Opinion
B308433
03-01-2022
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RONALD REYES CANEDOS, Defendant and Appellant.
Randall Conner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. MA066185, Shannon Knight, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Randall Conner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. 1
Defendant and appellant Ronald Reyes Canedos challenges the trial court's order finding him in violation of probation and sentencing him to 32 months in prison. He contends that recently enacted legislation limiting the maximum term of probation to two years (see Stats. 2020, ch. 328 (Assembly Bill No. 1950)) applies retroactively to his case. We agree, and we therefore reverse the trial court's order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On January 12, 2016, Canedos pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)), one count of possession of body armor by a violent felon (§ 31360, subd. (a)), and one count of possession of ammunition by a felon (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced him to four years in prison, with the execution of the sentence suspended pending the completion of four years of probation.
Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
More than three years later, on December 17, 2019, Canedos became involved in an argument with his wife, O.S. According to statements from family members, Canedos pulled a knife on O.S., moved it back and forth in front of her face, and threatened to kill O.S. and her mother. Three days later, on December 20, Canedos pleaded not guilty to several charges, including assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and the trial court summarily revoked his probation.
After a trial on the new charges, a jury convicted Canedos of assault with a deadly weapon, and the court found him in violation of his probation for failing to obey all laws. The court 2 imposed an aggregate sentence of 6 years 8 months in prison. The sentence consisted of the upper term of four years for assault with a deadly weapon, plus consecutive terms of eight months-one third the middle term-for each of the four previously suspended 2016 counts. In a prior opinion, we affirmed the conviction of assault with a deadly weapon. (See People v. Canedos (Oct. 21, 2021, B307948) [nonpub. opn.].)
DISCUSSION
A. Retroactivity of Assembly Bill No. 1950
In September 2020, just before the jury returned its verdict in Canedos's trial, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 1950, which reduced the maximum duration of probation in cases in which the court suspends the execution of a sentence pending the successful completion of probation. Previously, section 1203.1, subdivision (a) allowed courts to impose up to five years of probation in cases where the suspended sentence was five years or less. Under the new law, which became effective January 1, 2021, the maximum period of probation is two years. Canedos contends that this amendment applies retroactively to his case and that his probation expired before he committed the assault. He argues that the finding of a probation violation was invalid, and that we must reverse the order finding him in violation of probation and imposing a prison sentence. We agree.
"Generally, a statute applies prospectively unless otherwise stated in the language of the statute, or when retroactive application is clearly indicated by legislative intent." (People v. Winn (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 859, 872.) Beginning with its opinion in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada), however, 3 our Supreme Court has recognized an exception to this rule in ameliorative criminal statutes. The court explained that "[w]hen the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment it has obviously expressly determined that its former penalty was too severe and that a lighter punishment is proper as punishment for the commission of the prohibited act. It is an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply. The amendatory act imposing the lighter punishment can be applied constitutionally to acts committed before its passage provided the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is not final. This intent seems obvious, because to hold otherwise would be to conclude that the Legislature was motivated by a desire for vengeance, a conclusion not permitted in view of modern theories of penology." (Id. at p. 745.)
In People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66, the court held that this presumption of retroactivity applies where a new law merely allows for a possibility of reduced punishment by giving the trial court discretion to impose a lesser sentence. (Id. at p. 76.) In subsequent years, the court has reaffirmed this doctrine numerous times and applied it to a wide range of ameliorative criminal laws. (See People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 675-676 (Esquivel) [listing cases].)
In People v. Burton (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1 (Burton), the court applied this doctrine to Assembly Bill No. 1950 and held that the law applies retroactively because it is an ameliorative statute that reduces a criminal defendant's potential punishment. Although" '[p]robation is neither 4 "punishment" [citation] nor a criminal "judgment" [citation]'" (Burton, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th Supp. at p. 16), the court recognized that probation is a restriction on liberty and increases the likelihood that the probationer will be found in violation of probation and incarcerated. In addition, the court recognized that the Legislature, in enacting Assembly Bill No. 1950, intended to prevent probationers from further involvement in the criminal justice system because of probation violations that do not involve new criminal conduct. (Burton, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th Supp. at p. 15.) With no evidence of legislative intent to the contrary, the court concluded that the ameliorative changes of Assembly Bill No. 1950 should" 'extend as broadly as possible'" (Burton, supra, at p. 16, quoting People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 657 (Conley)), including to defendants already on probation. Several subsequent cases that have considered the issue reached the same conclusion. (See, e.g., People v. Quinn (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 874, 879-884 (Quinn); People v. Sims (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 943, 955-964 (Sims); People v. Lord (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 241, 244-246 (Lord); People v. Stewart (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 1065, 1070-1074, review granted June 30, 2021, S268787 (Stewart).)
The Attorney General concedes that Assembly Bill No. 1950 applies retroactively, but argues that we should nevertheless affirm Canedos's sentence because the trial court had already terminated his probation at the time Assembly Bill No. 1950 became effective. This represents a distinction from the cases cited above that address the retroactive effect of the law in that, in the previous cases, the defendant challenged the probation order as part of a direct appeal of a conviction. There had been no finding of a violation. (See Quinn, supra, 5 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 878; Stewart, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1069-1070, review granted; Sims, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 946-947; Lord, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 243.) Because Canedos had already violated his probation when Assembly Bill No. 1950 became effective, the Attorney General argues that the amendment in the law does not benefit him.
We are not persuaded. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Esquivel compels the conclusion that, although the trial court terminated Canedos's probation, that decision was not yet final for purposes of Estrada retroactivity. Esquivel was similarly situated to Canedos: He was sentenced to five years in prison, with the sentence suspended pending the completion of probation. (Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 673.) He did not initially challenge the sentence, but filed an appeal after the court three years later found him in violation of the terms of his probation and ordered the suspended sentence into effect. (Ibid.) In the interim, the Legislature had enacted a statute restricting the applicability of certain sentence enhancements that constituted two years of Esquivel's sentence. The court held that the law applied retroactively to Esquivel. (Id. at p. 678.) The court explained that "[t]his case was not final, for purposes of the Estrada presumption, because the 'criminal prosecution or proceeding' brought against defendant was not complete when the ameliorative legislation at issue took effect. [Citation.] Defendant had not exhausted direct review of the order causing his carceral punishment to take effect. The time for him to seek that review had not expired. And he had not successfully completed probation." (Ibid.) The revocation of probation did not prevent the defendant from challenging the validity of his sentence on appeal because the revocation was not yet final. 6
The same is true in this case. The trial court terminated Canedos's probation in 2020, but that decision was still on appeal, and therefore not yet final for purposes of Estrada, when Assembly Bill No. 1950 became effective. Canedos is therefore entitled to benefit from the retroactive application of the law.
The Attorney General attempts to escape this conclusion by arguing that the Legislature did not intend for Assembly Bill No. 1950 to apply retroactively to defendants whose probation was already revoked when the law became effective. The retroactive application of an ameliorative criminal statute is not a constitutional requirement, but rather a matter of "presumed legislative intent." (Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 680.) If the Legislature indicates that a statute should have limited or no retroactive application, courts accede to that intention. (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 656.)
The Attorney General claims to discern such a limitation in Assembly Bill No. 1950's lack of a mechanism for shortening existing probation terms, and its lack of any discussion of retroactivity. But a law's silence on retroactivity is not sufficient to overcome the Estrada presumption. "Our cases do not 'dictate to legislative drafters the forms in which laws must be written' to express an intent to modify or limit the retroactive effect of an ameliorative change; rather, they require 'that the Legislature demonstrate its intention with sufficient clarity that a reviewing court can discern and effectuate it.'" (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 656-657.) Thus, in Conley, the court held that Proposition 36, which limited the application of the "Three Strikes" law, was not fully retroactive because the electorate created a specific mechanism for convicted defendants to seek resentencing. (Conley, supra, at pp. 657-659.) The court 7 explained that "[w]here, as here, the enacting body creates a special mechanism for application of the new lesser punishment to persons who have previously been sentenced, and where the body expressly makes retroactive application of the lesser punishment contingent on a court's evaluation of the defendant's dangerousness, we can no longer say with confidence, as we did in Estrada, that the enacting body lacked any discernible reason to limit application of the law with respect to cases pending on direct review." (Id. at pp. 658-659.) Assembly Bill No. 1950 contains no equivalent provision, and there is no basis for us to infer a limitation on the retroactive effect of the law.
B. Application of Retroactivity to Canedos
Because Assembly Bill No. 1950 applies retroactively to Canedos's case, the maximum duration of his probation was two years, expiring in January 2018. Thus, by the time Canedos committed assault with a deadly weapon in 2019, the court no longer had jurisdiction to revoke his probation. (See People v. Butler (Feb. 15, 2022, B313121) __ Cal.App.5th __ [2022 WL 456406, p. *2] (Butler).) We must therefore reverse the trial court's order revoking probation and sentencing Canedos to 2 years 8 months in prison.
Our reversal of Canedos's sentence on the probation violation of course does not affect his conviction or sentence for assault with a deadly weapon, which we affirmed in our prior opinion in this case. (People v. Canedos, supra, B307948.)
In many cases, that would not be the end of the story: We would need to remand the case to the trial court for a full resentencing hearing. Under the full sentencing rule, when we overturn a portion of a defendant's sentence and remand 8 the case, "the resentencing court has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the sentence, and not just the portion" that was the basis of the resentencing hearing. (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) "This rule is justified because an aggregate prison term is not a series of separate independent terms, but one term made up of interdependent components. The invalidity of one component infects the entire scheme." (People v. Hill (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 831, 834.)
The trial court is bound by a significant restriction on its resentencing authority after a successful appeal, however: The new sentence must be no more severe than the original one.(People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 358-360.) This requirement is consistent with the function of Estrada to allow defendants to benefit from retroactive ameliorative changes in the law, as well as with the intent of the Legislature in enacting Assembly Bill No. 1950 to reduce the risk to probationers of reincarceration. (See Stewart, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1073-1074, review granted.)
We requested supplemental briefing on the question of whether we should consider Canedos's plea based on an indicated sentence analogous to a plea bargain. We now view this issue as immaterial because even if we were to treat Canedos's guilty plea as analogous to a plea bargain for purposes of resentencing, the same restriction on the length of his sentence would apply. (See Butler, supra, __ Cal.App.5th at p. __ [2022 WL 456406 at p. *5].)
In this case, because there is no effective sentence that would be less than two years probation, there is no reason to remand for resentencing. Thus, we see no alternative but to order the trial court to reduce Canedos's sentence to two years probation and to strike the prison sentence the court imposed 9 upon finding him in violation of probation. (See Butler, supra, __ Cal.App.5th at p. __ [2022 WL 456406 at pp. *5-*6].)
DISPOSITION
The trial court's sentencing order is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for resentencing with directions to modify Canedos's term of probation to two years in accordance with section 1203.1, subdivision (a) as amended by Assembly Bill No. 1950, and then to set aside the prison sentence, reinstate and terminate probation. The trial court is also directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and to forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
We concur: BENDIX, J., CRANDALL, J. [*] 10
[*] Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.