Opinion
E079159
11-17-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROBERTO ANTONIO CARCEDO, Defendant and Appellant.
Laura R. Vavakin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski, Brendon W. Marshall, and Kathryn A. Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County Super. Ct. No. FWV20004415 Richard V. Peel, Judge. Affirmed.
Laura R. Vavakin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski, Brendon W. Marshall, and Kathryn A. Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
CODRINGTON, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant Roberto Antonio Carcedo appeals the trial court's order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because (1) it was unknowingly, and his free judgment was overcome by ignorance and fear when he entered his guilty plea, and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the pleabargaining stage. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The factual background is taken from the probation report, which relied on the police report.
On the evening of December 20, 2018, defendant was driving along surface streets at a high rate of speed. As he approached an intersection, he failed to yield to a red light, causing him to crash into two other vehicles. The drivers and passengers involved sustained significant injuries as a result of the collision. Defendant fled the scene of the accident, leaving his vehicle behind. Officers searched defendant's vehicle and found a glass pipe and a baggie of suspected methamphetamine, along with drops of blood on the interior of the vehicle.
Officers later located defendant passed out on the porch of a nearby residence. Defendant was interviewed at the hospital and stated he did not remember anything that happened prior to him being transported to the hospital. A blood sample was taken from defendant for drug screening. The results showed that amphetamines and cannabinoids were detected in defendant's blood sample.
On December 9, 2020, the San Bernardino County District Attorney filed a three-count felony complaint charging defendant with driving under the influence of an alcoholic beverage causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a); count 1), driving with a 0.08 percent blood alcohol content causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b); count 2), and hit and run causing injury (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(1); count 3). The complaint also alleged as to counts 1 and 2 that defendant inflicted bodily injury to more than one person (Veh. Code, § 23558), and as to all counts, that he personally inflicted great bodily injury upon three different victims (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a).) The complaint further alleged that defendant sustained a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)).
All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
Defendant was arraigned on June 11, 2021, and entered into a plea agreement on September 8, 2021. Pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement, defendant agreed to plead guilty to one felony count of driving under the influence of an alcoholic beverage causing injury, admit one of the three alleged great bodily injury enhancements, admit the prior strike conviction, and serve four years in state prison. In exchange, the People agreed to dismiss all remaining counts and allegations.
Prior to pleading guilty, defendant executed a plea form and initialed the boxes containing the constitutional rights he would be waiving by pleading guilty. Among others, he initialed the boxes indicating his attorney had explained the consequences of pleading guilty; that no one had used any force, violence, threats, menace, undue influence, or duress to get him to plead guilty; and that he was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol which could interfere with his ability to understand what he was doing. In addition, defendant initialed the box stating he had sufficient time to consult his attorney concerning his plea agreement, that his lawyer had explained everything on the plea form to him, and that he fully understood the boxes he was initialing. He further initialed the box stating he waived and gave up "any right to appeal from any motion [he] may have brought or could bring and from the conviction and judgment in [his] case" since he was receiving the benefit of his plea bargain. Defendant's attorney signed the plea form and indicated that she had personally read and explained the contents of the plea form to defendant. The plea form was also signed by defendant and the prosecutor.
At the September 8, 2021, change of plea hearing, the trial court went over the plea form with defendant and the plea agreement and explained to defendant the constitutional rights he would be waiving by pleading guilty. Defendant indicated that he understood his rights and the consequences of pleading guilty and confirmed that he had initialed and signed his plea form. In response to the court's question of whether he had any questions, defendant responded in the negative. He also responded "No" to the court's query as to whether anyone had used any threats or violence to force him to plead guilty, and "Yes, sir," to the court's question of whether he was entering the plea of his own free will. Defendant thereafter pled guilty to count 1 and admitted the great bodily injury enhancement attached to that count and the prior strike conviction allegation. The remaining charges and enhancement allegations were dismissed. The parties stipulated that a factual basis for the plea was contained within the police report. The trial court found that defendant had read and understood the plea form and the nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea. The court also determined that defendant understandingly and intelligently waived his constitutional rights; that defendant had personally and orally entered the plea; that defendant had entered the plea freely and voluntarily; and that there was a factual basis for the plea. The matter was thereafter continued for sentencing.
On October 18, 2021, the date initially set for sentencing, defendant appeared in court and requested to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to section 1018. The trial court relieved the San Bernardino County Public Defender's Office and appointed a conflict panel attorney to consult with defendant regarding his desire to withdraw from the plea agreement.
On January 18, 2022, defendant's conflict counsel filed a motion to withdraw defendant's guilty plea. Defendant declared that at the time he entered into the plea agreement, he was confused about the nature and consequences of the plea; felt pressured to accept the plea bargain; was under the impression that none of his prior six appointed attorneys had "adequate knowledge" of the facts of the case; the Public Defender's office failed to adequately investigate the case; and he did not have a chance to review the discovery until after he executed the change of plea. Defendant further declared that had he seen the discovery prior to the change of plea, he would not have entered into the plea agreement because he believed he could "win [his] case" and that he "feel[s]" he should be allowed to withdraw his plea.
The People's opposition to defendant's motion was filed on February 4, 2022. The People argued that defendant did not change his plea due to mistake or ignorance and that he was not unduly pressured into the plea agreement. The People also asserted that defendant was adequately advised of the plea, aware of the nature and consequences of his plea, and that defendant failed to show there was "favorable evidence not disclosed to the defense" prior to the change of plea.
The hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his plea was held on May 26, 2022. During the hearing, conflict counsel called attorney Neeta Chowdhry, the former deputy public defender who had represented defendant during the change of plea proceedings, to testify. Attorney Chowdhry testified that there were four attorneys, including herself, who had worked on defendant's case. She indicated that it was her common practice to take notes of what occurred at each hearing for a particular defendant and that she had taken notes of what occurred at defendant's September 8, 2021, hearing. She had reviewed her notes and notes from defendant's other attorneys before testifying. Prior to meeting with defendant, she had thoroughly reviewed the case, including the police report, for any potential defenses and the delay in prosecuting defendant, and had calculated his maximum exposure based on the current charges and allegations. On the day of the change of plea, Attorney Chowdhry had examined the case with defendant and explained to him the process of how his case would proceed if he pled guilty or decided to take the case to trial. She had informed defendant that if he chose to take the case to trial, she would take additional steps to develop any defenses, including the use of an investigator. Defendant had requested a copy of his discovery, which he received after his change of plea. Defendant was aware that his blood sample had not yet been analyzed to determine the amount of amphetamines and cannabinoids in his system at the time of the accident. Specifically, in response to conflict counsel's query of whether she saw "any quants for the amphetamines and the cannabinoids," Attorney Chowdhry responded, "No." In response to conflict counsel's question of whether she informed defendant "that there weren't any quants for those before he took the deal," Attorney Chowdhry replied, "Yes."
Attorney Chowdhry had explained to defendant that based on the current charges and allegations his maximum exposure was 17 years 8 months, and that he could potentially face life in prison if it was proven that he had two prior strike convictions.Ultimately, she had advised defendant that the prosecution's offer of four years was a good deal. Attorney Chowdhry explained that she had informed defendant that she was an experienced attorney, the prosecution's offer was a "good deal," and that she was "not a person to force any client to take a deal." Before defendant signed the plea agreement form, Attorney Chowdhry had gone over "every item" on the change of plea form, including explaining the nature of the charges and consequences of his plea and the fact that defendant could lose his driver's license if he took the deal. Attorney Chowdhry confirmed that defendant had signed and initialed the plea form, including the statement "'My attorney explained to me that other possible consequences of this plea and any admissions of enhancements and/or prior convictions may be.'" She denied threatening or forcing defendant into entering the plea agreement or making any promises to defendant to enter the plea.
At the time, only one prior strike conviction was alleged but there was a question about whether defendant had another, uncharged, prior strike conviction.
Following argument from counsel, the trial court denied defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court found no showing of good cause or undue pressure as required by section 1018, and that defendant had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered into the plea agreement. The court explained: "In fact, the opposite was clear from the transcript. He understood what he was getting into. We discussed it. He made waivers about knowing about his case, not being under any pressure, and I don't find convincing the argument with regard to him not having received his discovery. It's purely conclusory that the later review of the discovery convinced him he would have been found not guilty of the particular offense ....[¶] I do find Ms. Chowdhry's testimony to be convincing about how she goes about preparing for and representing a defendant in a pre-preliminary hearing.... I don't find any good cause to allow [defendant] to withdraw from his plea."
On June 9, 2022, the trial court sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement to four years in state prison with 428 days' credit for time served. The remaining charges, allegations, and another misdemeanor case were dismissed. Defendant timely appealed.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because his plea was unknowingly and involuntarily made, it was a product of fear, ignorance/mistake, or duress, and his counsel was ineffective. Specifically, he asserts his counsel failed to have the blood sample tested to assess the level of cannabinoids and amphetamines in his system while driving before advising him to plead guilty, he was unaware of a "potentially meritorious defense, was ignorant of the evidence necessary to prove the driving under the influence charge, and [he] was suffering within a climate of duress and coercion."
A. Legal Principles
A trial court may allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea before judgment upon a showing of good cause pursuant to section 1018. (People v. Archer (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 693, 702 (Archer); see § 1018 ["On application of the defendant at any time before judgment . . ., the court may, . . . for a good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted."]; People v. Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 894 (Patterson); People v. Breslin (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1415-1416 (Breslin).) To prevail, the defendant must establish good cause by clear and convincing evidence. (People v. Codinha (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1047, 1070.) "'Mistake, ignorance or any other factor overcoming the exercise of free judgment is good cause for withdrawal of a guilty plea' under section 1018." (Patterson, at p. 894; accord, Breslin, at p. 1416; Archer, at p. 702.) Inadvertence, fraud, or duress are other factors that may overcome a defendant's free judgment. (People v. Huricks (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1208 (Huricks).) A defendant claiming that he or she was pressured into the plea must demonstrate that it was more than the pressure experienced by "every other defendant faced with serious felony charges and the offer of a plea bargain." (Id. at p. 1208.) "The defendant must also show prejudice in that he or she would not have accepted the plea bargain had it not been for the mistake" or other relevant factor. (Breslin, at p. 1416.)
However, a "defendant may not withdraw a plea because the defendant has changed his or her mind." (Archer, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 702; see People v. Knight (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 337, 344 ["buyer's remorse . . . is not sufficient"].) Even "[t]he fact [a defendant] may have been persuaded, or was reluctant, to accept the plea is not sufficient to warrant the plea being withdrawn." (People v. Ravaux (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 914, 919 (Ravaux).) Likewise, "[p]ostplea apprehension regarding the anticipated sentence, even if it occurs well before sentencing, is not sufficient to compel the exercise of judicial discretion to permit withdrawal of the plea." (People v. Hunt (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 95, 104 (Hunt).)
We review a ruling on a plea withdrawal motion for an abuse of discretion and defer to the trial court's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. (Breslin, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1416; People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254.) "'A trial court will not be found to have abused its discretion unless it "exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that results in a manifest miscarriage of justice."'" (People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 71.) Pleas "resulting from a bargain should not be set aside lightly and finality of proceedings should be encouraged." (Hunt, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at p. 103.) In determining the facts, "the trial court is not bound by uncontradicted statements of the defendant," and where evidence is contradictory, the trial court is "entitled to resolve the factual conflict against" the defendant. (Id. at pp. 103, 104.)
A defendant "is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in determining whether to accept or reject a plea bargain." (Archer, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 707; see Breslin, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1418.) "To show denial of that right, a defendant must show (1) his or her counsel's performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant." (Breslin, at p. 1418.) "'[T]o satisfy the "prejudice" requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" (Id. at p. 1419.) A defendant's "'self-serving'" assertion of prejudice that he or she would not have accepted a plea bargain with competent representation "'is insufficient in and of itself to sustain the defendant's burden of proof as to prejudiced"-the assertion "'must be corroborated independently by objective evidence.'" (Id. at p. 1421.) The defendant bears the burden of proving an ineffective assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence. (Id. at p. 1418; see Archer, at p. 707.)
A reviewing court "must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. [Citation.] Tactical errors are generally not deemed reversible, and counsel's decision[-]making must be evaluated in the context of the available facts. [Citation.] To the extent the record on appeal fails to disclose why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, we will affirm the judgment unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation." (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 389.)
B. Analysis
We address together defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and ignorance/mistake or coercion/duress because they are essentially two sides of the same coin-defendant maintains Attorney Chowdhry's ineffective assistance caused him to operate under ignorance, mistake, fear, or coercion when he changed his plea.
As previously noted, "in determining the facts, the trial court is not bound by uncontradicted statements of the defendant." (Hunt, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at p. 103.) The trial court may "take into account the defendant's credibility and his [or her] interest in the outcome of the proceedings." (Ravaux, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 918.) The denial of defendant's motion implies a credibility determination and a finding that no mistake, ignorance, or any other factor relating to the supposed failure to analyze defendant's blood sample affected defendant's decision to accept the plea offer. The record adequately supports those findings.
Here, prior to defendant's change of plea, Attorney Chowdhry was in possession of the discovery, including the police report, and was aware that the blood sample indicated the presence of amphetamines and cannabinoids. Contrary to defendant's appellate counsel's claim during oral argument, a reasonable interpretation of the record is that defendant was also aware of this information and was informed by Attorney Chowdhry that a quantitative analysis of the blood sample had not been performed. Attorney Chowdhry explained to defendant that if he wished to fight his case, she would take additional steps to develop any defenses, including the use of an investigator. Defendant was also aware of his maximum exposure should he proceed to trial and the consequences of pleading guilty. Simply put, prior to his change of plea, and despite the fact that he did not have a physical copy of the discovery at that point, defendant was fully aware of the evidence in the case, including the results of an initial blood test and that a quantitative analysis of the blood sample had not been performed. Despite this knowledge, defendant pled guilty. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that defendant decided to plead guilty and forego going to trial with a speculative or "potential" defense after realizing his exposure was significantly higher than the prosecutor's offer of four years.
Nor does the record convince us that defense counsel coerced defendant into entering a plea. There is nothing in the record that suggests that the prosecution misrepresented facts to defendant, or that the plea offer was made for an improper purpose or without a reasonable basis in the evidence. Indeed, defendant received much leniency, with the imposition of four years for the charged offenses and enhancement allegations. Defendant's general claim that he was pressured into signing the plea is insufficient to show good cause to withdraw where "[n]othing in the record indicate[d] he was under any more or less pressure than every other defendant" in the same situation. (Huricks, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 1208.) Before accepting defendant's guilty plea, the trial court verified with defendant that no threats, violence, coercions, or promises not detailed in the plea agreement were used to force defendant to plead guilty. Attorney Chowdhry testified that she does not force her clients to accept plea deals and denied threatening or forcing defendant to accept the plea deal. After being assured by defendant that he was entering the plea agreement of his own free will, the trial court found the guilty plea to be knowingly, voluntarily, and freely made. Defendant has not shown with clear and convincing evidence that his decision to take the plea deal was a product of mistake, ignorance, or some other factor overcoming the exercise of free judgment.
Furthermore, defendant failed to allege the required element of prejudice. (Cf. Hill v. Lockhart (1985) 474 U.S. 52, 53, 58 ["petitioner failed to allege the kind of prejudice from the allegedly incompetent advice of counsel that would have entitled him to a hearing," "we believe that requiring a showing of 'prejudice' from defendants who seek to challenge the validity of their guilty pleas on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel will serve the fundamental interest in the finality of guilty pleas"].) By failing to make any showing that he "would not have accepted the plea bargain had it not been for" factors related to the quantitative analysis of his blood sample taken at the time of the accident, defendant did not carry his burden to present "clear and convincing evidence" of good cause for the withdrawal of his plea. (Breslin, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1416.) Defendant never declared that he would not have pled guilty had his counsel analyzed his blood sample or had he known the quantitative analysis of his blood sample. He has still not alleged or explained on appeal how the quantitative analysis of his blood sample would have changed his decision to accept the plea bargain, besides claiming he was not fully informed before he accepted the plea deal.
In addition, there is no indication in the record to suggest that a quantitative analysis of his blood sample would have been a meritorious defense. (Compare People v. Ramirez (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1504-1508 [denial of motion to withdraw plea found to be abuse of discretion where the defendant was unaware of a supplemental police report that identified new defense witnesses and implicated another suspect]; People v. Harvey (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 660, 670-671 [trial court abused discretion in denying motion to withdraw where the defendant was unaware of a psychiatrist's report that potentially negated a required element of the crime to which she pleaded guilty]; People v. Dena (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 1001, 1007-1008 [denial of motion to withdraw plea found to be abuse of discretion where the defendant was unaware of a blood alcohol test report that could have supported a defense of diminished capacity].) Indeed, the record here suggests otherwise. Moreover, appellate courts have held that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea even when there are conceivable defenses or newly discovered evidence. (See People v. Kunes (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1443-1445 [no abuse of discretion in denying a motion to withdraw despite the defendant's claim his counsel failed to tell him about a possible necessity defense]; Breslin, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1415-1418 [no abuse of discretion even though assault victim recanted].)
Breslin, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th 1409 is instructive. In Breslin, the defendant was charged with, among other things, inflicting corporal injury upon her boyfriend. (Id. at pp. 1413-1414.) After Breslin entered a guilty plea to the corporal injury charge, the victim provided a declaration to defense counsel stating that he tripped, grabbed Breslin, and was injured when Breslin accidentally fell on top of him. (Id. at p. 1414.) Breslin moved to withdraw her guilty plea and the trial court denied the motion. (Id. at p. 1415.)
On appeal, Breslin argued that her plea was not a knowing and intelligent waiver of her constitutional rights because, at the time of the plea, she was unaware that the victim had fundamentally changed his account of the incident. (Breslin, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1415.) She further claimed that her plea was not made voluntarily because her former appointed counsel failed to investigate her case and failed to discover-prior to her plea-that the victim had tried to recant his statements about the incident. (Ibid.) In denying Breslin's motion to withdraw her plea, the appellate court reasoned: "Breslin contends that she presented 'uncontroverted evidence' to show that at the time of her plea she was unaware of 'crucial facts' that would have provided her with 'a strong, potentially meritorious defense to the charged crime.' Breslin's argument is not supported by the record. The 'evidence' of such 'crucial facts' is contained in the victim's declaration, in which he stated that he wanted to talk to the district attorney about recanting his statement soon after Breslin was arrested, but no one was available to speak with him. The timing of the victim's eventual recantation is somewhat suspect.
Indeed, the first time anyone learned of the victim's new version of the incident was after Breslin entered her guilty plea and just days before the [ ] scheduled sentencing hearing. There is no evidence anywhere in the record, and certainly not clear and convincing evidence, that Breslin had a potentially meritorious defense at the time she pleaded guilty to the charged crime. Breslin's argument ignores the obvious-the victim's undisclosed change of heart was not known until after Breslin entered her guilty plea." (Id. at p. 416, italics omitted.)
The court further reasoned that, "Although the prosecution's case might have been slightly weaker than it appeared when Breslin pleaded guilty, this does not invalidate her plea. It might be a different matter if there were actually persuasive, independent evidence the victim had committed perjury or if the prosecution had withheld critical evidence. But we emphasize that there is good reason to believe the victim's new account was the product of latent misgivings about Breslin facing criminal punishment. [¶] After evaluating the totality of the circumstances, the trial court acted well within its discretion in ruling that Breslin failed to meet her burden by clear and convincing evidence to show that she entered her guilty plea under mistake, ignorance, or any other factor overcoming her exercise of free judgment." (Breslin, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1417-1418.)
Defendant's reliance on People v. O'Hearn (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 280 (O'Hearn) is misplaced. In that case, after O'Hearn pled guilty to making criminal threats, O'Hearn moved to withdraw his plea, which was eventually denied by the trial court. (Id. at p. 298.) In his motion, O'Hearn claimed that his counsel "'barely met with hi[m] . . .,' made a single court appearance before the guilty plea, and then failed to attend the sentencing hearing, and at some point lost the case file, to the detriment of subsequent counsel and O'Hearn. [Counsel] never explained to O'Hearn what the elements of potential defenses were, did not inquire about his extensive mental health history, did not advise him that the charged crime was a strike, and did not raise with O'Hearn or the prosecution any alternative to pleading guilty as charged." (Id. at pp. 286-287.) In addition, O'Hearn's attorney had failed to inform the trial court or the prosecutor about O'Hearn's extensive mental health history, which included hospitalizations in mental health facilities and a history of schizophrenia, psychosis, and schizoaffective disorder, and which would have negated the specific intent for making criminal threats. (Id. at p. 287.) Moreover, O'Hearn's counsel "had been repeatedly found to have failed to provide his clients competent legal services" and "[h]e was publicly disciplined by the State Bar four times for misconduct respecting his representation of clients and suspended from practice twice, in 2005 and 2011." (Ibid.)
Under the above circumstances, the Court of Appeal found O'Hearn's counsel's performance to be deficient and prejudicial, and reversed the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. (O'Hearn, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 295, 297298, 302.) The court noted "[t]he problem here is not the lack of resources but the blindness of counsel to factors indicating the availability of a potential mental state defense." (Id. at p. 297.) The court explained that counsel was informed by "O'Hearn of past but undefined mental health issues, and the police report, which [counsel] possessed, indicated that the arresting officers had had numerous prior contacts with O'Hearn regarding his aberrant behavior and considered whether they should initiate commitment proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150. [Counsel]'s acknowledged concern whether O'Hearn was competent to stand trial should also have caused him to wonder whether his client's mental state might provide a defense; the same is true of [counsel]'s awareness of '[t]he fact that O'Hearn had committed multiple offenses at the same location against multiple victims, in some cases the same victims, and that they all involved being out of control,' as [counsel] testified." (O'Hearn, at p. 297.) The court further noted that O'Hearn's counsel "never asserted any strategic reason for failing to learn whether his client's mental state provided the basis for a possible mental defense." (Ibid.)
This case is clearly distinguishable from O'Hearn. Unlike in that case, as the People point out, the present case does not present substantial evidence of a possible meritorious defense necessitating investigation prior to disposition. While a quantitative blood analysis may have shown low levels of amphetamines and cannabinoids in defendant's system shortly after the accident, it still would have provided sufficient evidence for the People to secure a conviction. Defendant never claimed that someone other than him caused the accident. There is no dispute that defendant was speeding or that he ran a red light or or that he fled the scene following the accident. It is undisputed that defendant had amphetamines and cannabinoids in his system at the time of the accident or that defendant had a bag of suspected methamphetamine and pipe in his car. Even low levels of these substances could be used to assert that he was under the influence of two different controlled substances at the time he was driving. Such circumstances would reasonably permit a jury to conclude defendant's mental or physical abilities were so impaired that he was no longer able to drive a vehicle with the caution of a sober person, using ordinary care, under similar circumstances. (CALCRIM No. 2100.)
"All decisions to plead guilty are heavily influenced by difficult questions as to the strength of the prosecution's case and the likelihood of securing leniency. [Citation.] '"Considerations like these frequently present imponderable questions for which there are no certain answers; judgments may be made that in the light of later events seem improvident, although they were perfectly sensible at the time. The rule that a plea must be intelligently made to be valid does not require that a plea be vulnerable to later attack if the defendant did not correctly assess every relevant factor entering his [or her] decision."'" (Breslin, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1417, quoting Hunt, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at p. 103.)
Because defendant failed to show good cause to withdraw his plea by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: McKINSTER Acting P. J. MILLER J.