Opinion
E052958
11-03-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PAUL HENRY CAMARENA, Defendant and Appellant.
Renee Paradis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, and Barry Carlton and Marissa Bejarano, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super.Ct.No. FSB1005264)
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. John N. Martin, Judge. Affirmed in part as modified; reversed in part.
Renee Paradis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, and Barry Carlton and Marissa Bejarano, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Paul Henry Camarena pleaded guilty to an offense of check forgery, after he attempted to cash a forged check at a local store. He was admitted to probation on specified terms and conditions. Because of defendant's past association with a criminal street gang, the court imposed several gang-related probation terms. Defendant's counsel objected to two of the probation terms, but the trial court overruled the objections. Defendant now appeals, renewing his claims that the objected-to terms are improperly imposed. We agree that the objected-to conditions were improper; we order one term stricken and the other modified. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In December 2010, the San Bernardino Police Department received a call from a local discount department store concerning a possible attempted forgery in progress at the store. The reporting party for the store told the police that, on December 16, 2010, someone had cashed a check from a company called "Arrowhead Medical Associates." After the check was cashed, store employees discovered that the check was fraudulent, because it was drawn on "Wachovia Bank," but at the time Wachovia Bank was no longer in existence. The very next day, December 17, 2010, defendant and a companion entered the same store, and attempted to cash similar checks. Defendant and his companion each went to a different register, and gave the cashiers a check and identification. The cashiers each called for a manager to approve the transaction; the manager determined that the checks were fraudulent and called the police. Defendant and his companion waited in the store for about 15 minutes, but left after the delay in processing their cash requests.
Police officers stopped defendant's vehicle as he and his companion were about to enter the on-ramp to a nearby freeway. They were taken back to the store for further investigation, and they were then arrested.
Defendant was charged in a felony complaint with one count of check forgery in violation of Penal Code section 470, subdivision (d). It was also alleged that defendant had two prison term priors, pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). Before the preliminary hearing, as a result of a plea bargain, defendant agreed to plead guilty to the forgery charge, and the prison term priors were stricken. The court imposed the upper term of three years in state prison on the forgery offense, but suspended execution of the sentence and admitted defendant to supervised formal probation for three years, on certain terms and conditions.
Among the terms and conditions were a cluster of so-called "gang terms," which, although not separately identified as such, appear to include such provisions as not associating with any persons known to be gang members, not wearing or displaying any articles of clothing, emblems or other items associated with gangs, not having aerosol paint containers, markers or etching devices, restricting defendant's presence from criminal court buildings, and—the terms challenged here—an 11:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. curfew, and reporting to and presenting a copy of the probation terms and conditions to the local police agency "gang detail."
The probation department had interviewed defendant regarding the offense in preparation for sentencing. Defendant explained that, although he was employed at the time of the offense, his job was affected by the weather; because of inclement weather, he had worked for only one week before his arrest. An ex-girlfriend gave him the fraudulent checks; his purpose in cashing the checks was to obtain money to buy Christmas presents for his children. During the interview, defendant also remarked that he had formerly associated with the North Side Colton gang, but he was no longer an active gang member; he explained that he was too old (defendant was 41 years old) to associate with the gang. The probation report noted over 20 tattoos on various parts of defendant's body, some of which appear to have had possible gang significance (e.g., "NC," "Southern," "NSC," "SUR," and "Colton"). The probation report stated: "As the defendant has prior associations with the North Side Colton gang, as well as gang related tattoos, gang terms will be included."
At sentencing, the trial court struck several of the common or standard probation terms (e.g., compliance with a court-ordered payment schedule, submitting a record of income and expenses, prohibiting possession of a credit card), modified others (e.g., requiring defendant to carry identification and a copy of his probation terms "at all times" was modified to provide that he do so "while in public"), and overruled objections to yet others (e.g., requiring defendant to "[s]ubmit to, and cooperate in, a field interrogation by any peace officer at any time of the day or night").
The court then heard defense counsel's specific objections to the terms at issue here. Defense counsel noted she routinely objected to "the restriction on freedom of movement. This is the be in your house by 11:00 p.m., effectively a curfew." She argued: "This is a forgery case. There's no gang alleged. He's got some tat[t]oos that don't seem to have any connection to . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . that I can tell." The court inquired: "Are you arguing he's not a former gang member?" Counsel responded, "I'm arguing that the gang terms . . .—Term 27, . . . home by 11:00 [p.m.], I don't see the nexus for imposing that term. . . . I think it's much more egregious than don't wear certain items of clothing, especially when there isn't really anything in the record that I can see that would support it. So I don't think it's reasonable, and it doesn't comport with the law in terms of being connected to the crime itself. So I would ask to strike [term] 27 and also [term] 28."
Term 27 required that defendant: "Be inside your place of residence every evening by 11[:00] p.m. and not leave said residence before 6[:00] a.m. unless there is a verifiable family emergency or you are traveling to or from a place of employment or school."
Term 28 required defendant to "[r]eport to the local police agency gang detail with a copy of your terms and conditions, and show proof to the probation officer within fourteen (14) days from today's date or your release from custody."
The court overruled the objections to those terms, but counsel pursued the matter as to term 28, to report to the "gang detail." She requested that the court strike the reference to "gang detail," but to require reporting only to the local law enforcement agency: "I would just ask on [term] 28 if the Court—to just strike 'report to the local police agency'—it states 'gang detail.' I think him reporting with his terms and conditions is enough. To ask for the gang detail, which I'm not even sure—it's quite a vague terminology in the first place. I'd ask the Court to just strike that portion." The court overruled this objection also.
Defendant has now appealed, again raising the issue of the propriety of the imposition of terms 27 and 28, the curfew requirement, and the requirement effectively to register with the local law enforcement agency's gang unit.
ANALYSIS
I. The Curfew Requirement Is Improper as Applied to Defendant, an Adult, in
Circumstances Where Gang Activity Was Not Established, and Had No Nexus to the Crime
The propriety of the terms of probation is measured under the Lent standard: "A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it '(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .'" (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486.)
Moreover, "[t]he California Supreme Court has acknowledged a distinction between the permissible scope of discretion in probationary sentencing by the juvenile court and that allowed for adults: 'Although the goal of both types of probation is the rehabilitation of the offender, "[j]uvenile probation is not, as with an adult, an act of leniency in lieu of statutory punishment; it is an ingredient of a final order for the minor's reformation and rehabilitation."' [Citation.] '"In light of this difference, a condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper for an adult probationer may be permissible for a minor under the supervision of the juvenile court. . . ."' ([In re] Sheena K. [(2007)] 40 Cal.4th [875] at p. 889; see also In re Frank V. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1232, 1242-1243 [this rule derives from the court's role as parens patriae].)" (In re Luis F. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 176, 189.)
Thus, what is a permissible term of probation for a juvenile may not be permissible as applied to an adult. Similarly, general curfew ordinances may be valid when directed at juveniles, but would unduly interfere with the liberty interests of adults. "Deprivation of a minor's liberty does not necessarily amount to confinement in the same way that it may for an adult. Unemancipated minors, naturally, are subject to adult care and control. In this vein, cities and municipalities may pass curfews, based solely on age, that discriminate against minors and limit their liberty. (In re Nancy C. (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 747, 758 [upholding constitutionality of curfew ordinance forbidding juveniles from loitering in streets during nighttime hours].)" (In re Walter P. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 95, 101.)
The probation question at issue here is, in effect, a curfew imposed on defendant, an adult.
The People urge that imposing a curfew as a condition of probation on an adult does not interfere with a probationer's constitutional rights (freedom of movement). However, "[a] probation condition that imposes limitations on a person's constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad." (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.)
The People note that "the right of free movement is not absolute and may be reasonably restricted in the public interest." (In re White (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 141, 149.) White, however, involves an unreasonable restriction on freedom of movement.
In White, the defendant was convicted of prostitution. The trial court imposed a condition of probation which significantly restricted the defendant's freedom of movement: she was forbidden from being anywhere within certain bounded areas within the city, "at any time, day or night, or be present upon either side of any street which is a border of such area." (In re White, supra, 97 Cal.App.3d at p. 143.) She could not therefore go to any restaurants or other businesses within the mapped areas, she could no longer travel by bus because the depot was within the mapped areas, she was forced to move because her residence had been within one of the mapped areas, she could not take her children to the park or zoo because they bordered the mapped areas, and she was similarly restricted from many other reasonable and lawful activities because of the probation condition. The Court of Appeal held that such a restriction was unreasonable, unduly harsh, and oppressive. (Id. at p. 147.) "In some regards the condition may be related to future criminal conduct. However, the condition is too broad in proscribing every type of activity. Keeping White out of the map area will have a minimal effect on future criminal conduct except possibly in that particular area. As previously noted, there was prosecution testimony in the superior court hearing that this type of probation condition only moves solicitors to other areas of Fresno. Unlike conditions proscribing hitchhiking or the frequenting of specific places (such as bars, pool rooms, etc.), this condition is simply too broad. There is little factual nexus between the proscribed activity and future criminality." (Ibid.)
People v. Delvalle (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 869, 879, cited by the People, involved a restriction on the defendant's freedom of association. The defendant was convicted of attempting to buy a child. One of the conditions of his probation was that he stay away from places where children congregate. The probation condition was directly related to the convicted crime; he had attempted to purchase a child by following her home from school. The probation condition was tailored to specific places, such as elementary schools, day care centers and parks. It was reasonably related to the compelling state interest both in protecting children and in the defendant's reformation and rehabilitation (removing the temptation to duplicate the offense in similar locations).
There is no such direct or reasonable connection here to any compelling interest or to reforming and rehabilitating a defendant whose crime had nothing to do with gang membership and nothing to do with nighttime activities.
The People cite several out-of-state cases to justify imposing a curfew condition like that here. All are distinguishable.
In State v. Donovan (1977) 116 Ariz. 209 , a woman asked for law enforcement accompaniment when she went to retrieve her belongings from the home she had shared with the defendant. While officers were present in the house to prevent domestic violence, they observed drug paraphernalia. The defendant was convicted of the drug offenses and placed on probation. Among other probation conditions, the defendant was required to live at home with his parents, not be out of the house after 10:00 p.m. for eight months, and to continue his education and seek employment. (Id., 568 P.2d at p. 1109.) The discussion of the probation conditions was not extensive; the court simply found the conditions were related to the defendant's rehabilitation and protection of the public. The stated conditions did involve a curfew, but they also included requirements that the defendant live at home with his parents and attend school. The defendant's age is not stated in the opinion, but it is difficult to imagine such conditions being imposed in the case of a 41-year-old adult.
State v. Sprague (1981) 52 Or.App. 1063 involved a 20-year-old woman who was convicted of harassment, a misdemeanor, for striking a police officer who was arresting her friend. Both young women were out on the street at midnight, after having spent the evening at a bar. The trial court imposed a 10:00 p.m. curfew. The appellate court upheld the curfew condition as against the defendant's claim of impingement on her constitutional rights. First, the condition was reasonably related to the needs of an effective probation: the trial judge was "'convinced, based on the facts of the case and on the facts of her—her age, her situation with the [11-month-old] child, her habit of hanging around with the crowd, and then becoming a part of it, . . . obviously a member of some sort of group. It just means that she has very strong group ties. Those people, I don't feel, are very good for her to be hanging around, at least after dark. They show an alarming lack of maturity and a propensity for getting into trouble.'" (Id., 629 P.2d at p. 1328.) The curfew restriction was reasonably related to the defendant's circumstances which had led to the offense, i.e., the youth and vulnerability of the defendant, as well as the connection of the offense to nighttime activities in bars. In those circumstances, the reviewing court held that the curfew restriction "[w]as a minimal restraint on defendant's liberty and reasonably related to an effective probation." (Id. at pp. 1328-1329.) The defendant may have been an adult, but she was only barely so, and, under California standards, was under age to be patronizing drinking establishments. Nighttime activities were directly related to her conviction.
In Kominsky v. State (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1976) 330 So.2d 800, the defendant was found guilty of possession of marijuana. The court placed the defendant on probation for five years and appointed his parents as probation advisors. The court also imposed probation conditions restricting the defendant from driving more than 35 miles per hour, and subjecting him to a curfew of 8:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. In addition, the defendant was ordered to pay $10 per month into the county fine and forfeiture fund. The defendant asked about his appeal rights; the trial court told the defendant he had a "snowball's chance" on appeal, and indicated that he would increase the amount to be paid in supervision reimbursement costs if the defendant decided to appeal. The defendant did appeal, and the trial court promptly increased his payments from $10 per month to $30 per month. In a very abbreviated opinion, the appellate court found all three of the challenged conditions punitive and unduly restrictive. The reviewing court ordered the driving restriction changed to "obey all traffic laws," ordered the court to strike the increase in the reimbursement amount, and modified the curfew condition to read from 11:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. (Id. at pp. 801-802.)
The cursory nature of the appellate opinion does not indicate the defendant's age, but apparently the defendant was sufficiently immature that the court appointed his parents as probation advisers. The People here can take small comfort from Kominsky, which does not establish that the routine imposition of a curfew on a mature adult is constitutionally permissible, particularly, as here, where nighttime activities had no relation whatsoever to the underlying offense, i.e., the reason for which the defendant has been subjected to probation supervision.
As to the reasonableness of the curfew condition in general, pursuant to the Lent criteria, the People rely on In re Laylah K. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1496 and People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, to uphold the imposition of the curfew term, as part of a set of "gang terms," in this case. As with the constitutional cases, these cases are likewise inapposite.
In In re Laylah K., supra, 229 Cal.App.4th 1496, disapproved on another point in In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 962, fn. 2, 983 and 984, footnote 13, the Court of Appeal upheld the imposition of a constellation of "gang terms" for a juvenile probationer whose crime had "gang overtones," even though it was not definitively shown to be gang related. In In re Laylah K., the minor and two other girls accosted a woman walking her dog along the street. They demanded to know why the woman was wearing an article of red clothing. They yelled obscenities at the woman, challenged her to a fight, and the minor twice punched her in the face. All the juveniles presented false identification when they were caught by police. The probation report stated that the case had "gang overtones" because of the altercation over the red clothing. Two of the juveniles admitted they had friends who were members of the Crips gang, and one of the girls involved was in fact a Crips member. A family member of one of the juveniles told the probation officer that, if the juveniles were not gang members, they were at least gang associates. Under these circumstances, there was sufficient indication of gang involvement, or the potential for gang involvement, to justify adding "gang terms" to the juveniles' probation requirements. The gang terms included a curfew between 8:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. (In re Laylah K., supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 1499.)
The "gang terms" included:
"Term 4: Prohibits minors from being out of their homes between 8[:00] p.m. and 5[:00] a.m.
"Term 8: Prohibits minors' presence at any known gathering area of the Crips gang.
"Term 9: Prohibits association with known members of the Crips gang.
"Term 10: Prohibits possession of weapons and association with persons who are in possession of weapons.
"Term 11: Orders submission to warrantless search and seizure.
"Term 12: Orders submission to chemical testing.
"Term 15: Prohibits presence at a court proceeding unless minor is a party, defendant, or witness.
"Term 16: Prohibits wearing clothing or emblems affiliated with membership in the Crips gang." (In re Laylah K., supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 1499.)
By contrast, defendant's case here was not permeated with "gang overtones." The type of crime, check forgery, was not one typically associated with criminal street gangs. Presumably, the crime to which defendant pleaded guilty was conducted during normal open business hours (attempting to pass a forged check at a cash register in a discount department store), not under cover of night. Defendant's motivation was to provide a means to buy holiday presents for his children. Defendant did have many tattoos, some of which may have had gang associations, but he also related that he had ceased to belong to any gang. His age, 41, was atypical for gang membership. Defendant only mentioned his past gang membership in passing during his probation interview; there was no showing of any active involvement or association with any gang or gang-related activity, either with respect to the crime, or with respect to defendant himself. In addition, defendant is an adult, not a juvenile who is generally subject to the custody and control of a parent or guardian. In short, there was no nexus between any facts having to do with gangs, on the one hand, and defendant, his crime, and reasonably pertinent supervision requirements, on the other.
In People v. Lopez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th 615, the defendant was charged with grand theft of a vehicle, unlawful taking and driving of a vehicle, and receiving stolen property. Via plea bargain, he pleaded guilty to the taking-and-driving charge. The charges arose from an incident in which the defendant and a companion were found in and around a stolen vehicle at 2:00 a.m. The defendant had several gang tattoos and was "a self admitted gang member." (Id. at pp. 621-622.) The defendant was admitted to probation, among the terms of which was the following: "No. 15: 'The defendant is not to be involved in any gang activities or associate with any gang members, nor wear or possess, any item of identified gang clothing, including: any item of clothing with gang insignia, moniker, color pattern, bandanas, jewelry with any gang significance, nor shall the defendant display any gang insignia, moniker, or other markings of gang significance on his/her person or property as may be identified by Law Enforcement or the Probation Officer.'" (Id. at p. 622.) The trial court overruled the defendant's objection to this probation term, and the defendant appealed. The defendant contended there was no evidence to show that his current crime was gang related. The Court of Appeal noted that: "The People acknowledge there is nothing in the record which suggests the offense to which Lopez pled guilty was the product of gang activity. Nonetheless, the People maintain the information in the probation report about Lopez's gang connections justified the condition." (Id. at p. 623.) The court held that "Condition No. 15 was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion in this case. Prohibitions against a variety of gang-related activities have been upheld when imposed upon juvenile offenders. [Citing In re Laylah K., supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 1496, 1500-1502, and other cases.] Because '[a]ssociation with gang members is the first step to involvement in gang activity,' such conditions have been found to be 'reasonably designed to prevent future criminal behavior.' [Citation.] Whether the minor was currently connected with a gang has not been critical. Thus, probation terms have been approved which bar minors from being present at gang gathering areas, associating with gang members, and wearing gang clothing. [Citation.] [¶] We believe probationary proscriptions against gang-related conduct are equally proper when imposed upon adult offenders such as Lopez. The path from gang associations to criminal gang activity is open to adults as well as to minors. Though the courts have sometimes sustained probation conditions imposed upon a juvenile offender that would be 'unconstitutional or otherwise improper' if imposed upon an adult offender, the basis for this distinction has been that a juvenile probationary order is a part of a final order, which the minor may not reject, aimed at ensuring the minor's reformation and rehabilitation, while an adult probationary order, which the defendant may reject, is an act of leniency in lieu of the prescribed statutory punishment. [Citation.] This difference is not of material effect here. The rehabilitative point of condition No. 15 is the same with respect to an adult such as Lopez as it is with respect to a minor such as the juvenile in Laylah." (Id. at pp. 624-625, fn. omitted.)
Lopez, however, is distinguishable and does not stand for the proposition that all gang-related probation conditions which might be imposed upon minors are equally properly imposed upon adults, as long as there is some possible gang connection somewhere in the defendant's background. First, the defendant in Lopez was admittedly an active gang member. Second, the gang-related conditions imposed did not, so far as is shown, include a curfew provision. Third, the kind of crime in which the defendant was involved was typical of gang crimes, even if there was no particular evidence to indicate that the specific crime was gang related. Fourth, the verbiage, to the effect that "[w]hether [a] minor was currently connected with a gang has not been critical," was made in the context of young people who might not yet be clear associates or members of gangs, but who were on a path leading naturally to such a progression, from familiarity, to association, to membership and active participation in criminal gang activities. Some adults—young adults—might also be on a similar progressive pathway from nonmembership to association to full and active membership in a gang, but older adults are not necessarily subject to the same influences. In other words, people can and do leave gangs.
The only facts concerning defendant's gang membership in the instant case came from defendant himself. He admitted past gang membership, but also said that he was no longer a member. Defendant's age, 41, was not typical of active gang membership or associated activity. There was thus no reason to disbelieve defendant's statement. Minors and young adults might have a tangential gang association which suggests a pathway toward greater gang-related involvement and criminality. The tangential gang association has a reasonable likelihood of leading to further or greater gang involvement and activity. However, defendant's past gang association was, so far as is known, truly past and not connected in any way to either the current offense or future criminality. His tangential (past) gang affiliation did not establish a reasonable likelihood of future gang activity.
The curfew provision of defendant's probation, justified as a "gang term," was improper. There was no showing that defendant's past gang association was anything other than past, or that it had any relationship to the current crime. The current offense was committed during regular business hours, not in the wee hours of the morning. It was not a crime which was shown to be typical of criminal street gang crimes. The curfew provision relates to conduct which is not itself criminal. Defendant is not a minor, and thus juvenile curfew ordinances have no applicability to him. The probation condition forbids conduct which, in this context, has no reasonable relationship to future criminality. It was proposed off-handedly by the probation department, solely as a "gang term," when there was utterly no showing of any gang influence active in defendant's life. The trial court overruled defendant's objection, not on the basis of any real or reasonable connection to future criminality, but solely on its view that defendant had been a gang member in the past: "Are you arguing he's not a former gang member?" There was no other justification for imposing any of the "gang terms." That justification was not shown to have a reasonable relation to future criminality in defendant's case.
The curfew probation condition was unreasonable in its relationship to probation supervision, and was an unreasonable interference with defendant's constitutional rights, in the context of this case, which involved only past gang membership, no evidence of any current gang association, no connection or nexus between past gang membership and the present offense, and no nexus of any crime to nighttime activity.
II. The Probation Condition Requiring Reporting or De Facto Registration With a Gang
Detail or Unit Was Improper
One of the "gang terms" perfunctorily recommended by the probation department and imposed by the court was that defendant show proof within 14 days that he had made contact with, and given a copy of his probation terms and restrictions to, not merely the local law enforcement agency where he lived, but specifically with the "gang detail." Effectively, defendant was required to register with the local gang unit.
As with the curfew probation condition, however, there was no showing that gang membership, even former gang membership, had any connection whatsoever to the crime. In this context, where there was utterly no evidence of any active gang connection, the requirement singling out registration with the "gang detail" was not related to future criminality. Defense counsel had agreed that providing defendant's terms and conditions to the local law enforcement agency was reasonably related to future criminality, as alerting the police of his probation status. Giving notice to the local agency would serve every reasonable purpose of probation in the absence of any indication that defendant's former gang membership had anything to do with his actions, criminal or otherwise. The notification requirement is ordered modified to require that defendant "[r]eport to the local police agency with a copy of your terms and conditions, and show proof to the probation officer within fourteen (14) days from today's date or your release from custody."
DISPOSITION
In the absence of any evidence of any current or likely gang connection, and no nexus of any gang activity to defendant's conviction, the imposition, seemingly as a matter of routine, of "gang terms" as conditions of probation was an abuse of discretion. The challenged terms—imposition of a curfew on an adult and requiring de facto registration with the "gang detail" of the local law enforcement agency—violated the Lent criteria and impinged on defendant's constitutional rights. Term 27, imposing a curfew, is ordered stricken. Term 28 is modified to state that defendant must "[r]eport to the local police agency with a copy of your terms and conditions, and show proof to the probation officer within fourteen (14) days from today's date or your release from custody." The trial court is ordered to correct its records to reflect these modifications. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed. (See People v. Burden (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1277, 1281.)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
We concur:
MILLER
J.
CODRINGTON
J.