Opinion
2012-12-21
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Lasean J. BROWN, Defendant–Appellant.
Scott T. Godkin, Utica, for Defendant–Appellant. Scott D. McNamara, District Attorney, Utica (Matthew P. Worth of Counsel), for Respondent.
Scott T. Godkin, Utica, for Defendant–Appellant.Scott D. McNamara, District Attorney, Utica (Matthew P. Worth of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, SCONIERS, AND WHALEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of two counts each of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.16[1] ) and criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (§ 220.39[1] ). Inasmuch as the confidential informant involved in the drug transactions giving rise to defendant's conviction was identified and testified at trial, defendant's contention that County Court erred in denying that part of his pretrial omnibus motion seeking disclosure of the identity of the informant is academic ( see People v. Ingram, 217 A.D.2d 986, 987, 629 N.Y.S.2d 1016;see generally People v. Goggins, 34 N.Y.2d 163, 168–169, 356 N.Y.S.2d 571, 313 N.E.2d 41,cert. denied419 U.S. 1012, 95 S.Ct. 332, 42 L.Ed.2d 286). We reject defendant's further contention that the court erred in denying that part of his omnibus motion seeking a Darden hearing. Because the informant testified before the grand jury and at trial, the objectives of a Darden hearing, i.e., confirmation that the informant existed and provided information to the police concerning the drug sales at issue, were met ( see People v. Kimes, 37 A.D.3d 1, 15–16, 831 N.Y.S.2d 1,lv. denied8 N.Y.3d 881, 832 N.Y.S.2d 494, 864 N.E.2d 624,reconsideration denied9 N.Y.3d 846, 840 N.Y.S.2d 772, 872 N.E.2d 885;see generally People v. Wilson, 48 A.D.3d 1099, 1100, 851 N.Y.S.2d 776,lv. denied10 N.Y.3d 845, 859 N.Y.S.2d 404, 889 N.E.2d 91).
We reject defendant's contention that the court's denial of his challenge for cause to one of the prospective jurors requires reversal ( seeCPL 270.20[2] ). Defendant did not use a peremptory challenge as to the prospective juror at issue and did not exhaust all of his peremptory challenges before the completion of jury selection. Thus, the court's denial of defendant's challenge is not a basis for reversal ( seeCPL 270.20[2]; People v. Flocker, 223 A.D.2d 451, 452, 637 N.Y.S.2d 369,lv. denied88 N.Y.2d 847, 644 N.Y.S.2d 693, 667 N.E.2d 343). We note in any event that the prospective juror at issue was not in fact seated as a juror. Finally, under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request, made on the morning that the trial was scheduled to commence, for an adjournment to permit his new attorney to prepare his defense ( see People v. Povio, 284 A.D.2d 1011, 1011, 725 N.Y.S.2d 784,lv. denied96 N.Y.2d 923, 732 N.Y.S.2d 640, 758 N.E.2d 666). “[T]he right to counsel does not include the right to delay” ( People v. Arroyave, 49 N.Y.2d 264, 273, 425 N.Y.S.2d 282, 401 N.E.2d 393 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).
We have reviewed defendant's remaining contention and conclude that it does not warrant reversal or modification of the judgment.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.