Opinion
No. XXXXX.
2013-06-5
PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Emma COTTINI, Defendant.
Paul Czajka, Esq., Columbia County District Attorney Hudson, for the People. Emma Cottini, Claverack, Defendant Pro Se.
Paul Czajka, Esq., Columbia County District Attorney Hudson, for the People. Emma Cottini, Claverack, Defendant Pro Se.
DAVID A. DELLEHUNT, J.
The People, by and through the Columbia County District Attorney Paul Czajka (hereinafter “the DA”), move for an order pursuant to CPL § 440.10 vacating defendant's plea of guilty in connection with the above-referenced matter on the grounds that “the Court did not have jurisdiction over the action or of the person of the Defendant upon the People's announcement that they declined to prosecute the Vehicle and Traffic charge against the Defendant”. The Defendant failed to submit any papers in connection with the instant motion.
On or about June 14, 2012 the Defendant was charged with a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1110(a), Failure to Obey a Traffic Control Device, by Simplified Traffic Information (Uniform Traffic Ticket 1K21033HSP). The Simplified Traffic Information scheduled the matter for a first appearance on July 3, 2012. Defendant entered a not guilty plea by mail and the matter was scheduled for a pre-trial conference on August 7, 2012. On August 7, 2012 the DA moved by Order to Show Cause for the Court's recusal from the instant case, and for a stay pending the determination of the recusal motion; the motion was made returnable on September 20, 2012. By Decision/Order dated September 26, 2012 the Court denied the DA's motion to recuse. The instant case was set down for trial on October 2, 2012. The DA served the Defendant with a Notice of Motion seeking the Court's recusal and simultaneously served a subpoena upon the arresting New York State Trooper for trial. On the eve of trial the DA withdrew his motion for recusal as it applied to the Defendant. Upon calling the case, the Defendant, DA and arresting New York State Trooper were all present . The Defendant requested to change her plea from not guilty to guilty. The DA espoused his intention to “decline to prosecute”, even though his witness had been subpoened, the subpoena contained a duly signed delegation for the New York State Trooper to conduct the trial and the New York State Trooper stood ready to testify. The Court advised the Defendant on the record of the implications of entering a guilty plea , and notwithstanding the aforesaid, the Defendant was adamant that the Court accept her guilty plea before commencing the trial. The Court accepted Defendant's guilty plea and assessed a fine in the amount of $15.00 and mandatory surcharge in the amount of $85.00.
The Order to Show Cause with supporting papers consisted of thirteen pages.
The motion was one of 63 identical Orders to Show Cause filed in the Kinderhook Town Court on August 7, 2012.
The matter was set down for trial in accordance with VTL 1806 in order to avoid having the Defendant make excessive appearances in connection with a simple traffic infraction case.
The 12 page Notice of Motion specified a return date of October 2, 2012 and sought identical relief to that requested by the Order to Show Cause dated August 7, 2012, and was the third such request for the same relief.
Also in attendance were numerous other members of the New York State Police, including the Captain of the local barracks.
The Simplified Traffic Information also contained the requisite warning, in accordance with VTL 1807, printed in a noticeably distinct manner as follows: “A plea of guilty to this charge is equivalent to a conviction after trial. If you are convicted, not only will you be liable to a penalty, but in addition your license to drive a motor vehicle or motorcycle, and your certificate of registration, if any, are subject to suspension and revocation as prescribed by law”.
The pro se Defendant was subjected to the filing of multiple motions in connection with her simple traffic infraction case and the ensuing delays occasioned thereby.
The DA's argument that the Court is bound to follow the Columbia County Court's opinions in People v. Beckman, 38 Misc.3d 878 (Columbia County Court 2012) and People v. Kerwin Jones—Indictment No. 12–051 (Hon. Richard Koweek, January 22, 2013) is unavailing. In Beckman, supra. the Defendant was indicted for a violation of Penal Law § 130.45, Criminal Sexual Act in the Second Degree, a Class D Felony. The DA, apparently without any explanation whatsoever, declined to prosecute, and the Columbia County Court (Hon. Jonathan Nichols) dismissed the indictment on that basis. The DA contends that the Court not only has the inherent power to dismiss under the circumstances, but is obligated to dismiss as soon as he utters the words “decline to prosecute”. The Court of Appeals has spoken on the issue of whether a Court has the power to dismiss a case when a prosecutor refuses to prosecute. See, People v. Douglass, 60 N.Y.2d 194 (1983). Under the Doctrine of Stare Decisis the Court is compelled to follow the highest Court in the State, rather than the more recent decisions of the Columbia County Court. See, People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 337–338 (1990). The fact that an intermediate Appellate Court may have failed to follow binding precedent is of no moment. See, Warnock v. Duello, 30 AD3d 818, 819 (3rd Dept.2006); Battle v. State, 257 A.D.2d 745, 746 (3rd Dept.1999).
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court upon the filing of an accusatory instrument. CPL § 100.05. The DA avers that he can deprive the Court of its jurisdiction simply by uttering the words “decline to prosecute”. Once jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court, however, the case remains upon the Court's docket until one of the following occurs: a disposition after trial, a plea by the defendant, or the case is disposed of upon a motion brought in accordance with CPL § 170.30. See, People v. Douglass, 60 N.Y.2d 194 (1983). Although the DA has discretion on how to prosecute a case after it is filed, the DA does not possess unfettered discretion over the disposition of the accusatory instrument. See generally, Id. at 202–204;Matter of Cloke v. Pulver, 243 A.D.2d 185, 189 (3rd Dept.1998). The Court must serve as the gatekeeper for any proposed disposition in order to insure that the same is above board and appropriate. See, People v. Rossi, 39 Misc.3d 496 (Stuyvesant Justice Court 2013); People v. Donnaruma, 963 N.Y.S.2d 848, 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 23130 (Albany City Ct.2013). As the Court of Appeals has explained, nolle prosequi was abolished over a century ago and the power to dismiss was transferred from the prosecutor to the Judge. See, People v. Extale, 18 NY3d 690, 694 (2012).
Here the DA admittedly lacks standing to bring a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction under CPL § 440.10. CPL § 440.10 provides in pertinent part:
At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which it was entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such judgment ...
CPL § 440.10(1) [emphasis added]. Likewise, under the circumstances presented the Court may not vacate a defendant's guilty plea on the DA's motion or its own motion. See, People v. Moquin, 77 N.Y.2d 449 (1991); People v. Wright, 205 A.D.2d 1013 (3rd Dept.1994). A defendant has an absolute right to enter a plea of guilty at any time in the proceeding. Despite the Court's allocution, the Defendant insisted on her right to enter a plea of guilty to the charge of a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1110(a), Failure to Obey a Traffic Control Device. The Court determined that the Defendant's decision to plea guilty was a voluntary, knowing and intelligent decision, and the Court was obligated to accept the same. See, People v. Tedesco, 38 AD3d 1102 (3rd Dept.2007), lv. den.8 NY3d 991 (2007).
Accordingly, for all of the aforementioned reasons, the DA's motion is denied in its entirety. This opinion shall constitute the Decision and Order of the Court.