Opinion
January 22, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Beerman, J.).
Ordered that the judgment and the order are affirmed.
On the evening of September 23, 1985, the defendant, armed with a shotgun, rifle, and hunting knife, proceeded to the home of his former wife and fired numerous shots through the windows and doors of the premises. One of these shots struck his former wife, wounding her in the leg and buttocks. On appeal the defendant contends, inter alia, that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel in defending himself against a charge of attempted murder in the second degree stemming from the shooting of his wife based upon his attorney's reliance on a lack of intent rather than an extreme emotional disturbance defense. We disagree.
It is well settled that a reviewing court must look at the totality of the evidence as to the circumstances of a particular case and to applicable law in determining whether a defendant has been provided with the effective assistance of counsel, and must "`avoid both confusing true ineffectiveness * * * with mere losing tactics and according undue significance to retrospective analysis'" (People v. Satterfield, 66 N.Y.2d 796, 798; People v Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137; People v. Sanchez, 148 A.D.2d 760). The courts will not "second-guess whether a course chosen by [a] defendant's counsel was the best trial strategy, or even a good one, so long as defendant was afforded meaningful representation" (People v. Satterfield, supra, at 799-800). Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the defendant was afforded meaningful representation by a well-prepared attorney who pursued a reasonable trial strategy which resulted in the acquittal of the defendant on other charges including four counts of attempted murder in the first degree. The record further indicates that trial counsel's decision not to pursue the defense of extreme emotional disturbance constituted legitimate trial strategy (see, People v. Sanchez, supra; People v. Harris, 109 A.D.2d 351, 361-362), particularly in light of the psychiatric evaluation prepared at counsel's request that opined that the defendant was not suffering from extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the shooting (see, People v. Harris, supra).
Further, contrary to the defendant's contention, the evidence adduced at trial which established that he fired a shot from his rifle at four police officers who responded to the scene of the shooting, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, was legally sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of four counts of attempted assault in the first degree and one count of reckless endangerment in the first degree (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621; see also, People v. Coello, 111 A.D.2d 866; People v. Rodriguez, 121 A.D.2d 409). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
The defendant's contention that the trial court's verdict was repugnant is unpreserved for appellate review (see, People v Alfaro, 66 N.Y.2d 985; People v. Hillmon, 154 A.D.2d 887; People v Baldwin, 130 A.D.2d 666) and we decline to reach it in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction.
We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions, including his allegation that the sentence imposed was excessive, and find that they are either unpreserved for appellate review or are without merit. Bracken, J.P., Lawrence, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.