Opinion
2017–13359 Ind. No. 6281/16
10-21-2020
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Shakie BROWNFIELD, appellant.
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (Samuel Barr of counsel), for appellant. Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Sholom J. Twersky, and Andrew S. Ayala of counsel), for respondent.
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (Samuel Barr of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Sholom J. Twersky, and Andrew S. Ayala of counsel), for respondent.
LEONARD B. AUSTIN, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, SHERI S. ROMAN, BETSY BARROS, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Miriam Cyrulnik, J.), rendered November 15, 2017, convicting him of assault in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that he was deprived of a fair trial by the admission of certain hearsay statements which improperly bolstered the complainant's testimony is partially unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Chin, 148 A.D.3d 925, 926, 49 N.Y.S.3d 517 ). In any event, the defendant's contention is without merit. The testimony of the complainant and a police officer regarding a statement made by the complainant shortly after the crime identifying the defendant as the one who stabbed him was admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, and did not constitute improper bolstering (see People v. Chin, 148 A.D.3d at 926, 49 N.Y.S.3d 517 ). Further, the testimony of the police officer that he arrested the defendant and released another individual after speaking to a woman was properly admitted to complete the narrative and explain the sequence of events leading to the defendant's arrest (see People v. Grace, 179 A.D.3d 1092, 1092–1093, 114 N.Y.S.3d 668 ).
The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish the serious physical injury element of assault in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Chestnut, 149 A.D.3d 772, 773, 50 N.Y.S.3d 549 ). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish that the complainant sustained a serious physical injury within the meaning of Penal Law § 10.00(10) (see People v. Rudenko, 151 A.D.3d 1084, 54 N.Y.S.3d 597 ). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d at 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ; People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ). The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675 ).
AUSTIN, J.P., LEVENTHAL, ROMAN and BARROS, JJ., concur.