Opinion
2004NY013984.
Decided June 22, 2004.
The defendant is charged with obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (PL 195.05) and operation of a vehicle without a safety belt (VTL 1229-c). The information alleges that a police officer observed the defendant in the front passenger seat of an operating motor vehicle not wearing her safety belt. When the officer asked the defendant to identify herself, she refused to provide any form of identification and responded: "I don't have to give you no f**king ID; F**k you, lock me up; I'm not giving you no f**king ID; I don't have sh** for you." The defendant also refused to be fingerprinted or photographed and thereby allegedly prevented the officer from properly processing her arrest.
The defendant moves to dismiss the obstructing governmental administration charge for facial insufficiency and for various other relief. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is denied.
An information is facially sufficient if the factual section contains allegations of an evidentiary nature demonstrating reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged (CPL 100.15; CPL 100.40 [b]). The facts must be supported by nonhearsay allegations which establish, if true, every element of the charged offense (CPL 100.40 [c]; People v. Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133, 135; People v. Hall, 48 NY2d 927). Conclusory allegations are insufficient ( People v. Dumas, 68 NY2d 729).
Penal Law § 195.05 provides, in pertinent part, that "a person is guilty of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree when he intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from performing an official function, by means of intimidation, physical force or interference, or by means of any independently unlawful act . . ."
The allegation that the police officer observed the defendant in the front seat of an operating motor vehicle not wearing a safety belt gives this court reason to believe that the officer was performing an official function, namely, monitoring vehicles for traffic infractions. Therefore, the issue is whether the defendant violated the statute when she: (a) refused to provide the officer with identification after being stopped for a traffic infraction, (b) spoke harshly to the officer, or (c) refused to be photographed or fingerprinted after her arrest. To be considered a violation, her actions had to either constitute an obstruction, impairment or perversion of the administration of law, or her actions had to prevent the officer from performing an official function by means of intimidation, physical force, interference, or an independent unlawful act.
The court holds that neither the defendant's refusal to provide the officer with identification nor her statement to the officer constituted obstruction of governmental administration as a matter of law. Instead, the facts here are akin to People v. Offen ( 96 Misc 2d 147 [Crim Ct, NY County 1978]), cited with approval by the Court of Appeals in In re Davan L. ( 91 NY2d 88).
In Offen, police officers observed the defendant littering on the sidewalk. When an officer informed the defendant that he would receive a summons, the defendant ignored the officer's demand for identification, a prerequisite to the summons process, and replied "go f**k yourself" ( Offen, 96 Misc 2d at 148, 149). The defendant then fled into a store, locked the door, and refused to allow the officers to enter ( id. at 149). The court dismissed the obstructing governmental administration charge, holding that the defendant's refusal to provide identification and his subsequent refusal to open the door to the officers was not a crime ( id. at 150).
Similarly, defendant's refusal to identify herself when stopped for a traffic infraction, accompanied by her vulgar statement, did not rise to the level of obstruction. New York's "stop and identify" statute, CPL 140.50 (1), applies only to persons suspected of committing felonies or misdemeanors, and not traffic infractions ( see Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District of Nevada, ___ US ___, 2004 U.S. Lexis 4385 [June 21, 2004] [sustaining Nevada's "stop and identify" statute]). Had the defendant cooperated with the officer and provided her identification, the officer would likely have issued her a traffic summons without arresting her. The defendant's refusal to identify herself made it necessary for the officer to arrest her and take her into custody in order to ascertain her identity. It is constitutionally permissible to take a defendant into custody after a traffic infraction ( see Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 US 318). Although our Court of Appeals has held that custodial arrests should not be made for traffic violations where a summons can be issued instead ( People v. Howell, 49 NY2d 778), when a defendant refuses to supply identification to a police officer, a custodial arrest in lieu of a summons is proper ( see People v. Rodriguez, NYLJ, June 21, 2002, at 20 [Crim Ct, NY County, Harris, J.]; see also People v. Copeland, 39 NY2d 986 [holding it was proper to arrest a motorist who did not produce a driver's license upon being requested to do so by the police officer]).
Further, even if the defendant's coarse statement exceeded the bounds of polite discourse, it did not constitute obstructing governmental administration because mere words alone do not satisfy the requirement of an intimidating, unlawful, or interfering physical act as mandated by the statute ( In re Davan L., 91 NY2d at 90; People v. Case, 42 NY2d 98, 102).
Nevertheless, the court must deny the defendant's motion to dismiss because the information contains an allegation, albeit a bare-bones one, that the defendant refused to allow the police to fingerprint her and thereby prevented the police from processing her arrest. Criminal Procedure Law § 160.10 permits an officer who has arrested a defendant for any offense to fingerprint the defendant when the officer is unable to ascertain the defendant's identity. Although CPL 160.10 is permissive and does not require an officer to fingerprint an unidentified defendant (unlike CPL 160.10, which directs that an officer must fingerprint the defendant upon an arrest for a felony, misdemeanor or loitering), once an officer decides to fingerprint a defendant in a situation such as this one, he does so in the course of performing an official function, namely, the arrest of a defendant for an offense.
The issue presented then, is whether this defendant's conduct prevented the officer from obtaining her fingerprints. People v. Santos ( 182 Misc 2d 764 [Crim Ct, NY County 1999]), is instructive on this issue. In that case, after being arrested for a B misdemeanor, the defendant pulled away from the officer, sat in a chair and refused to get up when the officer attempted to fingerprint her ( id. at 765). The court held that the defendant's actions constituted the use of physical force as well as interference with official government action ( id. at 771). Here, the court finds that the information gives reasonable cause to believe that the defendant impaired the officer's performance of an official function because it alleges that the defendant refused to allow the officer to fingerprint her. Although the allegation is spare, the standard for pleading a prima-facie case is different than the burden of proof at trial, and the allegations here are sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss ( see People v. Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 680).
However, because of the nature of the allegations, and given that the court file contains a fingerprint report, establishing that the defendant was eventually fingerprinted, the People are directed to respond to paragraphs 5 (a) through (f) of the defendant's Request for a Bill of Particulars dated May 11, 2004, to provide the defense with a copy of any fingerprint card and photographs relating to this defendant for this arrest, and to provide the defense with the following additional Particulars concerning the defendant's refusal to be photographed and fingerprinted:
1. State the exact date, time and location when the defendant refused to be photographed and fingerprinted.
2. Describe the defendant's conduct that is alleged to constitute her refusal to be photographed and fingerprinted.
3. Identify, giving names, badge numbers and command, any persons who took the defendant's fingerprints or photograph in connection with these charges.
These items (discovery and Bill of Particulars) are to be provided to the defense by July 23, 2004.
Defendant's motion to suppress her statement is granted to the extent that a Huntley/Dunaway hearing is ordered.
Defendant's motion to preclude unnoticed statements or identification testimony is denied.
Defendant's Sandoval/Ventimiglia motion is referred to the trial court.
To the extent not addressed herein, the remainder of the motions are denied.
The case is scheduled for Hearing and Trial in Part B on August 3, 2004. Both parties are to be ready on that date.
A copy of this decision is being mailed to both parties on June 22, 2004.
This opinion constitutes the decision and order of the court.