Opinion
No. 2006BX009926.
2013-03-28
JEANETTE RODRIGUEZ–MORICK, J.
Defendant seeks to renew his motion to vacate a 2006 guilty plea pursuant to Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). Between the court's original decision denying Defendant's motion to vacate and the instant renewal motion, the United States Supreme Court decided Chaidez v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1103 (2013). Chaidez makes clear that Padilla has no retroactive effect.
Accordingly, Defendant's renewal motion is denied.
Last year, the Appellate Division, First Department, held that Padilla should be applied retroactively. People v. Baret, 99 AD3d 408 (1st Dep't 2012). The Baret court arrived at that conclusion based on its interpretation of the federal retroactivity standards announced in Teague v. Lane, which standards were adopted by the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Eastman, 85 N.Y.2d 265, 275 (1995). While state courts may apply a broader retroactivity standard than Teague, see Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 267–268 (2008), neither the Baret court nor the Court of Appeals in Eastman suggested a departure from the Teague standard. Since Chaidez applied Teague, Chaidez controls. See, e.g., People v. Watson, 14 Misc.3d 942, 950 (N.Y. Co. Sup.Ct.2007) (applying both Teague and U.S. Supreme Court case law construing Teague to determine retroactivity of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)).
On February 23, 2006, Defendant pleaded guilty to Penal Law § 220 .03, Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree. On January 11, 2012, six years later, Defendant moved to vacate that plea pursuant to C.P.L. § 440.10(1)(h) on the ground that he received ineffective counsel under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). By Decision and Order dated July 9, 2012, Hon. Gia L. Morris denied Defendant's motion to vacate his plea, in part because Defendant failed to establish that he was prejudiced as a result of his counsel's ineffective assistance. Specifically, Judge Morris noted that even if Defendant had established that his counsel failed to advise him of the immigration consequences deriving from his 2006 guilty plea, Defendant's prior 1999 conviction would have rendered him subject to deportation. Defendant therefore could not demonstrate that he would have rejected the 2006 plea and proceeded to trial had his counsel properly advised him in 2006 of immigration consequences, given his 1999 conviction.
By motion dated July 24, 2012, Defendant moves to renew his January 11, 2012, motion to vacate pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 2221 in light of People v. Picca, 97 AD3d 170 (2nd Dep't 2012). Pursuant to Padilla, the defendant in Picca moved to vacate his 2006 plea that, along with his prior conviction, subjected him to deportation proceedings. Reversing the trial court's summary denial of Defendant's motion, the Second Department held that since “no immigration detainer had been placed upon him for the prior conviction as of the time he pleaded guilty to the [second] offense in 2001,” his deportation “was neither imminent nor inevitable,” and Defendant's counsel's failure to advise him about the immigration consequences of his 2001 plea, which constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, may have prejudiced Defendant. Id. at 179–80, 185. The court therefore ordered a hearing. Id. at 188.
As already noted, however, subsequent to Picca, the United States Supreme Court decided Chaidez v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1103 (2013), in which the Court limited the Padilla rule to those defendants whose convictions became final prior the Padilla decision in 2010. Id. at 1113. Since Defendant's 2006 conviction was final well before the Court decided Padilla in 2010, the Supreme Court's decision in Chaidez forecloses Defendant's reliance upon Padilla and its progeny. The motion to renew is therefore denied.
It is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's renewal motion to vacate his 2006 plea of guilty to Penal Law § 220.03 is denied.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.
SO ORDERED: