Opinion
KA 02-02509.
December 31, 2003.
Appeal from a judgment of Onondaga County Court (Walsh, J.), entered October 23, 2002, convicting defendant after a jury trial of arson in the first degree and intimidating a witness in the third degree (two counts).
FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (PHILIP ROTHSCHILD OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (VICTORIA M. WHITE OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.
Before: PRESENT: PINE, J.P., WISNER, HURLBUTT, KEHOE, AND HAYES, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him following a jury trial of arson in the first degree (Penal Law § 150.20) and two counts of intimidating a witness in the third degree (§ 215.15 [1]), defendant contends that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. We disagree. "Great deference is accorded to the fact-finder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony and observe demeanor" ( People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495). We see no basis to disturb the jury's resolution of credibility issues where, as here, there is no basis to conclude that the testimony of any witnesses was incredible as a matter of law.
We reject the contention of defendant that reversal is required based upon certain of County Court's evidentiary rulings. The court properly precluded a police officer from testifying to hearsay statements of a witness she interviewed ( see People v. Romero, 78 N.Y.2d 355, 361) and properly precluded another officer from rendering an opinion on the truthfulness or veracity of the victim ( see People v. Allen, 222 A.D.2d 441, 442, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 844). By failing to raise a specific objection, defendant has failed to preserve for our review his contention that certain testimony of a police officer constituted bolstering ( see People v. West, 56 N.Y.2d 662, 663; People v. Alshoaibi, 273 A.D.2d 871, 872, lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 960). In any event, the testimony of the officer that she would not have ruled out defendant as a suspect had she known certain facts did not constitute bolstering ( cf. People v. Brown, 262 A.D.2d 570, 577, affd 95 N.Y.2d 776; People v. Milligan, 309 A.D.2d 950; see generally People v. Holt, 67 N.Y.2d 819, 821). Defendant has failed to brief any specific arguments with respect to his contention that the cross-examination of the victim was hampered and thus has abandoned that contention on appeal ( see People v. Jansen, 145 A.D.2d 870, 871, lv denied 73 N.Y.2d 923). We reject defendant's contention that the court erred in precluding defense counsel from questioning an officer about the contents of a written document. The officer who purportedly wrote the document could not authenticate the writing and defense counsel did not pursue any other method of authenticating it ( see People v. Boswell, 167 A.D.2d 928, lv denied 77 N.Y.2d 826; cf. People v. Jean-Louis, 272 A.D.2d 626, 627, lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 890).
Although the prosecutor violated the court's Sandoval ruling, the court sustained defendant's objection and granted defendant's request for curative instructions. Because defendant "neither objected further nor requested a mistrial[,] * * * the curative instruction `must be deemed to have corrected the error to the defendant's satisfaction'" ( People v. Williams, 277 A.D.2d 960, 960, lv denied 96 N.Y.2d 789, quoting People v. Heide, 84 N.Y.2d 943, 944; see People v. Trembling, 298 A.D.2d 890, 892, lv denied 99 N.Y.2d 540). To the extent that defendant contends that a comment by the prosecutor on summation was improper, defendant failed to object to the comment and thus has failed to preserve that contention for our review ( see People v. Shabazz, 289 A.D.2d 1059, 1060, affd 99 N.Y.2d 634, rearg denied 100 N.Y.2d 556; People v. Perez, 298 A.D.2d 935, 937, lv denied 99 N.Y.2d 562). We decline to exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice ( see CPL 470.15 [a]).
Defendant was afforded a "fair opportunity to question prospective jurors" ( People v. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d 600, 616 n; see People v. Jean, 75 N.Y.2d 744, 745), and we therefore conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing reasonable limitations on defense counsel's questioning of those prospective jurors ( see People v. Vargas, 88 N.Y.2d 363, 377). Finally, based upon our review of the record, we reject the contention of defendant that he was denied a fair trial based on cumulative errors ( cf. People v. LaDolce, 196 A.D.2d 49, 53).