Opinion
2016–12134 Ind.No. 1595/14
08-05-2020
The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Latrina CROCKER, Appellant.
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (Cynthia Colt of counsel), for appellant. Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Camille O'Hara Gillespie, and Michael Bierce of counsel), for respondent.
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (Cynthia Colt of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Camille O'Hara Gillespie, and Michael Bierce of counsel), for respondent.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., JEFFREY A. COHEN, ROBERT J. MILLER, BETSY BARROS, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ruth Shillingford, J.), rendered October 28, 2016, convicting her of manslaughter in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress her statements to law enforcement officials.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
We agree with the Supreme Court's determination denying that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress her statements to law enforcement officials. A review of the totality of the circumstances (see People v. Anderson, 42 N.Y.2d 35, 396 N.Y.S.2d 625, 364 N.E.2d 1318 ), including the duration and conditions of detention, the conduct and demeanor of the police toward the defendant, and the age, physical state, and mental state of the defendant, established that her statements to the police, which were given after she was informed of, and waived, her Miranda rights (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ), were voluntarily made (see People v. Pegues, 59 A.D.3d 570, 571–572, 873 N.Y.S.2d 160 ).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of manslaughter in the first degree ( Penal Law § 125.20[1] ). "[A]n intoxicated person can form the requisite criminal intent to commit a crime, and it is for the trier of fact to decide if the extent of the intoxication acted to negate the element of intent" ( People v. Flores, 40 A.D.3d 876, 877, 836 N.Y.S.2d 273 ; see Penal Law § 15.25 ). The defendant's intent to cause serious physical injury (see Penal Law § 10.00[10] ) may be inferred from her conduct in stabbing the victim in the chest with a steak knife (see People v. Steinberg, 79 N.Y.2d 673, 682, 584 N.Y.S.2d 770, 595 N.E.2d 845 ; People v. Forde, 120 A.D.3d 509, 990 N.Y.S.2d 637 ). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675 ).
DILLON, J.P., COHEN, MILLER and BARROS, JJ., concur.