Opinion
4-22-0894
12-21-2023
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MERCEDEZ LEMONE BYRD, Defendant-Appellant.
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County No. 20CF1011 Honorable John Casey Costigan, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Doherty and Lannerd concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
HARRIS JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: Defendant's comments during his statement in allocution at sentencing constituted a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, triggering the trial court's duty to conduct a Krankel inquiry.
¶ 2 Following a jury trial, defendant, Mercedez Lemone Byrd, was convicted of 13 counts of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(4) (West 2014)) and 5 counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (id. § 11-1.60(d)). The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of imprisonment totaling 97 years. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence.
¶ 3 On appeal, defendant argues (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to present propensity evidence pursuant to section 115-7.3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-7.3 (West 2020)), (2) the court improperly failed to conduct an inquiry into his pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel as required by People v. Krankel, 102 Ill.2d 181 (1984), and (3) his convictions for criminal sexual assault based on the allegations in counts 24, 25, and 27 violate the one-act, one-crime rule because those counts were predicated on the same physical act. We agree with defendant's second argument and, because we find it dispositive for purposes of resolving the instant appeal, discuss only the facts related to that particular claim.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 In September 2020, a grand jury returned bills of indictment charging defendant with, in relevant part, 13 counts of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(4) (West 2014)) and 5 counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (id. § 11-1.60(d)), alleging he committed various sexual acts against A.R. (born June 2003), who was the daughter of his then-girlfriend, S.R.
¶ 6 Defendant's case proceeded to a jury trial, which was conducted on June 22, 2022, and June 23, 2022. Defendant testified on his own behalf at trial. He denied the allegations raised against him. Following the arguments of the parties, the jury found defendant guilty of each count beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 7 On September 2, 2022, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing. At the hearing, defendant made a statement in allocution, which began as follows:
"THE DEFENDANT: First off, Your Honor, I was railroaded in this case and the charges presented by the Court held no truth to them at all, and the State didn't present any factual evidence that would or should have convicted me, only coerced allegation after another. Just as good stories uncontested by my attorney, unfortunately this Court isn't about stories. It's about truth and facts, and the
factor [ sic ] remains is, the Court-the State's Attorney-the State's Attorney did not prove any facts in this, just countless coerced lies given by my accused as well as other State's witnesses. Constantly changed testimony from the original statement given by police, nurses, and child advocacy center.
Crucial pieces of evidence in my defense were never mentioned or brought up, and if they had been, I am beyond confident the jury would have rendered a not guilty verdict. Even without my evidence presented, the State did not provide any evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that suggests I committed any crime in which [ sic ] I was charged with. Instead, they presented witnesses who did not mind lying under oath in order to help the State in their case." (Emphases added.)
Defendant dedicated the remainder of his statement in allocution to challenging the sufficiency of the State's evidence and to identifying several pieces of evidence that would have purportedly undermined the State's case if presented at trial. Specifically, defendant alleged that (1) through a sexual assault examination, A.R. tested positive for a sexually transmitted disease (STD) that neither he nor S.R. had contracted, (2) one of S.R.'s paramours informed him that he had a "similar situation when dealing with" A.R. and overheard conversations between A.R. and S.R. that defendant did not commit the charged offenses, and (3) both he and his sister "have countless text messages" from S.R. indicating she knew defendant was innocent.
¶ 8 Following defendant's statement, the trial court sentenced him to concurrent, 6- year terms of imprisonment on the aggravated criminal sexual abuse convictions and to consecutive 7-year sentences on the criminal sexual assault convictions, to be served consecutively to the 6-year sentences, for a total of 97 years.
¶ 9 On September 8, 2022, defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, which the trial court denied.
¶ 10 This appeal followed.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 Defendant argues, in relevant part, the trial court erred in failing to conduct a Krankel inquiry into his pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. He claims that he triggered the court's duty to conduct a Krankel inquiry when he stated in allocution that the State only presented "good stories uncontested by my attorney" and "[c]rucial pieces of evidence in my defense were never mentioned or brought up," after which he identified the purportedly exculpatory evidence that was not presented at trial. We review de novo the legal question of whether the trial court erred in failing to conduct a Krankel inquiry. People v. Moore, 207 Ill.2d 68, 75 (2003).
¶ 13 We note as an initial matter that after briefing was completed in the instant appeal, this court issued its decision in People v. Wheaton, 2023 IL App (4th) 221070-U. We subsequently granted defendant's unopposed motion to cite Wheaton as additional persuasive authority supporting his Krankel claim.
¶ 14 The common law procedure developed from the supreme court's decision in Krankel "serves the narrow purpose of allowing the trial court to decide whether to appoint independent counsel to argue a defendant's pro se posttrial ineffective assistance claims." People v. Patrick, 2011 IL 111666, ¶ 39. A Krankel inquiry is triggered "when a defendant brings a clear claim asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, either orally or in writing." (Emphasis added.) People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 18. "When such a claim is merely implicit or could be subject to different interpretations, a Krankel inquiry is not required." People v. Schnoor, 2019 IL App (4th) 170571, ¶ 67. Although a defendant need not use the words "ineffective assistance of counsel" to trigger a Krankel inquiry, he must still, at a minimum, state that "(1) he has a complaint about trial proceedings and (2) that complaint involves something his attorney did or failed to do." Id. ¶ 69.
¶ 15 When a defendant successfully raises a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel triggering Krankel, the trial court must "conduct some type of inquiry into the underlying factual basis, if any," of the claim. People v. Moore, 207 Ill.2d 68, 79 (2003). "If the trial court determines that the claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy, then the court need not appoint new counsel and may deny the pro se motion. However, if the allegations show possible neglect of the case, new counsel should be appointed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 29. In conducting a Krankel inquiry, "some interchange between the trial court and trial counsel regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegedly ineffective representation is permissible and usually necessary in assessing what further action, if any, is warranted on a defendant's claim." Id. ¶ 30. Additionally, "the court is permitted to discuss the allegations with defendant" and "to make its determination based on its knowledge of defense counsel's performance at trial and the insufficiency of the defendant's allegations." Ayers, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 12.
¶ 16 Here, defendant began his statement in allocution by stating, in relevant part, the following:
"THE DEFENDANT: First off, Your Honor, I was railroaded in this case and the charges presented by the Court held no truth to them at all, and the State didn't present any factual evidence that would or should have convicted me, only
coerced allegation after another. Just as good stories uncontested by my attorney, unfortunately this Court isn't about stories." ***
Crucial pieces of evidence in my defense were never mentioned or brought up, and if they had been, I am beyond confident the jury would have rendered a not guilty verdict. Even without my evidence presented, the State did not provide any evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that suggests I committed any crime in which [ sic ] I was charged with. Instead, they presented witnesses who did not mind lying under oath in order to help the State in their case." (Emphases added.)
Defendant dedicated the remainder of his statement in allocution to challenging the sufficiency of the State's evidence and to identifying several pieces of evidence that would have purportedly undermined the State's case if presented at trial. Specifically, defendant alleged that (1) through a sexual assault examination, A.R. tested positive for an STD that neither he nor S.R. had contracted, (2) one of S.R.'s paramours informed him that he had a "similar situation when dealing with" A.R. and overheard conversations between A.R. and S.R. that defendant did not commit the charged offenses, and (3) both he and his sister "have countless text messages" from S.R. indicating she knew defendant was innocent.
¶ 17 In Wheaton, the defendant was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and criminal sexual assault and sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment. Wheaton, 2023 IL App (4th) 221070-U, ¶ 2. The defendant stated in the presentence investigation report (PSI) that "his attorney 'did nothing' at trial," and he "denied any wrongdoing and felt his attorney failed to call witnesses and provide evidence on his behalf." Id. ¶ 7. The defendant also provided a statement at the sentencing hearing in which he indicated one of the alleged victims had made multiple reports that the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services determined were unfounded and he "wished those papers had been brought into evidence." Id. ¶ 8. The defendant further identified several witnesses who could have been called in his defense but were not. Id. On appeal, this court found the defendant's statements in the PSI and at the sentencing hearing were sufficient to trigger a Krankel inquiry. Id. ¶ 20. We reasoned that the defendant's "statements were neither ambiguous nor amenable to multiple interpretations" and that he was clearly complaining about counsel's failure "call witnesses or provide evidence on [his] behalf." Id. ¶¶ 19, 22.
¶ 18 We agree with defendant that Wheaton provides persuasive authority in support of his Krankel argument. As was the case in Wheaton, we find defendant here made a complaint about counsel's performance at trial, such that the trial court's duty to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry into his claims was triggered. At the outset of his allocution statement, defendant asserted that "crucial pieces of evidence in my defense were never mentioned or brought up, and if they had been, I am beyond confident the jury would have rendered a not guilty verdict." Defendant then proceeded to identify witnesses that were not called in his defense and purportedly exculpatory evidence that was not presented. Specifically, he stated that a sexual assault examination conducted on A.R. revealed that she had contracted an STD that neither he nor S.R. had contracted. Defendant further maintained that a paramour of S.R. informed him that he had a "similar situation when dealing with" A.R. and overheard conversations between A.R. and S.R. that defendant did not commit the charged offenses. Finally, defendant stated that both he and his sister "have countless text messages" from S.R. indicating she knew defendant was innocent. These statements may fairly be considered a complaint by defendant that counsel failed to call witnesses on his behalf and to present exculpatory evidence at trial.
¶ 19 In arguing to the contrary, the State highlights the length of defendant's allocution statement and notes that defendant only explicitly mentioned counsel one time, and in the first sentence of his statement. We find the State's argument unpersuasive. While defendant only mentioned counsel a single time, we do not agree that "defendant's statement was amenable to more than one interpretation." As noted above, defendant stated that "crucial pieces of evidence in my defense were never mentioned or brought up." We think the only reasonable interpretation of this statement is that defendant was complaining counsel failed to present crucial pieces of evidence at trial. Who else could have presented evidence on behalf of defendant? As the supreme has noted, this authority rested solely with defense counsel:
"[T]rial counsel has the right to make the ultimate decision with respect to matters of tactics and strategy after consulting with his client. Such matters include what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike and what trial motions should be made. [Citation.] Such matters also include the defense to be presented at trial." People v. Ramey, 152 Ill.2d 41, 54 (1992).
Because defense counsel possessed the right to ultimately decide which witnesses to call and what evidence to present, it is clear that defendant was complaining about counsel's failure to call certain witnesses and present certain pieces of evidence at his trial. Accordingly, we find the circumstances called for a preliminary Krankel inquiry into defendant's pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 20 Having found that remand is necessary to conduct a Krankel inquiry, we decline to address the other issues defendant has raised on appeal. See People v. Bell, 2018 IL App (4th) 151016, ¶¶ 24, 37 (declining to address the defendant's remaining arguments where the cause first had to be remanded for the trial court to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry). However, we retain jurisdiction over defendant's remaining claims, meaning he may appeal again if he is dissatisfied with the proceedings on remand and raise the claims that were not addressed in this order. See People v. Wilson, 2019 IL App (4th) 180214, ¶ 26.
¶ 21 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 22 For the reasons stated, we remand the cause for a preliminary Krankel inquiry into defendant's unaddressed pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 23 Remanded with directions.