Opinion
2013-04-8
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Juan CONCEPCION, Appellant.
Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains (Laurie Sapakoff and Steven Bender of counsel), for respondent. Turner & Turner, Tarrytown (Frederick W. Turner of counsel), for appellant.
Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains (Laurie Sapakoff and Steven Bender of counsel), for respondent. Turner & Turner, Tarrytown (Frederick W. Turner of counsel), for appellant.
PRESENT: IANNACCI, J.P., MARANO and TOLBERT, JJ.
Appeal from an amended judgment of the City Court of Yonkers, Westchester County (Richard F. Sweeney, J.), rendered December 21, 2010. The amended judgment, following a hearing, revoked a sentence of probation previously imposed by the same court (Thomas R. Daly, J.), upon a finding that defendant had violated the conditions thereof, and resentenced defendant to time served on his prior conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree.
ORDERED that the amended judgment is reversed, on the law and facts, the sentence imposed on December 21, 2010 is vacated, and the violation of probation petition is dismissed.
On June 22, 2009, defendant was convicted, upon his plea of guilty, of violating Penal Law § 220.03, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, and sentenced to three years' probation. On July 30, 2010, defendant's probation officer filed a violation of probation petition ( seeCPL 410.30).
At defendant's first appearance on the petition, the prosecutor, quoting a physician's letter which stated that defendant suffers from a “Schizoaffective Disorder,” recommended that defendant be examined to determine whether he is an incapacitated person ( seeCPL 730.10[2]; 730.30 [1] ). Pursuant to the City Court's order, defendant was subsequently examined by two psychologists, both of whom declared defendant a schizophrenic with auditory hallucinations who was lacking the cognitive capacity to understand the court proceedings and to assist his counsel with the defense. Defense counsel objected to any proceedings on the merits of the petition, owing to defendant's lack of capacity. The City Court noted the objection and ordered the violation of probation hearing to commence. Following the hearing, the City Court revoked the sentence of probation and entered an amended judgment resentencing defendant to time served.
On appeal, defendant does not raise any issue regarding the sufficiency of the testimony of defendant's probation officer to establish that defendant had committed acts which constituted a violation of the terms of his probation. The sole issue on this appeal is whether the City Court's failure to afford defendant a competency hearing as a predicate to a violation of probation proceeding denied him his right to due process. Agreeing that going forward with the violation of probation proceeding may have been “ill-advised” in light of the examination findings, the People argue that, because defendant has served his sentence, the appeal is moot. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that we may review the issue and that, as a matter of due process, defendant was entitled to a hearing to determine his competence to participate in a violation of probation proceeding before such a proceeding could go forward.
As a general rule, an appellate challenge to the propriety of a violation of probation determination is deemed to be moot if the defendant has served the sentence imposed pursuant to the amended judgment ( e.g. People v. Baker, 100 A.D.3d 1154, 1155, 954 N.Y.S.2d 236 [2012];People v. Pesce, 9 Misc.3d 138[A], 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 51749[U], 2005 WL 2803123 [App. Term, 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2005] ). However, whether defendant was entitled, as a matter of due process, to a preliminary determination as to competence before being subjected to such a proceeding is of importance to the criminal justice system ( People v. Fuller, 57 N.Y.2d 152, 156 n. 2, 455 N.Y.S.2d 253, 441 N.E.2d 563 [1982] ) and is sufficiently likely to recur but to evade appellate review, owing to the mootness doctrine, to require review of the claim's merits ( Lopez v. Evans, 104 A.D.3d 105, 107–08 n. 2, 957 N.Y.S.2d 59 [1st Dept. 2012];Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 714, 431 N.Y.S.2d 400, 409 N.E.2d 876 [1980] ). Consequently, the issue presented herein falls within the exception to the mootness doctrine.
A trial court may, sua sponte, order a competency examination when it has reasonable grounds to suspect that a defendant, charged with a violation of probation, suffers from a mental disease or defect sufficient to deprive him or her of the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist in the defense (CPL 730.10[1]; People v. Veneziano, 62 A.D.3d 588, 878 N.Y.S.2d 888 [1st Dept. 2009];People v. Costanza, 36 A.D.3d 829, 829 N.Y.S.2d 160 [2d Dept. 2007];People v. Ramirez, 29 A.D.3d 1022, 815 N.Y.S.2d 480 [2d Dept. 2006];see generally People v. Tortorici, 92 N.Y.2d 757, 686 N.Y.S.2d 346, 709 N.E.2d 87 [1999] ). Given the examination results, it was error for the City Court to decline to hold a competency hearing to determine defendant's fitness to participate in a violation of probation proceeding.
There remains a question as to whether, following a hearing wherein a defendant is found incompetent, a violation of probation proceeding may go forward. In the rather analogous context of a revocation of parole proceeding, there are “certain older decisions” ( Lopez v. Evans, 104 A.D.3d 105, 107–10, 957 N.Y.S.2d 59) from the Appellate Division, Third and Fourth Departments, which hold that a parolee's mental competence is not a condition precedent to a revocation hearing ( People ex rel. Newcomb v. Metz, 64 A.D.2d 219, 223, 409 N.Y.S.2d 554 [3d Dept. 1978];People ex rel. Porter v. Smith, 71 A.D.2d 1056, 420 N.Y.S.2d 817 [4th Dept. 1979] ) but is merely a factor to be considered “in mitigation of, or as an excuse for, the charged violation” ( Matter of McCants v. Travis, 291 A.D.2d 594, 596, 737 N.Y.S.2d 416 [3d Dept. 2002] ). However, in Lopez, the Appellate Division, First Department, rejected this “older” line of cases and held that “the basic requirements of due process applicable to a parole revocation proceeding” require a predicate determination of competence before the revocation proceeding may commence ( Lopez v. Evans, 104 A.D.3d 105, 107–08, 957 N.Y.S.2d 59). We now hold that the considerations underlying the determination in Lopez are equally applicable to probation violation proceedings and that an alleged violation of probation may not be adjudicated while a defendant is incompetent. Violation of probation hearings are summary in nature (CPL 410.70[3] ), and a violation finding need only be based on a preponderance of the evidence (CPL 410.70[5]; e.g. People v. Fusco, 91 A.D.3d 984, 985, 936 N.Y.S.2d 360 [2012] ), which may include hearsay ( People v. Bevilacqua, 91 A.D.3d 1120, 1121, 936 N.Y.S.2d 397 [2012] ), rendering due process considerations of particular importance in this context.
In light of the fact that defendant has served his sentence, the violation of probation petition must be dismissed ( see Lopez v. Evans, 104 A.D.3d 105, 957 N.Y.S.2d 59).
Accordingly, the amended judgment is reversed, the sentence imposed on December 21, 2010 is vacated, and the violation of probation petition is dismissed.