidence.” Counsel’s declaration in support of the motion stated that, in addition to materials related to dishonesty, information related to an officer’s racial bias or planting of evidence would be relevant.
Williams’s motion stated that Officer Saragueta was one of the chase officers. Saragueta did not testify at trial.
Defense counsel’s declaration offered in support of the motion additionally averred that the information sought was material and relevant to Williams’s defense, which would be that “the arrest did not occur as the officers wrote in the arrest report and that the officer fabricated the arrest report.” Williams argued that the police report contained “a gross inaccuracy” in that it “stated that Defendant Williams attempted to throw contraband over a fence in order to dispose of it. However, Officer Calderon stated at the preliminary hearing that it was Defendant Crutchfield that attempted to throw the contraband over the fence.” According to counsel’s declaration, the credibility of the arresting officers was “the key to the case” and the defense expected to show that the “[o]fficers involved fabricated incidents and statements alleged” in the police report and complaint.
A police report prepared by Officer Calderon and attached to the motion stated that Officers Diaz, Saragueta, and Ruiz observed Williams attempting to throw the black bindle over the fence. Also attached to the Pitchess motion was a portion of Calderon’s preliminary hearing testimony, in which Calderon stated he had been told by Officers Diaz, Saragueta, and Detective Ruiz that Crutchfield (rather than Williams), attempted to toss the black bag over the fence. Calderon acknowledged that the police report erroneously stated Williams was the individual who tossed the bag. Calderon explained, “It was a mistake.”
The trial court denied the motion, reasoning, “It appears that the specific factual scenario that is required by these motions is not present[.]” Williams now asserts the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion. We disagree.
b. Legal principles.
Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 establish a two-step procedure for a criminal defendant’s Pitchess discovery of peace officer records. (People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 109; People v. Gutierrez (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1472-1473; California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1019; City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 9.) “To initiate discovery, the defendant must file a motion supported by affidavits showing ‘good cause for the discovery,’ first by demonstrating the materiality of the information to the pending litigation, and second by ‘stating upon reasonable belief’ that the police agency has the records or information at issue. [Citation.]” (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1019.) If a defendant shows good cause, the trial court examines the material sought in camera to determine whether disclosure should be made and discloses “only that information falling within the statutorily defined standards of relevance.” (Ibid.) The statutory scheme balances the peace officer’s claim to confidentiality and the defendant’s compelling interest in all information pertinent to the defense. (People v. Samuels, supra, at p. 109.)
Warrick v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.4th 1011, clarified the good cause standard. “There is a ‘relatively low threshold’ for establishing the good cause necessary to compel in camera review by the court. [Citations.]” (People v. Thompson (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1316.) To establish good cause, “defense counsel’s declaration in support of a Pitchess motion must propose a defense or defenses to the pending charges” and articulate how the discovery sought might lead to relevant evidence. (Warrick, at p. 1024.) The defense must present “a specific factual scenario of officer misconduct that is plausible when read in light of the pertinent documents.” (Id. at p. 1025; People v. Thompson, supra, at p. 1316.) “A scenario sufficient to establish a plausible factual foundation ‘is one that might or could have occurred. Such a scenario is plausible because it presents an assertion of specific police misconduct that is both internally consistent and supports the defense proposed to the charges.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Thompson, supra, at p. 1316, italics omitted.) Depending on the facts of the case, “the denial of facts described in the police report may establish a plausible factual foundation.” (Ibid.; Warrick, at pp. 1024-1025.) A defendant need not establish that it is reasonably probable his version of events actually occurred, provide corroborating evidence, show that his story is persuasive or credible, or establish a motive for the officer’s alleged misconduct. (Warrick, at pp. 1025-1026.) Discovery is limited to instances of officer misconduct related to the misconduct asserted by the defendant. (Id. at p. 1021.)
Trial courts are vested with broad discretion when ruling on Pitchess motions (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 832), and we review a trial court’s ruling for abuse. (People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 992; People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1228; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 330.)
c. The trial court’s denial of the Pitchess motion was not an abuse of discretion.
Williams’s motion fell far short of meeting even the “relatively low threshold” for establishing the good cause necessary to compel in camera review by the court. At the outset, we observe that to the extent the motion purported to seek records unrelated to dishonesty, it was overbroad. The motion stated that Williams intended to show the officers had been untruthful. Records related to any other category of police misconduct, such as racial bias or planting evidence, was completely irrelevant to any defense at trial. “A request for information that is irrelevant to the pending charges does not satisfy the specificity requirement.” (People v. Hill (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1089, 1096, fn. 7, disapproved on other grounds by People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 48, fn. 5; Warrick v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1021; People v. Hustead (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 410, 416.) A “showing of good cause must be based on a discovery request which is tailored to the specific officer misconduct that is alleged.” (California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 1021.)
Williams likewise failed to establish good cause for review of records related to dishonesty. Williams’s motion did little more than point out that an officer made an error in the police report, which the officer readily acknowledged at the preliminary hearing. Williams cites no persuasive authority for the proposition that an officer’s simple error amounts to misconduct. Even if the error at issue could be characterized as misconduct–a contention we do not accept–Williams’s motion still failed to establish good cause. Williams did not dispute any of the specific facts contained in the police report. Although he vaguely argued that he “dispute[d] the account of the officers,” that the “officers falsified their observations of his conduct,” and that the police report was “fabricated as to [Williams’s] activity during the time just prior to his arrest,” Williams never specified which portions of the report were purportedly untruthful. He did not provide an alternate version of the facts regarding his presence and his actions prior to and at the time of his arrest, or explain the facts set forth in the police report. (See People v. Thompson, supra, at p. 1316.) Williams did not deny selling cocaine to Calderon, and did not deny that Crutchfield had cocaine in the black bindle. Williams did not offer any innocent explanation for his conduct or his presence in an area known for narcotics activity. In short, Williams did not specify any police misconduct that would have supported a defense at trial, nor did he set forth a factual scenario, plausible or otherwise, that would have supported such a defense. While the denial of facts described in the police report may, in a proper case, establish a plausible factual foundation (People v. Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1024-1025; People v. Thompson, supra, at p. 1318), Williams did not do even that with any degree of specificity. Williams’s showing “is insufficient because it is not internally consistent or complete” and “does not present a factual account of the scope of the alleged police misconduct, and does not explain [the defendant’s] own actions in a manner that adequately supports his defense.” (People v. Thompson, supra, at p. 1317; cf. Warrick v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1027 [defendant established specific factual scenario where he explained his conduct, a reason for police actions, and an exculpatory explanation for the drugs found on the ground near him].)
Nonetheless, Williams urges that “[c]hallenges to police credibility warrant especially close judicial scrutiny in cases involving ‘Fifth Corridor Sweeps arrests” because there is an “inherent threat to the constitutional rights of defendants caught” in such police operations. In his view, officers conducting such “sweeps” have a motive to “ ‘get results’ ” and misidentification, carelessness, or “malfeasance” is likely. For these reasons, he contends, the specific factual scenario requirement should be satisfied “by the nature of the sweep itself.”
Unsurprisingly, Williams cites no authority in support of this proposition, which is contrary to established principles governing Pitchess review. Peace officer personnel records are confidential and may be discovered only in accordance with the procedures established by the Evidence Code. (People v. Gutierrez, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 1472.) The statutory scheme, including the good cause requirement, reflects a legislative balancing of the accused’s need for disclosure of relevant information with the law enforcement officer’s legitimate expectation of privacy in his or her personnel records. (Garcia v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 63, 69-70; People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1219-1220.) Williams ignores this carefully crafted statutory balancing of interests. His argument, if adopted, would establish a presumption that the records of all officers engaged in a certain type of police operation are subject to in camera review, without presentation of any specific factual scenario of officer misconduct whatsoever. Simply put, this is not the law as articulated by our Supreme Court and our Legislature. Our Supreme Court has made clear that in order to show good cause for in camera review, the defense must present “a specific factual scenario of officer misconduct that is plausible when read in light of the pertinent documents.” (Warrick v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1025, italics added.) Williams’s motion failed to meet this standard, and was properly denied.
3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Williams’s motion to strike prior conviction allegations.
a. Additional facts.
The information charged Williams with a prior “strike” conviction for robbery suffered in 1996 (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) and five prior “prison term” convictions within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b), suffered between 1995 and 2006. The information further alleged a 1989 conviction for possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351), which formed the basis for a three-year enhancement pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a). As noted ante, Williams admitted the allegations prior to sentencing.
The information charged Crutchfield with a 1990 strike conviction for robbery, seven prior prison term convictions suffered between 1982 and 2003, and a 1998 conviction for possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5).
Prior to trial, the parties discussed the possibility of a negotiated disposition. Initially both defendants opted to go to trial. After further discussion, the People offered a negotiated disposition of 10 years in prison for Crutchfield and 8 years for Williams, with both appellants required to admit their “strike” priors. Appellant Crutchfield wished to accept the proposed disposition, but appellant Williams did not. Because the People’s offer was “a package deal,” the matter proceeded to trial.
Before sentencing, Williams moved to strike the prior conviction allegations pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th 497, on the grounds that his prior convictions were remote in time, his current conviction for selling cocaine base was not serious, and he was “a lifelong drug addict who sustained the disputed conviction to support his drug habit.” At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel argued that the prior “strike” conviction was 11 years old, and Williams’s three subsequent incarcerations were all for possession of drugs for personal use. Other than “some very old offenses,” Williams’s convictions were all drug-related.
The trial court denied the motion, explaining: “After consideration of the constitutional rights of the defendant and the interest of society in fair prosecution of the crime, the court has determined that it will not exercise its discretion pursuant to Penal Code section 1385 to dismiss the prior conviction for Mr. Williams due to the extensive criminal history after suffering the 1996 conviction. In fact, he suffered three subsequent convictions: one in 1999, one in 2002, and one in 2006.”
The court stated that it tentatively intended to sentence Williams to the mid-term of four years, doubled to eight years pursuant to the Three Strikes law. It added an additional consecutive year for each of the five section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancements, and a three-year term for the Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a) enhancement, for a total of 16 years.
For Crutchfield, the court likewise proposed a tentative sentence of the mid term of four years, doubled due to the prior strike conviction, plus an additional consecutive year for each of three section 667.5 prior prison term convictions, plus three years for a Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a) enhancement, for a total of 14 years in prison. The court stated it intended to exercise its discretion to strike Crutchfield’s four prison priors suffered in 1982, 1987, 1990, and 1993, based on remoteness. Pursuant to section 654, sentence on count 2 was stayed.
The court expressly stated: “I do not mean to in any way punish either Mr. Williams or Mr. Crutchfield for going to trial. I gave you my tentative. It was a little bit different for Mr. Crutchfield than it was for Mr. Williams. It was based on, as I stated, the age of some of the prison priors and also on the fact that Mr. Crutchfield’s strike is much older than it would be for Mr. Williams. But that’s the reason why there’s a discrepancy in terms of what I believe to be an appropriate sentence for Mr. Williams and for Mr. Crutchfield.... [T]he court did not take into consideration whatsoever the fact that either one of them decided to go to trial or whether there was a desire by one defendant or the other prior to going forth with the trial with regard to what the appropriate sentence would be.”
Williams’s counsel pointed out that Williams’s 1989 conviction for possession of a controlled substance for sale, which formed the basis for the three-year Health and Safety Code enhancement, was older than two of Crutchfield’s stricken prison term priors. Counsel urged that Williams’s conviction should likewise be stricken because it was remote. Counsel also complained that during settlement negotiations in chambers, the court had indicated that if Williams proceeded to trial and was convicted, it contemplated a sentence of between 13 and 14 years, rather than the 16-year sentence tentatively ordered. Counsel queried whether any evidence during trial caused the court to increase the sentence. The court replied that it did not recall what sentence had been discussed in chambers, and the tentative sentence was based upon the court’s review of the probation officer’s report and the People’s sentencing memorandum, as well as on Williams’s Romero motion. The trial court then imposed the sentences it had tentatively set forth for both Williams and Crutchfield.
b. Discussion.
In the furtherance of justice, a trial court may strike or dismiss an enhancement or prior conviction allegation or strike the additional punishment for an enhancement. (§ 1385, subd. (a); People v. Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 504; People v. Meloney (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1145, 1155.) A trial court’s refusal to strike a prior conviction allegation is reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375.) Under that standard, the party seeking reversal must “ ‘clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977.) It is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike a prior conviction. (People v. Carmony, supra, at p. 378.) Only extraordinary circumstances justify a finding that a career criminal is outside the Three Strikes law. (Ibid.) Therefore, “the circumstances where no reasonable people could disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme must be even more extraordinary.” (Ibid.)
When considering whether to strike prior convictions, the relevant factors a court must consider are “whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) The three strikes law “not only establishes a sentencing norm, it carefully circumscribes the trial court’s power to depart from this norm.... [T]he law creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) We presume the trial court considered all of the relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary. (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310.)
As Williams appropriately acknowledges, the trial court in the instant matter was aware of its discretion to dismiss the enhancement and prior conviction allegations, and considered only permissible factors when ruling on the motion. However, he contends that because his prior convictions were primarily drug-related, and his prior “strike” conviction was 11 years old, the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion. He further implies that the trial court’s ruling was made to penalize him for rejecting the People’s negotiated disposition and proceeding to trial.
We are unpersuaded. Williams’s probation report indicates the following criminal history: In April 1989, Williams was convicted of possession of a narcotic substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351). He was given a six-month jail sentence and placed on probation. In November 1989, he was convicted of receiving stolen property (§ 496), sentenced to 30 days in jail and placed on probation. In May 1990, he was convicted of carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle (§ 12034, subd. (a)) and was again sentenced to a brief jail term and placed on probation. In March 1993, he was convicted of misdemeanor battery (§ 242) and placed on probation. In April 1994, he was convicted of committing battery causing serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)), given a 60-day jail sentence, and yet again placed on probation. In August 1994, he was convicted of taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent (Veh. Code, § 10851), and sentenced to 90 days in jail and placed on probation. In April 1995, he was again convicted of misdemeanor battery, sentenced to 75 days in jail, and placed on probation. Also during 1995, he was convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor (§ 261.5), given 15 days in jail, and placed on probation. In November 1995, he was convicted of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)), given a suspended jail sentence, and placed on probation. Less than a month later, in December 1995, he was convicted of burglary (§ 459) and sentenced to 16 months in prison. In September 1996, he was convicted of the misdemeanor of using or being under the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a)), given a suspended jail sentence, and placed on probation. Late in 1996, he was also convicted of second degree robbery (§ 211) and sent to prison for three years. In January 1999, he was again convicted of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) and was sentenced to two years in prison. After his release, he violated parole four times. In December 2002, he was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, and sentenced to two years in prison. He subsequently violated parole four times. In May 2006, he was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and sent to prison for 16 months. In February 2007, he was convicted of possession of paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364) and sentenced to summary probation and 26 days in jail. In March 2007, he violated parole. He committed the instant crime but a few months later, in May 2007, while he was on parole.
On this record, the trial court clearly did not abuse its discretion by refusing to strike the prior conviction allegations. Williams has now suffered 17 convictions, some involving violence and two involving drug sales. The argument that his 1996 “strike” conviction for robbery, his 1989 conviction for possession of a controlled substance for sale, or his 1995, 1996, or 1999 prior “prison term” convictions were remote in time lacks merit. The fact a prior conviction is remote has little mitigating force “where, as here, the defendant has led a continuous life of crime.” (People v. Pearson (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 740, 749; People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813 [20-year-old felony conviction not remote given defendant’s criminal recidivism; a trial court cannot be expected to “simply consult the Gregorian calendar with blinders on”].) Williams’s probation report demonstrates the absence of any significant period since 1989 in which he has led a legally blameless life. Instead, Williams’s 18-year criminal history demonstrates he is “the kind of revolving-door career criminal for whom the Three Strikes law was devised.” (People v. Gaston (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 310, 320; People v. Pearson, supra, at p. 749.)
Likewise, the fact that his crimes may have been tied to his drug addiction did not compel grant of the motion. “[D]rug addiction is not necessarily regarded as a mitigating factor when a criminal defendant has a long-term problem and seems unwilling to pursue treatment.” (People v. Martinez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1511.)
Williams was repeatedly given the benefit of the doubt in prior cases when he was placed on probation. Nonetheless, he continued to reoffend. His “conduct as a whole was a strong indication of unwillingness or inability to comply with the law. It is clear from the record that prior rehabilitative efforts have been unsuccessful for defendant. Indeed, defendant’s prospects for the future look no better than the past, in light of defendant’s record of prior offense and reoffense.... There is no indication from the record here that the court failed to consider the relevant factors or that it abused its discretion in determining that, as a flagrant recidivist, defendant was not outside the spirit of the three strikes law. [Citation.]” (People v. Philpot (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 893, 906-907.) This is not the sort of “extraordinary” case in which the defendant falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme. (See, e.g., People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378; People v. Philpot, supra, at p. 907.) The trial court’s ruling was neither irrational nor arbitrary, and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Nor can we conclude that the trial court’s denial of Williams’s motion was made to retaliate against him for refusing to accept the People’s plea offer. The basis for Williams’s contention is that the trial court treated his codefendant more favorably by striking prior conviction allegations that were more recent than Williams’s. A fair reading of the record, however, does not bear this contention out. The trial court expressly denied that Williams’s rejection of the plea offer influenced its sentencing choices. A comparison of the defendants’ criminal histories does not give us reason to doubt the court’s statement. Both defendants had suffered “strike” convictions for robbery, Crutchfield in 1990 and Williams in 1996. The trial court did not strike either of these convictions. Each had suffered a qualifying drug-related prior conviction that subjected him to a three-year Health and Safety Code section 11370.2 enhancement. Crutchfield’s prior was suffered in 1998, Williams’s in 1989. The trial court did not strike either of these convictions. Williams had suffered five section 667.5, subdivision (b) “prison term” priors in 1995, 1996, 1999, 2002, and 2006. Crutchfield had suffered seven prison term priors in 1982, 1987, 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, and 2003. The trial court declined to strike any of Williams’s section 667.5, subdivision (b) priors, but struck the four most remote of William’s prison term priors, i.e., those suffered in 1982, 1987, 1990, and 1993. All of Crutchfield’s stricken section 667.5, subdivision (b) priors were thus more remote than Williams’s prison priors, demonstrating a reasonable basis for the court’s sentencing decision. The trial court treated the defendants identically in terms of the prior “strikes” and Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a) enhancements. Further, it pointed out that Williams’s prior strike conviction was more recent than Crutchfield’s. We cannot say the court abused its discretion, nor did it evidence any disproportionate treatment of Williams.
As to Williams’s contention that the trial court failed to adequately respond to his query regarding why the court’s in-chambers sentencing estimate differed from the eventual sentence imposed, we observe that the court stated it did not recall the specifics of the chambers discussion and sentenced defendants based on the probation report and sentencing memoranda, items that would not have been available to the court at the earlier discussion.
Finally, contrary to Williams’s argument, the record does not suggest he was less culpable than Crutchfield. The evidence showed the two men played equally prominent roles in the drug sale. Crutchfield held the bag of drugs while Williams acted as a go-between, transferring the money and drugs between the undercover officer and Crutchfield. We do not agree that Williams’s role in the crime was less significant than Crutchfield’s. Under these circumstances, we discern no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed.
We concur: KLEIN, P. J., CROSKEY, J.