Opinion
H047110
05-29-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JONATHAN MICHAEL CASH, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. F24863)
In 2016, defendant Jonathan Michael Cash pleaded no contest to multiple offenses and was sentenced to an 11-year prison term. The trial court also imposed various fines and fees as part of defendant's sentence. Defendant did not appeal and his judgment of conviction became final.
In 2019, defendant (acting pro per) filed a motion requesting that his fines be reduced by $125 for each day he had been in custody, citing Penal Code section 2900.5, subdivision (a). The trial court denied that motion without hearing or comment on May 17, 2019. Defendant now appeals from the denial of his motion.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
On appeal, defendant (now represented by appointed counsel) argues that (1) section 1237.2 conferred jurisdiction on the trial court to consider his postjudgment motion and (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion without determining whether he had an ability to pay the fines and fees, citing People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157. Defendant has abandoned his misplaced reliance on section 2900.5, subdivision (a). The Attorney General responds that the appeal must be dismissed because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain defendant's postjudgment motion. We agree.
Section 2900.5, subdivision (a) provides that "all days of custody of the defendant . . . shall be credited upon his or her term of imprisonment, or credited to any base fine that may be imposed, at the rate of not less than [$125] per day." Defendant is still serving his term of imprisonment and appears not to have any excess custody credits that could be applied to reduce a fine.
"Generally, once a judgment is rendered and execution of the sentence has begun, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence. [Citations.]" (People v. Torres (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1081, 1084 (Torres); People v. Turrin (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1207-1208 [applying the foregoing general rule to a request to modify a restitution fine].) "There are exceptions to the general rule. [For example, a] court may recall a sentence and resentence a defendant under certain circumstances within 120 days of the defendant's custody commitment. (§ 1170, subd. (d)(1).) Resentencing is also authorized under the circumstances specified in sections 1170.126, 1170.18, and 1170.95. Courts may correct computational and clerical errors at any time. [Citation.] Unauthorized sentences and ' " 'obvious legal errors at sentencing that are correctable without referring to factual findings in the record or remanding for further findings' " ' are correctable at any time. [Citations.]" (Torres, supra, at p. 1085.)
It is undisputed that the execution of defendant's sentence began before he filed the motion that is the subject of this appeal. Accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant that motion unless an exception to the general rule that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify a sentence after execution has begun applies. It is further undisputed that none of the established exceptions to that general rule is applicable. Instead, defendant argues that section 1237.2 expanded superior court jurisdiction to allow for the modification of fines, fees, and assessments even after a final judgment.
Section 1237.2 provides in full: "An appeal may not be taken by the defendant from a judgment of conviction on the ground of an error in the imposition or calculation of fines, penalty assessments, surcharges, fees, or costs unless the defendant first presents the claim in the trial court at the time of sentencing, or if the error is not discovered until after sentencing, the defendant first makes a motion for correction in the trial court, which may be made informally in writing. The trial court retains jurisdiction after a notice of appeal has been filed to correct any error in the imposition or calculation of fines, penalty assessments, surcharges, fees, or costs upon the defendant's request for correction. This section only applies in cases where the erroneous imposition or calculation of fines, penalty assessments, surcharges, fees, or costs are the sole issue on appeal."
Thus, section 1237.2 bars criminal appeals challenging only the imposition or calculation of fines, penalty assessments, surcharges, fees, or costs unless the claim of error has been raised first in the trial court. The provision's legislative history indicates that its purpose is to conserve judicial resources and avoid costly appeals. (Torres, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 1086.)
The second sentence of section 1237.2 does, by its plain terms, enlarge trial court jurisdiction. It states that "[t]he trial court retains jurisdiction after a notice of appeal has been filed to correct any error in the imposition or calculation of fines, penalty assessments, surcharges, fees, or costs upon the defendant's request for correction." That represents an expansion of trial court jurisdiction, as the general rule is that the filing of a valid notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction and vests jurisdiction in the appellate court. (People v. Alanis (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1472.)
Defendant asks us to construe section 1237.2 as perpetually vesting jurisdiction in the trial court to correct erroneous fines and fees, even if such errors are raised long after the time for direct appeal has elapsed. That construction is inconsistent with the statutory language, which provides for the retention of trial court jurisdiction "after a notice of appeal has been filed." (§ 1237.2.) Defendant's construction also is inconsistent with the statute's purpose of conserving judicial resources by limiting the number of direct appeals raising common sentencing errors. Permitting defendants to assert error in the trial court after the time for direct appeal has passed would require the expenditure of more judicial resources, not fewer. Finally, defendant's statutory construction is inconsistent with the legislative history of section 1237.2. That legislative history reveals that the second sentence of section 1237.2 "was added to address [the] concern . . . that a defendant who belatedly discovers an erroneous fine could be left without a remedy if he or she [were] precluded . . . from challenging the fine on appeal (for failing to raise it in the trial court) and precluded from correcting the error in the trial court because that court had lost jurisdiction over the case." (Torres, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 1087.) Thus, "the statute's second sentence furthers [its primary] purpose [of promoting judicial economy and efficiency] by giving trial courts the power to resolve [fines and fees] challenges notwithstanding [a] pending appeal. That purpose is not served by extending the trial court's jurisdiction to motions made after the conclusion of the direct appeal" or after the time to appeal has elapsed. (Ibid.)
In sum, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant defendant's motion to modify his fines and fees. Given that lack of jurisdiction, the court's order denying the motion is not appealable. (Torres, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 1084.)
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed.
/s/_________
ELIA, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
PREMO, Acting P.J. /s/_________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.