Opinion
C084165
03-15-2018
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. CM034411)
Defendant Roger Coble, a mentally disordered offender, appeals his involuntary commitment to the State Department of Mental Health. He argues the trial court violated his constitutional right to a jury trial by failing to personally advise him and obtain his personal waiver of that right. He also argues insufficient evidence supported the trial court's extension of his commitment. We agree with defendant's first argument, and therefore need not consider his second. Accordingly, we reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 26, 2014, defendant pled no contest to one count of felony assault. He was sentenced to four years in prison with over three years of credit for time served, which he earned while gaining competency. On July 11, 2014, defendant was admitted to Atascadero State Hospital as a mentally disordered offender. He has remained in treatment since, with annual evaluations to monitor his condition.
On December 22, 2016, the prison medical director asked the district attorney to petition for defendant's continued involuntary treatment as a mentally disordered offender. The district attorney filed a petition under Penal Code section 2970, which applies to prisoners whose parole is about to end. The trial court held a hearing on February 1, 2017, to review the petition. At the hearing, the trial court received the district attorney's petition and the medical director's affidavit and accompanying evaluation of defendant's mental state. The parties stipulated the court could receive the report and affidavit into evidence.
Subsequent undesignated section references are to the Penal Code. --------
Based on this evidence and pursuant to section 2972, the court found defendant has "a severe mental disorder, which is not in remission, or cannot be kept in remission without treatment, and does represent a substantial danger of physical harm to others" and ordered a one-year involuntary commitment. (Cf. § 2972, subd. (c) ["If the court or jury finds that the patient has a severe mental disorder, that the patient's severe mental disorder is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment, and that by reason of his or her severe mental disorder, the patient represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others, the court shall order the patient recommitted"].)
The defendant was not present at the hearing and defense counsel had not consulted with him beforehand. Despite this, the trial court accepted defense counsel's waiver of defendant's right to a trial by jury.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to advise him personally of his right to a trial by jury and by accepting defense counsel's waiver of that right in lieu of defendant's personal waiver. Defendant therefore asks us to reverse the recommitment order. The People concede the trial court erred, but ask us to reverse and remand for a hearing on defendant's capacity to waive his right to a jury trial. We accept the People's concession, but agree with defendant that reversal is required.
Section 2972, subdivision (a) requires a hearing for involuntary commitment petitions submitted under section 2970. At the hearing, the court "shall advise the person of his or her right . . . to a jury trial." (§ 2972, subd. (a).) The default trier of fact under section 2972 is a jury, but the court can evaluate the evidence in a bench trial if both the prosecutor and the defendant himself waives the right to a jury trial. (Ibid; People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1124 ["defendant [must] personally waive his or her right to a jury trial before the court may hold a bench trial"].)
Failure to advise a mentally disordered prisoner personally of his right to a trial by jury and to obtain his personal waiver of that right at a section 2972 hearing is a " 'miscarriage of justice' " under article VI, section 13 of the state Constitution and warrants automatic reversal. (People v. Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1134.) Relying on counsel's waiver instead of obtaining a defendant's personal waiver deprives a defendant of his right to choose a jury trial and undermines the validity of the entire proceeding. As our Supreme Court explained, " '[i]t is an essential part of justice that the question of guilt or innocence shall be determined by an orderly legal procedure, in which the substantial rights belonging to defendants shall be respected.' " (Id. at p. 1139 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).) There is no way to apply harmless error analysis to an invalid waiver. (Id. at pp. 1135-1136.) The error therefore requires automatic reversal. (Ibid.)
The People urge us, however, to remand the case for a hearing to determine defendant's capacity to waive his right to a jury trial at the time of the 2017 hearing. The People argue Blackburn allows this remedy and a remand would "serve the interests of judicial economy" because it might allow the prosecution to avoid a trial. We do not find that Blackburn allows a remand for a hearing in this case to determine defendant's capacity to waive his rights, and judicial economy must give way to defendant's constitutional rights.
In Blackburn, our Supreme Court allowed a remand because "the trial court and the parties may have reasonably relied on . . . prior law in proceeding with a bench trial without making a record of Blackburn's personal waiver or his inability to make a knowing and voluntary waiver." (People v. Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1137.) This remedy applied "to all cases presently on direct appeal," implying subsequent judgments in violation of the holding would be automatically reversed. (Ibid.) Blackburn was filed on August 17, 2015. (Id. at p. 1113.) Defendant's involuntary treatment hearing occurred on February 2, 2017, well after Blackburn was decided. This case was not on appeal when Blackburn was decided, so we must reverse the involuntary commitment order. (See People v. Blancett (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1207.)
Defendant also argues the trial court violated his due process rights by involuntarily committing him without substantial evidence that his mental disorder made him unable to control his dangerous behavior. Because we find the trial court's judgment procedurally defective, we do not reach this issue.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.
/s/_________
Robie, Acting P. J. We concur: /s/_________
Butz, J. /s/_________
Hoch, J.