Opinion
July 5, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Pincus, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
A decision regarding recusal is generally a matter of personal conscience (see, People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, 68, cert denied 469 U.S. 1227, reh denied 471 U.S. 1049; People v. Reid, 140 A.D.2d 641). The mere fact that the Justice who presided over the joint pretrial Huntley hearing and jury trial of the defendant's accomplice also presided at the defendant's bench trial did not constitute an abuse of discretion. An attempt by the defendant to equate knowledge acquired from the pretrial adjudication and the accomplice's trial "with an appearance of impropriety thus requiring recusal for bench trial purposes, finds no support in law, ethics or sound policy" (People v. Moreno, 70 N.Y.2d 403, 407). Based upon the record before us, we find that the trial court presided in a fair and impartial manner and the defendant was in no way prejudiced by the Trial Judge's failure to recuse himself (see, People v. Reid, supra; People v. Montpeirous, 133 A.D.2d 709, lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 935).
The defendant's contention that he should have been permitted to withdraw his jury waiver finds no support in the record. Brown, J.P., Lawrence, Weinstein and Balletta, JJ., concur.