Opinion
Argued January 9, 1976
Decided February 10, 1976
Appeal from the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department, MICHAEL M. SKODNICK, J.
Carolyn Wheat, William E. Hellerstein and William J. Gallagher for appellant.
Nicholas Ferraro, District Attorney (William G. Schrager of counsel), for respondent.
MEMORANDUM.
The order of the Appellate Term should be affirmed.
The information which defendant challenges charged him both with assault and with harassment, although it specified no subsection of the statute governing the latter offense (Penal Law, § 240.25). CPL 100.15 in no way alters our holding in People v Todaro ( 26 N.Y.2d 325) that, when a general reference to the charge of harassment is accompanied by factual detail sufficient to describe the elements of a violation of any subsection of that statute, a defendant has received all the notice that due process requires (see In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257).
Here the supporting factual allegations in the information provided such notice, since they referred to a specific and well-defined incident, in the course of which defendant allegedly struck the complaining witness with a length of pipe (see Penal Law, § 240.25, subd 1). Moreover, while harassment had been held not to be a lesser included offense to assault (People v Moyer, 27 N.Y.2d 252; but see People v Stanfield, 36 N.Y.2d 467, 473 ; People v Cionek, 35 N.Y.2d 924; People v Hayes, 35 N.Y.2d 907, affg 43 A.D.2d 99), there is such an "intimate relation" between the two offenses that the same factual allegations could, under circumstances like those presented here, form the basis of an information as to either one (People v Grimes, 35 N.Y.2d 908, 910).
Chief Judge BREITEL and Judges JASEN, GABRIELLI, JONES, WACHTLER, FUCHSBERG and COOKE concur.
Order affirmed in a memorandum.