Opinion
2012-11323
11-18-2015
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Mahad BROWN, appellant.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Allegra Glashausser and Ronald Zapata of counsel), for appellant. Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Thomas M. Ross of counsel), for respondent.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Allegra Glashausser and Ronald Zapata of counsel), for appellant.
Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Thomas M. Ross of counsel), for respondent.
Opinion
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Carroll, J.), rendered December 12, 2012, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (three counts) and criminal possession of marijuana in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, the indictment is dismissed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent with CPL 160.50.
On December 3, 2011, police officers executed a warrant to search an apartment in Kings County. The police officers who testified at the defendant's trial (hereinafter the searching officers) testified that before they entered the apartment, officers from the Emergency Services Unit (hereinafter the ESU) had entered the apartment, handcuffed all the adults in the apartment, and then left. The searching officers then entered the apartment and found the defendant's mother and younger brother handcuffed in the living room, and the defendant handcuffed on the floor of a hallway that led to two bedrooms. In one of those two bedrooms the searching officers found a woman who had been handcuffed, and two small children. From that bedroom the searching officers recovered several firearms and a quantity of marijuana. None of the officers from the ESU testified at the defendant's trial, and no evidence was presented as to where the ESU officers found the defendant when they entered the apartment. The defendant was arrested and charged with, inter alia, several counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree pursuant to Penal Law § 265.02(1), and criminal possession of marijuana pursuant to Penal Law § 221.25.
In assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, “the court must determine whether there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trial” (People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). In making this assessment, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932).
Here, the People contended at trial that the defendant constructively possessed the weapons and marijuana. The element of constructive possession may be established, inter alia, where it is shown that the defendant exercised “ ‘dominion or control’ ” over the property by exercising a sufficient level of control over the place where the contraband is found or over the person from whom the contraband is seized (People v. Manini, 79 N.Y.2d 561, 573, 584 N.Y.S.2d 282, 594 N.E.2d 563, quoting Penal Law § 10.008; see People v. Arnold, 60 A.D.3d 960, 875 N.Y.S.2d 571; People v. Tirado, 47 A.D.2d 193, 366 N.Y.S.2d 140). “Constructive possession may be established by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence with inferences drawn from the facts presented in the case” (People v. Skyles, 266 A.D.2d 321, 322, 698 N.Y.S.2d 286; see People v. Brian, 84 N.Y.2d 887, 889, 620 N.Y.S.2d 789, 644 N.E.2d 1345). “Where ... the prosecution relies wholly upon circumstantial evidence to establish the guilt of the accused, the circumstances must be satisfactorily established and must be of such a character as, if true, to exclude to a moral certainty every other hypothesis except that of the accused's guilt” (People v. Olivo, 120 A.D.2d 466, 467, 502 N.Y.S.2d 739; see People v. Baffi, 119 A.D.3d 952, 953, 990 N.Y.S.2d 251).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), it was legally insufficient to establish the possession elements of the weapons possession and marijuana possession counts, as charged here. Although the defendant was present in the apartment when the search warrant was executed, “it is settled that one's mere presence in an apartment or house where contraband is found does not constitute sufficient basis for a finding of constructive possession” (People v. Edwards, 206 A.D.2d 597, 614 N.Y.S.2d 469; see People v. Swain, 241 A.D.2d 695, 696, 660 N.Y.S.2d 199). There was no evidence specifically connecting the defendant to the bedroom where the contraband was found, or otherwise connecting the defendant to the contraband. Under these specific circumstances, the People failed to prove that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the contraband, and therefore failed to prove the possession element of the counts as charged (see People v. Huertas, 32 A.D.3d 795, 821 N.Y.S.2d 205; People v. Gautreaux–Perez, 31 A.D.3d 1209, 817 N.Y.S.2d 839; People v. Swain, 241 A.D.2d 695, 696, 660 N.Y.S.2d 199; see also People v. Manini, 79 N.Y.2d at 572–573, 584 N.Y.S.2d 282, 594 N.E.2d 563; People v. Pearson, 75 N.Y.2d 1001, 1002, 557 N.Y.S.2d 269, 556 N.E.2d 1076).
In light of our determination, we do not reach the defendant's remaining contentions.