Opinion
A149841
03-23-2018
In re C.H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C.H., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J16-00611)
In this appeal from a disposition order declaring her a ward of the juvenile court, C.H. (Minor) challenges probation conditions that allow searches of her electronic devices and required her detention in juvenile hall for one weekend. We shall affirm the order.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The factual summary is taken from the probation officer's report.
On December 9, 2015, at about 4:20 a.m., Antioch Police Department officers responded to a report that a vehicle had crashed into a residence. Arriving at the scene, officers learned that Minor drove into one or more fences at a residence. Minor had two passengers in the vehicle at the time. The police found three bottles of alcohol in the vehicle. One of the bottles had been opened and was almost empty. Minor reportedly smelled of alcohol, admitted she had been drinking, performed poorly on field sobriety tests, and was arrested. Subsequent testing confirmed she had a 0.17 percent blood alcohol level.
When the probation officer interviewed her after the accident, Minor said that one of her passengers, E.G., then 19 years old, texted Minor earlier in the evening about getting together to drink and "hang out," and that she (Minor) snuck out of her house later while her parents were sleeping. Minor told the probation officer that she, E.G., and the second passenger sat drinking outside E.G.'s father's car until E.G. became too intoxicated to stand, and asked Minor to drive them home. Minor was 17 years old at the time, and had no prior sustained offenses. Minor lived with her parents, siblings, and extended family, with whom she had a good relationship.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In August 2016, the prosecution filed a juvenile wardship petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), alleging that Minor committed three misdemeanors: driving while under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)) (count one); driving while having a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent or greater (id., § 23152, subd. (b)) (count two); and giving false information to a peace officer (id., § 31) (count three). As to counts one and two, there was a special allegation that Minor's blood alcohol content had been above 0.15 percent.
On September 22, 2016, Minor pled no contest to count one, and counts two and three were dismissed. On October 20, 2016, the juvenile court adjudged Minor a ward of the court and placed her on probation. The court imposed various conditions recommended by probation, including conditions requiring that Minor: be at her legal residence between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m. unless accompanied by a parent; refrain from using or possessing any illegal drugs or alcohol; and submit to drug and alcohol testing. Additionally, the court imposed a probation condition requiring Minor to "[s]ubmit all electronic devices under [her] control to a search of any text messages, voicemail messages, call logs, photographs, e-mail accounts and social media accounts, with or without a search warrant, at any time of the day or night, and provide the probation or peace officer with any passwords necessary to access the information specified" (the electronics search condition). Although Minor's counsel argued there was no evidence linking cell phone usage to the offense here, the probation officer pointed out Minor had used texting to arrange the meeting to drink alcohol, and she argued the electronics search requirement would allow probation to monitor any further communications regarding such behavior. The juvenile court agreed, finding the texting provided a nexus between the offense and the electronics search condition.
The prosecution dismissed count three, acknowledging that a different person provided false information to the police.
The probation officer had also recommended Minor be ordered detained in juvenile hall for two weekends. Minor's counsel asked the court not to impose detention, observing that adults convicted of the same offense could avoid detention by joining the sheriff's office Work Alternative Program, and that Minor had been on the right track since her arrest, had brought her grades up, and was on course to graduate. The probation officer disagreed, contending that detention was required under Vehicle Code section 23536, and that Minor's conduct had been serious, because her blood alcohol content had been high and she had placed herself, her passengers, and the community at risk. The prosecutor agreed weekend detention should be required, citing the probation officer's report that Minor had been in a fight at school in recent months. The prosecutor also contended Minor had not fully accepted responsibility for the crash, as she told the probation officer it happened because the car radio was turned up too high, causing her to blackout. The juvenile court judge applauded Minor for improving her school grades, but ordered her to spend one weekend detained in juvenile hall, reasoning that this would help her to realize the consequences of her actions. This timely appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Electronics Search Condition
Minor contends the electronics search condition imposed here is unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent), superseded on other grounds as stated in People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 290, and unconstitutionally overbroad. She does not ask us to strike the condition, however, but, instead, seeks its modification, proposing language that would make it virtually identical to the modified condition that our colleagues in Division One, in In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288 (P.O.), upheld as valid under Lent and constitutionally sound. (Id. at pp. 291-292.) The electronics search condition imposed here was narrower than the one imposed in P.O., however, and Minor does not explain how her proposed modification would narrow its scope in any practical way. Nor are we convinced modification is necessary or appropriate here. For these reasons, we deny Minor's modification request and affirm the order imposing the existing condition.
As the parties acknowledge, the California Supreme Court has granted review in several cases to determine the validity of electronic devices search conditions like the one imposed here. (See, e.g., In re Ricardo P., review granted Feb. 17, 2016, S230923.)
1. Validity Under Lent
The juvenile court "may impose and require any and all reasonable [probation] conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd. (b).) " ' "The state, when it asserts jurisdiction over a minor, stands in the shoes of the parents" [citation], thereby occupying a "unique role . . . in caring for the minor's well-being." [Citation.] . . . [¶] The permissible scope of discretion in formulating terms of juvenile probation is even greater than that allowed for adults. "[E]ven where there is an invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults . . . .' " [Citation.] This is because juveniles are deemed to be "more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor's constitutional rights are more circumscribed." [Citation.] Thus, " ' "a condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper for an adult probationer may be permissible for a minor under the supervision of the juvenile court." ' " [Citations.]' [Citation.] [¶] We review the juvenile court's probation conditions for abuse of discretion, and such discretion will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse. [Citations.]" (In re Erica R. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 907, 912 (Erica R.).)
Although a juvenile court has broad discretion to impose probation conditions, its discretion has limits. "Under Lent, [supra, 15 Cal.3d 481] which applies to both juvenile and adult probationers, a condition is 'invalid [if] it "(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality." ' [Citations.] 'This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.' [Citation.]" (P.O., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 294.)
Here, Minor effectively concedes that the first prong of the Lent test is not met, i.e., that there is a relationship between the electronic search condition and her offense. Specifically, Minor agrees she used an electronic device (texting on her cell phone) to plan an activity (meeting friends late at night to hang out and drink) that culminated in her commission of the offense (driving while under the influence). Although she variously characterizes this connection as "attenuated" and "tangential," she does not assert there is "no relationship" between the electronics search condition here and her offense.
In her opening brief, Minor instead objects that the electronics search condition is not related to her offense insofar as it applies to (unspecified) electronic devices that cannot be used to send text messages or to communications other than text messages. But this objection focuses on the scope, rather than the existence, of a relationship and, therefore, is more appropriately raised and addressed in the context of Minor's argument about constitutional overbreadth, discussed below. Although there have been numerous cases addressing the propriety of juvenile courts imposing electronics search conditions, Minor cites none in which a court considered the scope of a relationship between an electronics search condition and an offense in applying the first prong of the Lent test. Instead, in her opening brief, she cites cases in which courts emphasized there was no relationship at all. (Erica R., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 912; In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 754.) Those cases are inapposite.
Minor's reply brief does not fill this void. In the portion of that brief nominally dedicated to analysis of the first prong of the Lent test, Minor relies entirely on reasoning and case law that is relevant instead to her claim of constitutional overbreadth. After first acknowledging the existence of a connection between the text message she sent on her cell phone and her subsequent delinquent conduct—rather than analyzing Lent, or asserting that the electronics search condition is invalid—Minor instead contends we should modify the scope of the condition here as the court did in P.O., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at page 298, after it concluded the condition there was unconstitutionally overbroad. Minor also cites In re M.F. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 489, which exclusively involved a claim of constitutional overbreadth, without any attendant Lent challenge to the electronics search condition there in question. (Id. at p. 493.)
In P.O., the court concluded that a broader electronics search condition—which extended, without qualification, to all electronic devices and all included content—was valid under Lent because it was reasonably related to future criminality, in that it allowed the probation officer to effectively supervise the juvenile's compliance with other probation conditions. (P.O., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 291, 295-296.)
As Minor does not here dispute the existence of a relationship between her usage of electronic devices and the offense, we decline to rule that the juvenile court abused its discretion in imposing the electronic search condition. (See P.O., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 294 [all three prongs of the Lent test must be satisfied " 'before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term' "].) In light of our conclusion on this point, we need not address the parties' respective arguments about whether the electronics search condition satisfied the third prong of the Lent test, by requiring or forbidding conduct that is not " 'reasonably related to future criminality.' " (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.)
2. Overbreadth
As noted, Minor also challenges the electronics search condition on grounds that it is unconstitutionally overbroad. "When a probation condition imposes limitations on a person's constitutional rights, it ' "must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition" '—that is, the probationer's reformation and rehabilitation—' "to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad." ' [Citations.] 'The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the [probationer]'s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.' [Citation.] ' " 'Even conditions which infringe on constitutional rights may not be invalid [as long as they are] tailored specifically to meet the needs of the juvenile.' " ' [Citations.]" (P.O., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 297.) "Whether a probation condition is unconstitutionally overbroad presents a question of law reviewed de novo." (Ibid.)
Minor here asserts that the juvenile court imposed the electronics search condition automatically, without tailoring it to fit the circumstances of her case or attempting to restrict its impact on her constitutional rights. As a result, she contends, the condition was unconstitutionally overbroad, impermissibly infringing her privacy rights and her right to freedom of expression. Further, in arbitrarily imposing the broader condition, Minor contends, the juvenile court infringed on her statutory privacy rights under California's Electronic Communications Privacy Act (Pen. Code, § 1546 et seq.) (ECPA) and the federal Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C., § 2701 et seq.) (SCA) and, by extension, violated her constitutional liberty interests.
In her opening brief, Minor concedes that the electronics search condition is constitutionally valid insofar as it allows searches of text messages on her electronic devices, in light of the connection between her texting and the offense. But, she asserts the condition is unconstitutionally overbroad insofar as it also allows searches of "voicemail messages, call logs, photographs, e-mail accounts and social media accounts." This broader condition impermissibly allowed probation to search " 'metadata' " about her communications, Minor contends, for example, reviewing information about the telephone numbers she dials, the length of her calls, the location of those receiving her calls, and the identity of her e-mail recipients.
The People do not agree that the broader condition was unconstitutionally overbroad. They cite In re Q.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1231, review granted April 12, 2017, S240222. There the court concluded that an identically worded electronics search condition was not unconstitutionally overbroad. (Id. at pp. 1234, 1236.) In doing so, it specifically rejected the minor's argument that the condition was not sufficiently tailored to that case because, although the minor's offense only involved one type of electronic device, a cell phone, the condition also allowed probation searches of other electronic devices. (Id. at p. 1236.) The court concluded that extending the electronics search condition to other devices was reasonable because it ensured the minor was not violating his probation, and circumventing supervision, by using other devices. (Id. at p. 1237.) As drafted, the court concluded, "the condition [was] directed at preventing minor from engaging in the very conduct that brought him under the court's supervision, while providing probation officers with flexibility in dealing with technological capabilities." (Ibid.)
In her reply brief, Minor responds by adjusting her position. Instead of requesting modification to limit searches to her text messages, she instead requests the modification Division One adopted in P.O., limiting searches of her " 'cell phone data and electronic accounts to media of communication[s] reasonably likely to reveal whether [she] is boasting about drug [or alcohol] use or otherwise involved with drugs [or alcohol].' " (P.O., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 298.) Minor, however, does not explain how the proposed modification would improve upon, or even narrow, the existing search condition. Neither the proposed nor the existing condition contains a limit on the types of device that may be searched. Nor does Minor suggest that the proposed modification would prevent probation—in searching for future boasts about drug or alcohol usage—from reviewing communications contained in the electronic applications allowed under the existing search condition, i.e., voicemail messages, photographs, e-mail accounts, and social media accounts. Review of those applications and of Minor's call logs additionally would be justifiable to monitor compliance with the separate probation condition directing her to refrain from future contact with certain individuals, for example, E.G., a condition that Minor does not challenge. As Minor effectively concedes that application of the modified electronics search condition approved in P.O. would be constitutionally permissible here, and as she provides no reasoned basis for concluding that proposed condition differs materially from the existing search condition, we are unconvinced modification is required.
In declining to modify the electronics condition as Minor requests, we also note that the existing condition here is not so broad as the one imposed in other cases that she cites, including In re J.B., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th 749. The electronics search condition there was entirely unrestricted, broadly allowing warrantless searches of " '[the minor's] electronics including [his] passwords' " without qualification. (Id. at p. 752.) Here, as discussed, the existing condition authorized searches of Minor's text messages, voicemail messages, call logs, photographs, e-mail accounts, and social media accounts. Unlike in J.B., however, it is not so broadly written that it would encompass other common electronic programs or applications typically containing private information, for example, about Internet searches or purchases, calendar appointments, health or banking records, or map searches.
We also reject Minor's suggestion that the juvenile court acted automatically in imposing the electronics search condition that probation recommended. Before entering its order, the court allowed both parties and probation to address and discuss probation's recommendations without limitation. Additionally, as he issued his order, the juvenile court judge included remarks specifically directed at Minor, acknowledging and applauding her recently improved school grades, cautioning her against any future drug use as it was "really bad for the developing brain," and earnestly counseling her about the tragic consequences that could result if she repeated her offense conduct in the future. The judge obviously was informed of and familiar with the facts of Minor's case when he entered his order.
Finally, we reject Minor's poorly developed argument that the electronics search condition was unconstitutionally overbroad because it restricted her statutory rights under the ECPA and SCA and, by extension, necessarily infringed her constitutional liberty rights. Minor's counsel did not reference either statute before the juvenile court and, therefore, forfeited any statutory claim she may have had. (See, e.g., In re M.V. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1508; People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 424.) To the extent she attempts an argument that the electronics search condition is overbroad and facially unconstitutional because it infringes her liberty interest (see, e.g., In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888 [allowing an argument on appeal that a probation condition is facially overbroad]), we reject it because it is not sufficiently developed or supported. (See, e.g., Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106 [appellate courts are not required "to examine undeveloped claims, nor to make arguments for [the] parties"].)
The argument relies on Minor's cursory assertion that the electronics search condition violated her statutory rights under the ECPA and SCA. Minor does not quote any specific provision of either law that she contends prohibits the electronics search condition, however, or cite any case law or other legal authority concluding that an electronics search probation condition would violate either law. Further, as Minor herself acknowledges, the ECPA now provides that a government entity may access electronic device information "if the device is seized from an authorized possessor of the device who is subject to an electronic device search as a clear and unambiguous condition of probation." (Pen. Code, § 1546.1, subd. (c)(10), italics added; see Stats. 2016, ch. 541, § 3.5, eff. Jan. 1, 2017.) Minor does not suggest the condition here was unclear or ambiguous, but simply assumes that the amendment did not apply because it took effect after her disposition hearing. This is not always true. A statute that merely clarifies existing law, for example, " 'does not operate retrospectively even if applied to transactions predating its enactment.' " (In re J.C. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1476.) As Minor does not cite any specific provision of either law that she claims the condition violated, or address the effect of the 2016 amendment to the ECPA allowing probation conditions of the kind imposed here, she fails to establish a predicate statutory violation.
Minor's attempt to demonstrate that any statutory violation infringed her constitutional right to liberty is similarly undeveloped. On this point, she simply cites two appellate decisions, without discussion or explanatory parenthetical. In the cited cases, the courts concluded that violations of other statutes implicated constitutional liberty interests. (See Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346-347 [by ignoring the defendant's statutory right to have a jury fix his punishment, the trial court potentially extended his sentence by as much as 30 years, thereby infringing his liberty interest]; Fetterly v. Paskett (9th Cir. 1993) 997 F.2d 1295, 1299-1300 [the state's failure "to abide by its own statutory commands" in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed implicated the defendant's liberty interest].) We do not read either case as announcing a broad rule that any alleged statutory violation in the sentencing context, including those related to probation searches, necessarily implicates a constitutional liberty interest.
B. Weekend Detention in Juvenile Hall
Finally, Minor contends the juvenile court erred in ordering her to spend a weekend detained in juvenile hall under Vehicle Code section 23536, subdivision (a), because that provision only applies to adults. Although the question has become moot, because Minor already has served her time, she urges us to address the issue nonetheless, contending the question "is of continuing public importance and is one ' " 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.' " ' [Citations.]" (In re Christina A. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1158-1159.) The People do not dispute this point, but instead assert that Minor forfeited the question because she did not raise it before the juvenile court. Minor disagrees, pointing out that she did object to the detention order, although on other grounds, and regardless, she asks that we exercise our discretion to decide the point as it is a purely legal issue. " 'As a general rule, a new theory may not be presented for the first time on appeal unless it raises only a question of law and can be decided based on undisputed facts.' [Citations.]" (In re P.C. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 279, 287.) The question here—whether section 23536 applies in a juvenile case—is one of statutory interpretation and does not implicate any disputed fact. Accordingly, we exercise our discretion to consider Minor's argument on the merits.
All unspecified statutory references in this section are to the Vehicle Code.
Before the juvenile court, Minor conceded that section 23436 applied to both juveniles and adults, but asserted that detention was neither required nor appropriate here.
We review the juvenile court's statutory interpretation de novo. (In re Damien (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 16, 20.) " 'As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose.' [Citation.] We begin by examining the statutory language because the words of a statute are generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citations.] We give the words of the statute their ordinary and usual meaning and view them in their statutory context. [Citation.] We harmonize the various parts of the enactment by considering them in the context of the statutory framework as a whole. [Citations.] 'If the statute's text evinces an unmistakable plain meaning, we need go no further.' [Citation.]" (In re C.H. (2011) 53 Cal.4th 94, 100.) Section 23536 provides that, "[i]f a person is convicted of a first violation of Section 23152"—driving under the influence—"that person shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than 96 hours, at least 48 hours of which shall be continuous, nor more than six months, and by a fine of not less than three hundred ninety dollars ($390), nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000)." (§ 23536, subd. (a).)
In her opening brief, Minor relies entirely on one point in contending that section 23536 only applies to adults. Her point is linguistic and it turns on the section's use of a single word. The word is "convicted." That term, Minor points out, is typically associated with adult proceedings. Juveniles are not convicted; rather, their wrongdoing is " 'adjudicat[ed].' " (See, e.g., In re Joseph B. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 952, 955; Welf. & Inst., § 203 ["An order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose"].) By using the term "convicted," Minor contends, the Legislature necessarily signaled that section 23536 applies exclusively to adults. The juvenile court erred, therefore, Minor contends, in ordering her weekend detention.
As the People point out, and as Minor's own authority confirms, however, the mere appearance of the word "convicted" in a statute is not dispositive on this issue. In In re Damien V., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th 16, for example, in a passage that Minor quotes, the court observed that a statutory reference to a "conviction . . . might indicate" the statute applied only to adults, not to juvenile defendants. (Id. at p. 21, italics added.) But, the court also acknowledged case law reaching a contrary conclusion in interpreting other statutes. (Id. at p. 22.) Further, the court there ultimately reached the same (contrary) conclusion, holding that Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (d)—an alternate penalty provision that uses the term "conviction" and contains no reference to juvenile adjudications (id. at pp. 20, 22)—"applies to juveniles as well as adults," based on its analysis of "[Penal Code] section 186.22 as a whole and its subdivisions, the purpose of Proposition 21 (the initiative which enacted the current version of [Penal Code] § 186.22, subd. (d)), and the other statutes added or amended by Proposition 21." (Id. at p. 19; see also, e.g., In re Jovan B. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 801, 807 [holding that Penal Code section 12022.1 "on bail" enhancement applies in juvenile court proceedings so as to extend the maximum period of physical confinement of a juvenile ward]; In re E.G. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 871, 875-880 [holding that Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b)(3), allowing reduction of "wobbler" offense to misdemeanor upon grant of probation, applies in juvenile proceedings].)
Minor presented no comparable statutory analysis in her opening brief affirmatively demonstrating that the juvenile court erred in interpreting section 23536 as applying to juveniles. She, therefore, failed to meet her burden on appeal. (See, e.g., In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 498-499 [it is a " 'cardinal principle of appellate review' " that " ' " 'error must be affirmatively shown' " ' "].) Although, in her reply brief, Minor belatedly presents new legal arguments based on the surrounding statutory framework, the section's legislative history, and relevant principles of juvenile law, we decline to consider those arguments because they were not timely made. (See, e.g., SCI California Funeral Services, Inc. v. Five Bridges Foundation (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 549, 573, fn. 18 ["appellant cannot salvage a forfeited argument by belatedly addressing the argument in its reply brief"]; In re Marriage of Khera & Sameer (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1477 [" 'Obvious reasons of fairness militate against consideration of an issue raised initially in the reply brief of an appellant' "]; Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847, 894-895, fn. 10 [points raised in reply brief for first time will not be considered unless good cause is shown for failure to raise them earlier].)
Further, even if we were to consider those belated arguments, we would reject them because they include significant misstatements about the law. For example, section 23536 is located in chapter 2 ("Court Penalties") of division 11.5 ("Sentencing for Driving While Under the Influence"). (See Stats. 1998, ch. 118, § 84, pp. 772-814 [adding division 11.5 under that title].) Minor notes that chapter 1 of the same division (§ 23500 et seq.) expressly addresses the penalties for driving while under the influence for " 'persons less than 21 years of age.' " (§ 23500.) She asserts that none of the statutes included in chapter 1 reference or incorporate section 23536. This is incorrect. Section 23514—located in article 3 of chapter 1 (§ 23509 et seq.)—explicitly references section 23536. It provides in relevant part as follows: "If a person . . . is adjudged a ward of the juvenile court for . . . a violation of Section . . . 23152 [Minor's offense here] punishable under Section 23536 , . . . and is granted probation, the court may order . . . that the . . . ward participate in the [Youthful Drunk Driver Visitation Program]," if the ward consents. (§ 23514, italics added.) The reference at least arguably suggests the Legislature anticipated and intended that a ward of the juvenile court would be "punish[ed] under Section 23536." (§ 23514.) Minor does not address this point.
Other provisions of the Vehicle Code compel the conclusion that, contrary to Minor's argument, the Legislature drew no distinction between a juvenile adjudication for a driving while under the influence offense and a "conviction." For example, section 23521 provides that any finding of a juvenile court judge, juvenile hearing officer, or referee of a juvenile court of a commission of an offense in any other state that, if committed in California, would be a violation of section 23152, "is a conviction of a violation of Section 23152" for purposes of the suspension or revocation of the minor's driving privileges. (Italics added.) Likewise, section 13352.3, subdivision (a) provides that the Department of Motor Vehicles shall immediately revoke the driving privilege of any person upon receipt of a court record "showing that the person was convicted in violation of Section 23152 or 23153 while under 18 years of age, or upon receipt of a report of a judge of the juvenile court, a juvenile hearing officer, or a referee of a juvenile court showing that the person has been found to have committed a violation of Section 23152 or 23153." (Italics added.) This statutory language plainly illustrates that the Legislature equated a driving while under the influence adjudication against a minor with a "conviction."
For these reasons, we reject Minor's argument that section 23536 exclusively applies to adults.
IV. DISPOSITION
The disposition order is affirmed.
/s/_________
Schulman, J. We concur: /s/_________
Reardon, Acting P.J. /s/_________
Streeter, J.
Judge of the Superior Court of California, City and County of San Francisco, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. --------