Opinion
H050411
11-06-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RAYMOND ANTHONY CARDENAS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 113917
Wilson, J.
In December 1986, Raymond Anthony Cardenas stabbed his ex-girlfriend Melissa Rainey to death with a knife after hiding in the backseat of her car. Cardenas, 20 years old at the time, was convicted of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) with a lying-in-wait special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) and personal use of a deadly weapon enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)). He was ultimately sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP).
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In June 2022, Cardenas filed a motion for an evidence preservation hearing (motion) pursuant to section 1203.01 and People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), seeking to make a record of mitigating evidence connected to his youth. The trial court denied the motion, holding that Cardenas is statutorily ineligible for such a hearing pursuant to section 3051, subdivision (h), because he was sentenced to LWOP for a controlling offense committed after he was 18 years of age.
On appeal, Cardenas concedes, as he did in the trial court, that section 3051, subdivision (h), categorically excludes individuals such as himself from the youth offender parole hearing he seeks. He argues, however, that the statute is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and California Constitutions by excluding youthful offenders sentenced to LWOP, but allowing youthful offenders sentenced to de facto LWOP to obtain a hearing.
We disagree and affirm.
We omit a further statement of facts, as this appeal does not raise any issues concerning the facts of the underlying offenses beyond those already summarized above. (People v. Mendez (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 347, 351, fn. 2.)
A. Applicable law and standard of review
1. Section 3051
In 2014, the Legislature enacted section 3051, "[i]n response to a series of decisions addressing Eighth Amendment limits on juvenile sentencing," such as Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, and Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48. (People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 197-198 (Sands), citing Sen. Bill No. 260 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2013, ch. 312, §§ 1, 4; In re Trejo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 972, 980981, &fn. 6 (In re Trejo).) "In its current form, the statute provides an opportunity for release (via youth offender parole hearings) to most persons convicted of crimes committed before the age of 26 in their 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration, depending on the sentence imposed for their' "[c]ontrolling offense." '" (Sands, supra, at p. 198, quoting § 3051, subds. (a)(2)(B), (b)(1)-(4).) A "controlling offense" is defined as the offense or enhancement of which the sentencing court imposed the longest term of imprisonment. (§ 3051, subd. (a)(2)(B).)
Section 3051 thus was originally enacted" 'explicitly to bring juvenile sentencing into conformity with Graham [and] Miller' as well as decisions from the California Supreme Court." (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 198, quoting Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261, 277.) As the Legislature explained, "recent developments in neuroscience showed that 'youthfulness both lessens a juvenile's moral culpability and enhances the prospect that, as a youth matures into an adult and neurological development occurs,' such individuals can, by demonstrating rehabilitation and maturity, become contributing members of society." (Sands, supra, at p. 198, citing Sen. Bill No. 260 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1.)
Initially, section 3051 "limited eligibility for youth offender parole hearings to juvenile offenders (although it excluded juveniles sentenced to life without the possibility of parole)." (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 198, citing People v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 346 (Morales).) "However, the Legislature later amended it to apply to most offenders who committed crimes before the age of 23, and then before the age of 26." (Sands, supra, at p. 198, citing In re Trejo, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 981, fn. 6; Sen. Bill No. 261 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2015, ch. 471, § 1; Sen. Bill No. 394 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2017, ch. 684, § 1.5.)
"In broadening the statute's reach, our Legislature again cited recent developments in neuroscience that indicate the maturity process does not end at 18 and that, in many cases, brain development involved in decision making and impulse control extends into one's early 20s." (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 198, citing People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 776-777 (Acosta); In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 434 (Williams).) "The Legislature also amended section 3051 to allow parole hearings, in their 25th year of imprisonment, for juveniles sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for crimes committed before age 18." (Sands, supra, at p. 198, citing § 3051, subd. (b)(4); Sen Bill No. 394 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2017, ch. 684, § 1.5.) "That amendment was aimed at remedying unconstitutional juvenile sentences without the need for an expensive and time-consuming resentencing hearing." (Sands, supra, at p. 198, citing Morales, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 347 [citations].)
Following these amendments, section 3051, subdivision (h), "continues to exclude certain categories of youthful offenders from the youth offender parole hearing process." (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 199, citing Morales, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 346.) Specifically, "[t]he process is unavailable to offenders 'sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a controlling offense that was committed after the person had attained 18 years of age.'" (Sands, supra, at p. 199, citing § 3051, subd. (h).)
Section 3051, subdivision (h) provides in its entirety: "This section shall not apply to cases in which sentencing occurs pursuant to Section 1170.12, subdivisions (b) to (i), inclusive, of Section 667, or Section 667.61, or to cases in which an individual is sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a controlling offense that was committed after the person had attained 18 years of age. This section shall not apply to an individual to whom this section would otherwise apply, but who, subsequent to attaining 26 years of age, commits an additional crime for which malice aforethought is a necessary element of the crime or for which the individual is sentenced to life in prison."
2. Equal protection principles
Constitutional guarantees of equal protection ensure that "the government does not treat a group of people unequally without some justification." (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 (Chatman), citing People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1207 [" '[E]qual protection safeguards against the arbitrary denial of benefits to a certain defined class of individuals.' "].) To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff "first must show that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner." (Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 568; see also People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 836 (Wilkinson).) "This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but 'whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.' [Citation.]" (Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253.) If the classification at issue affects similarly situated groups unequally, and does not involve a suspect class or a fundamental right, we inquire whether the classification is" 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.'" (Wilkinson, supra, at p. 836, quoting Clark v. Jeter (1988) 486 U.S. 456, 461.)
Both the state and federal Constitutions provide for equal protection of law. (Chatman, supra, at p. 287; U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).) Although the California Supreme Court's "analysis of state constitutional requirements sometimes deviates from how comparable federal requirements are analyzed, our precedent has not distinguished the state and federal guarantees of equal protection for claims arising from allegedly unequal consequences associated with different types of criminal offenses." (Chatman, supra, at p. 287, citing Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881 (Johnson), People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 11991201; see also, People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469 ["The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause."].)
Cardenas argues the strict scrutiny standard applies to this court's equal protection analysis. We disagree. (See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 838 [no fundamental interest in specific term of imprisonment or designation that a particular crime receives.].)
"A classification in a statute is presumed rational until the challenger shows that no rational basis for the unequal treatment is reasonably conceivable. [Citations.] The underlying rationale for a statutory classification need not have been' "ever actually articulated"' by lawmakers, and it does not need to' "be empirically substantiated."' [Citation.] Nor does the logic behind a potential justification need to be persuasive or sensible-rather than simply rational. [Citation.]" (Chatman, supra, at p. 289.)
We review a defendant's equal protection claim de novo. (Morales, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 345.)
B. Analysis
Cardenas argues that section 3051, subdivision (h), violates equal protection because it excludes youthful offenders sentenced to LWOP such as himself, but allows youthful offenders sentenced to de facto LWOP to obtain parole hearings. According to Cardenas, "there is no significant difference between a sentence of LWOP and a de facto LWOP sentence of, for example, 100 years to life." He cites a number of cases which have recognized that certain lengthy terms-of-years sentences are the functional equivalent to LWOP, albeit without that precise label: People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268 [100-year sentence]; Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 275-276 [50 years to life]; Moore v. Biter (9th Cir. 2013) 725 F.3d 1184, 1191 [254-year sentence]; People v. Lewis (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 108, 119 [115-year aggregate sentence]; People v. Mendez (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 47, 63 [84 years to life]. Cardenas contends that "there is no rational basis for concluding that an 18 to 25 year old sentenced to LWOP poses a greater threat of recidivism or danger to public safety than an 18 to 25 year old sentenced to a de facto LWOP sentence."
We acknowledge the current split between appellate districts on the "similarly situated" question, but we begin by assuming without deciding that individuals who are subject to LWOP sentences for controlling offenses committed between the ages of 18 and 25 are similarly situated with individuals who are subject to de facto LWOP sentences for controlling offenses committed between the ages of 18 and 25. (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 203; see also, Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 778-779; but see In re Williams, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th 427 [youthful offenders sentenced to LWOP not similarly situated to those sentenced to de facto LWOP].)
We next address whether the Legislature had a rational basis for the disparate treatment of these similarly situated groups. The majority of cases that have considered similar equal protection challenges have concluded the Legislature did have a rational basis. For instance, in In re Williams, a 21-year old was sentenced to two consecutive LWOP terms for shooting and killing two men during a robbery. (In re Williams, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 430.) The court stated: "The Legislature has prescribed an LWOP sentence for only a small number of crimes. These are the crimes the Legislature deems so morally depraved and so injurious as to warrant a sentence that carries no hope of release for the criminal and no threat of recidivism for society. In excluding LWOP inmates from youth offender parole hearings, the Legislature reasonably could have decided that youthful offenders who have committed such crimes-even with diminished culpability and increased potential for rehabilitation-are nonetheless still sufficiently culpable and sufficiently dangerous to justify lifetime incarceration." (Id. at p. 436.) Other courts have similarly rejected equal protection challenges to section 3051, subdivision (h): Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 781; People v. Jackson (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 199-200; Morales, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 347-349; Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 204-205; People v. Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 116, 127 (Ngo), review granted May 17, 2023, S279458.
Cardenas relies on the lone case to have reached the opposite conclusion: People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273 (Hardin), review granted Jan. 11, 2023, S277487. In Hardin, the defendant was convicted of special circumstance felony murder for a crime committed when he was 25 years old, and was sentenced to LWOP. (Id. at pp. 277, 279.) The court found no rational basis for distinguishing between youthful offenders sentenced to LWOP and other youthful offenders because the "superficially plausible justification" of assessing relative culpability by excluding some offenders "is belied by the statutory provisions that allow such a hearing for individuals who have committed multiple violent crimes (albeit not special circumstance murder) and were sentenced to a technically parole-eligible indeterminate state prison term that is the functional equivalent of life without parole. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 289.)
Any distinction in culpability between those sentenced to LWOP and those who receive parole-eligible indeterminate life sentences is "illusory," the court explained. (Hardin, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 290.) "In sum, while for some purposes it might be reasonable to view special circumstance murder differently from murder with no special circumstance finding, that is not a rational basis for the distinction in eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing made by section 3051." (Ibid.)
In Ngo, Division Two of the Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed the analysis in Hardin and explained why it declined to follow it: "The Legislature could rationally distinguish between youthful offenders with de jure and de facto LWOP sentences." (Ngo, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 126.) "A de jure LWOP sentence provides a bright-line test. Moreover, using a special circumstance as a bright-line test of culpability is well-established. By contrast, there is no established test of the culpability of a youthful offender with a de facto LWOP sentence." (Ibid.) The court also rejected the implicit determination in Hardin that a de facto LWOP sentence is an equivalent bright-line test, noting that, "in light of the many combinations of circumstances that could result in a de facto LWOP sentence, [the Legislature] could rationally leave the assessment of the culpability of such an offender up to a future Board." (Ibid.)
The Ngo court further explained a possible rational basis for the distinction drawn by the Legislature: "[Murder with special circumstances] is the most heinous crime known to our Penal Code, and one of the few crimes subject to the death penalty in California. (§ 190; see also §§ 37 [treason], 128 [procuring execution of innocent person by perjury], 219 [train wrecking causing death].) In Graham, the Supreme Court held that 'for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole.' [Citation.] It recognized that murder is different: 'Although an offense like robbery or rape is "a serious crime deserving serious punishment," [citation], those crimes differ from homicide crimes in a moral sense.' [Citation.] Thus, in a homicide case, it allowed a life without parole sentence for a juvenile offender, as 'a risk to society for the rest of his life,' despite its concern in nonhomicide cases about the difficulty of determining whether a juvenile is incorrigible. [Citation.]" (Ngo, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 123-124.) Likewise, the court added, "first degree murder with a special circumstance differs from ordinary first degree murder in a moral sense. 'It is the prerogative, indeed the duty, of the Legislature to recognize degrees of culpability when drafting a Penal Code.' [Citation.]" (Ngo, supra, at p. 124, citing Wilkinson, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 840.)
We agree with our colleagues' analysis in Ngo and will deny Cardenas's equal protection claim.
"We find a denial of equal protection only if there is no rational relationship between a disparity in treatment and some legitimate government purpose. [Citation.] This core feature of equal protection sets a high bar before a law is deemed to lack even the minimal rationality necessary for it to survive constitutional scrutiny. Coupled with a rebuttable presumption that legislation is constitutional, this high bar helps ensure that democratically enacted laws are not invalidated merely based on a court's cursory conclusion that a statute's tradeoffs seem unwise or unfair. [Citations.]" (Chatman, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 288-289.) "A classification in a statute is presumed rational until the challenger shows that no rational basis for the unequal treatment is reasonably conceivable. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 289.)
"When conducting rational basis review, we must accept any gross generalizations and rough accommodations that the Legislature seems to have made. A classification is not arbitrary or irrational simply because there is an 'imperfect fit between means and ends.' [Citation.]" (People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 77 (Turnage).) "At bottom, the Legislature is afforded considerable latitude in defining and setting the consequences of criminal offenses. [Citations.]" (Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th 871, 887.) "A statute is presumed constitutional, [citation], and 'the burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it,' [citation]." (Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 320 (Heller).)
Applying these standards here, we conclude the Legislature had a rational basis for excluding LWOP-sentenced youthful offenders from section 3051. As we have summarized above, courts have focused on the Legislature's intent to assign relative culpability for offenses and a legislative determination that youthful offenders sentenced to LWOP are especially incorrigible so as to not warrant a parole hearing. (See, e.g., In re Williams, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 436.)
II. Disposition
The trial court's order denying the motion is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Greenwood, P.J., Grover, J.