Opinion
February 3, 2000
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Broome County (Mathews, J.), rendered January 15, 1999, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crimes of rape in the first degree and attempted sodomy in the first degree.
Teresa Mulliken, Delhi, for appellant.
Gerald F. Mollen, District Attorney (Geoffrey B. Rossi of counsel), Binghamton, for respondent.
Before: CARDONA, P.J., MERCURE, CREW III, PETERS and MUGGLIN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
In satisfaction of two indictments charging him with various crimes related to his alleged attack on two females, defendant pleaded guilty to the crimes of rape in the first degree and attempted sodomy in the first degree. Pursuant to the plea agreement, defendant understood that an aggregate sentence of 8 to 16 years in prison would be imposed but that the individual sentences for each conviction would not be determined until the date of sentencing. County Court ultimately sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of 8 to 16 years on the rape count and 3 1/2 to 7 years on the attempted sodomy count, prompting this appeal.
Initially, defendant's challenges to the sufficiency of his plea allocution and the voluntariness of his plea are unpreserved for our review inasmuch as defendant neither moved to withdraw his guilty plea nor to vacate the judgment of conviction (see, People v. Alicea, 264 A.D.2d 900, 694 N.Y.S.2d 816). Even were we to consider defendant's arguments, we would find them to be without merit. Our review of the record reveals that defendant's guilty plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent (see, People v. Fernandez, 263 A.D.2d 673, 696 N.Y.S.2d 242; People v. Gibson, 261 A.D.2d 710), and that the plea allocution was legally sufficient despite defendant's failure to recite all of the elements of the crimes or his version of the events (see, People v. Victor, 262 A.D.2d 872, 694 N.Y.S.2d 774;People v. Tyler, 260 A.D.2d 796, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 980).
Finally, we reject defendant's contention that the sentence imposed was harsh and excessive. Notwithstanding the alleged mitigating circumstances advanced by defendant, we cannot conclude that the agreed-upon sentence was harsh and excessive in light of the particularly egregious and violent nature of defendant's conduct, defendant's knowledge that he would receive the aggregate sentence ultimately imposed and the lack of extraordinary circumstances warranting our intervention (see, People v. Ormsby, 242 A.D.2d 840, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 895; People v. Hamilton, 192 A.D.2d 738).
Defendant's remaining contentions, including those asserted in his pro se submission, have been reviewed and found to be lacking in merit.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.