Opinion
CR-5679-17
08-22-2018
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Jason W. BRANDT, Defendant.
Melissa A. Pasquale, Esq., Senior Assistant District Attorney, Dutchess County District Attorney, 236 Main Street, Poughkeepsie, NY 12601 Patrick F. Moore, Esq., Attorney for the defendant, 135 North Water Street, Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
Melissa A. Pasquale, Esq., Senior Assistant District Attorney, Dutchess County District Attorney, 236 Main Street, Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
Patrick F. Moore, Esq., Attorney for the defendant, 135 North Water Street, Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
Thomas J. O'Neill, J.
On June 11, 2018, a pre-trial probable cause hearing was scheduled to be held before this Court to determine the legality of a vehicle traffic stop by the police and whether evidence recovered by the police from the defendant was in violation of his Fourth Amendment constitutional rights. The People were represented by Sr. Assistant District Attorney Melissa A. Pasquale, Esq., and the defendant was represented by Patrick F. Moore, Esq. The parties waived the hearing, stipulated to the facts, and conceded that the only issue for this Court to decide is whether the New York State Trooper had probable cause to stop defendant's vehicle on the basis that defendant failed to properly signal his intention to turn thereby violating V.T.L. § 1163(b). The defendant is charged with driving while intoxicated in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2) and § 1192(3), and insufficient turn signal in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(b). Having duly deliberated on the issue, the Court makes the following findings and conclusions of law:
On October 31, 2017, at 4:21 A.M., the defendant was operating a grey 2017 Honda bearing New York State license plate number HRW 6136 heading in an easterly direction on Verazzano Boulevard in the City of Poughkeepsie. Defendant's vehicle came to a complete stop at a red light at the intersection of Verazzano Boulevard and Mount Carmel Square, in the City of Poughkeepsie, Dutchess County, New York. At no point in time prior to stopping at the light did defendant activate his signal lamps to turn. However, defendant did activate his right hand turn blinker while his vehicle was stationary at the red light, signaling his intent to turn right. Upon the defendant's completion of his signaled right hand turn, New York State Trooper Daniel Dworkin pulled the defendant over for failing to signal one hundred (100) feet prior to the intersection in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(b).
The defendant raises an issue concerning the validity of the initial stop for failing to begin signaling an intention to turn 'during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning." Defendant argues that the stop of his motor vehicle by the police had no legal basis, was pre-textual, and any evidence obtained as a result of this pre-textual stop must be suppressed. Specifically, defendant contends that he was well within his right to pull up to a red light, stop, and while stationary, and in the proper lane, signal his intent to turn, followed by a lawful right hand turn, without being in violation of the law. He was not required to signal one hundred (100) feet prior to effectuating the turn because his vehicle had come to a complete stop at a stop light. Defendant was stopped for violating V.T.L. § 1163(b), which he argues only applies to a moving vehicle that must signal a turn one hundred (100) feet prior to turning. Where the defendant's vehicle was stationary at a red light and he signaled his intention to turn while stopped, the one hundred (100) feet does not apply.
In opposition, the People argue that there is no exception for the requirement that the operator of a vehicle signal his intention no less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. The People cite People v. Tamburrino , 26 Misc.3d 930, 892 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Saratoga Springs City Court 2009), in support of the proposition that a stop of a vehicle that signaled while stopped at a red light, just prior to turning, was a valid stop. The People further argue that regardless of the Officer's subjective motives the stop was still valid, citing People v. Robinson , 97 N.Y.2d 341, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638 (2001).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The People have the initial burden to come forward with evidence to show the legality of the police conduct. See People v. Di Stefano , 38 N.Y.2d 640, 382 N.Y.S.2d 5, 345 N.E.2d 548 (1976) ; People v. Pettinato , 69 N.Y.2d 653, 511 N.Y.S.2d 828, 503 N.E.2d 1365 (1986). This burden cannot be satisfied with conclusory statements or assurances that the police conduct was proper, without an adequate demonstration of the facts. See People v. Dodt , 61 N.Y.2d 408, 474 N.Y.S.2d 441, 462 N.E.2d 1159 (1984) ; People v. Bouton , 50 N.Y.2d 130, 428 N.Y.S.2d 218, 405 N.E.2d 699 (1980). Here the facts are conceded. In turn, the defendant bears the ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence seized was illegally obtained and should not be used against him. See , People v. Hetrick , 80 N.Y.2d 344, 590 N.Y.S.2d 183, 604 N.E.2d 732 (1992). In the absence of credible evidence establishing a legal basis for the initial traffic stop of defendant's vehicle, the statements and other evidence seized subsequent to his arrest must be suppressed, as having been obtained in violation of defendant's constitutional rights.
Here, since the parties stipulated to the facts, the only issue before this Court is whether the Trooper had probable cause to stop the vehicle based upon his observations that he saw defendant not signal 100 feet prior to turning at a red light in violation of V.T.L. § 1163(b). The Court finds that the initial stop was not valid.
Section 1163 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law is entitled, "Turning movements and required signals ." (Hereinafter, "The Turning Statute"). Highlighting how The Turning Statute begins is necessary to provide a complete and thorough analysis of this issue. Specifically, and in relevant part, the Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(a) provides as follows,
No person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection unless the vehicle is in proper position upon the roadway as required in section eleven hundred sixty, or turn a vehicle to enter a private road or driveway, or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direction course or move right or left upon a roadway unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety. No person shall so turn any vehicle without giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided .
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(a) (emphasis added ). The Turning Statute then sets forth four(4) different scenarios setting the manners "hereinafter provided " of what a vehicle must do to provide the appropriate signal to others of one's intention to turn in order to comply with the law - only two (2) of which bear any meaningful discussion.
First, there is Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(b), which is what the State Trooper accused defendant of violating and provides the basis for the stop. This subdivision of the statute provides,
A signal of intention to turn right or left when required shall be given continuously during not less than the last one hundred feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.
However, this Court finds that V.T.L. § 1163(b) does not apply to the facts here, and finds instead that it applies to motor vehicles continuously traveling just prior to effectuating a turn. Likewise, this Court rejects the holding of People v. Tamburrino , 26 Misc.3d 930, 892 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Saratoga Springs City Ct. 2009) as unpersuasive, and is inapposite. Preliminarily, the Tamburrino Court noted that while the defendant signaled her intention to turn at the traffic light (like the facts here), she had failed to signal the change of lanes - which is a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(d) - and whether charged or not, it gave the officer a basis to stop the vehicle. Moreover, unlike here, the Tamburrino case hinged upon the duty to signal a lane change under all circumstances citing People v. Rice , 44 A.D.3d 247, 841 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1st Dept. 2007). Yet, here, it is undisputed that the defendant DID signal, whereas the defendant in Tamburrino signaled at the light, but failed to signal the lane change before reaching the traffic light.
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(d), bears significant relevance to the facts herein, because it addresses the opposite scenario of 1163(b) and when a motorist's must signal his/her intention to turn. V.T.L. § 1163(d) applies to a motor vehicle starting from a stopped or stationary position. Specifically, it provides,
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(c) and (e) bear no relevance to the facts of this case and thus reference to the language contained therein has been omitted.
The signals provided for in section eleven hundred sixty-four [ ] shall be used to indicate an intention to turn, change lanes, or start from a parked position and not be flashed on one side only on a parked or disable vehicle, or flashed as a courtesy or "do pass" signal to operators of other vehicles approaching from the rear .
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1164 is entitled, "Signals by hand and arm or signal lamps", and substantively provides that stop or turn signals shall be given, either by signal lamps or by means of the hand and arm.
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(d) (emphasis added ).
The parties stipulated that the defendant was stationary. The vehicle was stopped at a red light at the intersection of Verazzano Boulevard and Mount Carmel Square. The parties further stipulated that defendant activated his right hand turn signal while in a stationary position signaling his intention to turn. It is undisputed that defendant's vehicle was at an intersection and in a "proper position upon the roadway" in compliance with V.T.L. § 1163(a) . Therefore, at that intersection defendant was required at that time to give "an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided " Id.The facts of this case dictate that the "manner hereinafter provided" falls within the strictures of V.T.L. § 1163(d) - a stopped motor vehicle that must signal their intention to turn from a stationary position, not V.T.L. 1163 (b) - which requires signaling an intention to turn not less than the last 100 feet traveled. The applicability of this statute [ V.T.L. § 1163(d) ] is evident because while Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(b) provides similar language to (d), it is distinguishable.
And this Court is bound by the principles of statutory construction which provides that "the purpose of the statute and the objectives sought to be accomplished by the Legislature must be borne in mind," [ Abood v. Hospital Ambulance Serv . 30 N.Y.2d 295, 332 N.Y.S.2d 877, 283 N.E.2d 754 (1972) ; see also People v. Litto, 33 A.D.3d 625, 822 N.Y.S.2d 130 (2d Dept. 2006) ], and where "statutory language is unambiguous, a court will ordinarily give effect to the plain meaning of the words and apply the statute according to its express terms." Matter of Tucker v. Board of Educ. Community School Dist. No. 10 , 82 N.Y.2d 274, 604 N.Y.S.2d 506, 624 N.E.2d 643 (1993) [citations omitted]; see also Carey v. Cuomo , 209 A.D.2d 570, 619 N.Y.S.2d 646 (2d Dept. 1994). Bearing this in mind, and reading the statutes, as consistent with one another, which can be done so here, this Court finds that while both subdivisions require a signal of the motorists intention to turn, subdivision (b) applies to motor vehicles continuously traveling before turning and requires a signal of an intention to turn "during not less than the last 100 feet traveled", whereas subdivision (d) applies to those vehicles (not continuously traveling) that must also signal their intention to turn - but does not require a signal during the last 100 feet previously traveled.
In other words, had the defendant in this case not signaled at all at the stop light, and turned right, the Trooper could have conducted a valid motor vehicle traffic stop for violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(d) - failure to signal an intention to turn. But again, here the parties concede that the defendant did in fact signal. Therefore, the defendant complied with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(d) when it signaled his intention to turn while stopped at a traffic light. Defendant did not violate either V.T.L. § 1163(b) or § 1163(d), and there is no controlling case law that supports a finding otherwise.
Therefore, this Court finds that the People have failed to meet their burden in coming forth with evidence to show the legality of the police conduct. See People v. Di Stefano , 38 N.Y.2d 640, 382 N.Y.S.2d 5, 345 N.E.2d 548 (1976) ; People v. Pettinato , 69 N.Y.2d 653, 511 N.Y.S.2d 828, 503 N.E.2d 1365 (1986).The general rule of law is that where a police officer has "reasonable suspicion" to believe that a violation or crime is being committed or is afoot, the officer may effectuate a vehicle traffic stop. People v. Ingle , 36 N.Y.2d 413, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67, 330 N.E.2d 39 (1975) ; People v. Chilton , 69 N.Y.2d 928, 516 N.Y.S.2d 633, 509 N.E.2d 327 (1987) ; In re Muhammad F. , 94 N.Y.2d 136, 700 N.Y.S.2d 77, 722 N.E.2d 45 (1999). See also , People v. Robinson , 97 N.Y.2d 341, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638 (2001) (probable cause standard applied). Where the conduct observed provides a rational "articulable" reason to pull a car over, the officer may effectuate a vehicle traffic stop. People v. Ingle , 36 N.Y.2d 413, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67, 330 N.E.2d 39 (1975) ; Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). Here, the defendant did not violate any traffic laws, and Trooper Dworkin did not have the requisite "reasonable suspicion" to effectuate a lawful vehicle traffic stop of the defendant's vehicle. People v. Troche , 162 A.D.2d 483, 556 N.Y.S.2d 403 (2d Dept. 1990) ; People v. Blajeski , 125 A.D.2d 582, 509 N.Y.S.2d 648 (2d Dept. 1986).
THEREFORE , based upon the foregoing, this Court finds that there was no probable cause for the vehicle traffic stop, and the evidence seized subsequent to the arrest must be suppressed.
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.