Opinion
February 14, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaughn, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it allowed the prosecutor to introduce evidence, on the People's direct case, that in 1983 the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted burglary in the second degree based upon an act committed in 1982. The defendant argues that the admission of this evidence was prejudicial as it was irrelevant and temporally remote.
"Evidence of prior criminal acts `may be admitted to prove intent * * * when the evidence falls short of demonstrating that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, and where proof of a prior act is relevant to that issue'" (People v Figueroa, 195 A.D.2d 477, 478, quoting People v. Jackson, 193 A.D.2d 621; see, People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233, 245; People v Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 293). "Even when admissible [to show intent], however, the evidence may not be received unless its probative value exceeds the potential for prejudice resulting to the defendant" (People v. Alvino, supra, at 242; People v. Ely, 68 N.Y.2d 520, 529).
Here, the trial court improperly admitted the defendant's 1983 attempted burglary conviction as it was clearly prejudicial and temporally remote (see, People v. Gonzalez, 198 A.D.2d 431; People v. Sims, 195 A.D.2d 612). The defendant's intent to commit a burglary in 1982 is not probative of his intent to commit a burglary in 1991. Thus, the prejudicial value of the evidence outweighed its probative value and it should not have been admitted (see, People v. Hernandez, 71 N.Y.2d 233, 242; People v Rodriguez, 184 A.D.2d 795). However, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt (see, People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230).
The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Mangano, P.J., Rosenblatt, Copertino and Hart, JJ., concur.