Opinion
August 11, 1986
Appeal from the County Court, Westchester County (Marasco, J.).
Judgment reversed, on the law, and new trial ordered.
We find that the trial court improperly permitted the arresting officers to testify on direct examination as to the complainant's identification of the defendant. It would appear that this testimony was not essential to any appropriate narrative of the events leading to the apprehension of the defendant, but, rather was elicited for the prime purpose of bolstering the complainant's identification testimony. Such testimony was in contravention of the rule articulated in People v Trowbridge ( 305 N.Y. 471). The defendant did not attempt to demonstrate that the testimony of the complainant was a recent fabrication and therefore did not open the door to testimony which would otherwise be inadmissible as hearsay (see, People v Barnes, 93 A.D.2d 864, 865). Moreover, the evidence of the defendant's guilt rested solely upon the identification by the complaint (see, People v Felder, 108 A.D.2d 869) and, under the circumstances of this case, the error cannot be disregarded as harmless (cf. People v Johnson, 57 N.Y.2d 969).
We note that all too frequently prosecutors are engaging in the questioning of police witnesses in order to improperly bolster identification testimony in violation of the Trowbridge rule (see, People v Tugwell, 114 A.D.2d 869; People v Grubbs, 112 A.D.2d 104; People v Lee, 109 A.D.2d 1066; People v Williams, 109 A.D.2d 906; People v Felder, 108 A.D.2d 869, supra). While in some cases these errors have either not been preserved or have been found harmless, we would admonish prosecutors to avoid such conduct, and would alert the trial courts to be vigilant in preventing the introduction of such testimony.
We have examined the defendant's remaining contention and find it to be without merit. Mollen, P.J., Thompson, Brown and Rubin, JJ., concur.