Opinion
February 1, 1999
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Rivera, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was arrested in an apartment shortly after someone observed an individual entering the apartment through a window next to the fire escape at approximately 2:30 A.M. The police also recovered personal property belonging to the, owner of the apartment in a bag on the fire escape. The defendant testified that an acquaintance let him into the apartment. He contended that if the police had searched the apartment following his arrest, they would have discovered his acquaintance. Three police officers testified that they searched the apartment and found the defendant in a back room, hiding under some clothes. The defendant was charged, inter alia, with burglary in the second degree.
The defendant claims that the judgment should be reversed on the ground that the People's delayed disclosure of two memo book entries constituted a Rosario violation. During cross-examination of the People's second witness, a police sergeant, the defendant discovered that the People had not provided the sergeant's memo book. After a brief delay, the People provided the defendant with copies of relevant entries from the sergeant's memo book and the court adjourned the trial overnight. The Rosario material consisted of two memo book entries pertaining to the defendant's arrest. The first stated that it was "2:45", and the street address of the building where the burglary occurred. The second entry stated, "0300, one under by Jackson 62A". Jackson was the arresting officer.
Under the circumstances, the defendant was not substantially prejudiced by the People's delayed disclosure ( see, People v. Best, 186 A.D.2d 141; cf., People v. Banch, 80 N.Y.2d 610). The defendant had just begun cross-examining the police sergeant and had adequate opportunity to prepare for further cross-examination. Additionally, the terse entries contained in the memo book did not disclose any new information and thus could not have affected the defendant's opening statement or cross-examination of the People's first witness.
The defendant received meaningful representation from his defense counsel ( see, People v. Keels, 254 A.D.2d 372).
The defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, are, for the most part, unpreserved for appellate review ( see, CPL 470.05 Crim. Proc. [2]) and, in any event, without merit ( see, People v. Kirkland, 89 N.Y.2d 903; People v. Canty, 60 N.Y.2d 830; People v. Hughes, 228 A.D.2d 618; People v. Vincent, 226 A.D.2d 297; People v. Lipscomb, 187 A.D.2d 614; People v. Rosa, 186 A.D.2d 494).
Miller, J. P., Thompson, Sullivan and McGinity, JJ., concur.