Opinion
C079730
10-03-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PATRICK EDWARD BLACKSHIRE, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 13F03765)
A jury found defendant Patrick Edward Blackshire guilty of procuring and offering a forged instrument, perjury, and forgery of a legal document. The trial court sentenced him to a two-year state prison term.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in including language from Penal Code section 125 in the perjury instruction, and there is insufficient evidence to support the perjury and forgery convictions. Finding the error in the perjury instruction harmless, and sufficient evidence supporting the perjury and forgery convictions, we affirm.
Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
BACKGROUND
A
The Prosecution's Case
Alma and Oliver Slade are defendant's cousins. They inherited the home at 820 Carmelita Avenue (the property) in Sacramento from their mother. Since Oliver was homeless and mentally ill, Alma, who received power of attorney over the property from Oliver, was the sole decision maker for the property.
We refer to Alma and Oliver Slade by their first names to avoid confusion.
Taxes had not been paid on the property for some time and it had been declared uninhabitable. Alma and her husband tried to maintain the exterior between 2008 to 2011, but did no work inside the house. The home was abandoned; windows and doors were boarded up, high weeds grew in the yard, and the carpet, refrigerator, and pipes had been removed. Alma never allowed defendant to work or live there.
Although Alma testified that she never allowed defendant to work or live at the house, she at one point acknowledged that she had left a voice mail message with a district attorney's investigator that defendant would be at the property painting the house with his men.
Defendant offered Alma $60 for the property in 2010, which she declined. Ten months later, he advised Alma that the property had a $30,000 lien against it. Alma eventually refused to answer defendant's calls about the property.
Defendant befriended Alma on Facebook in September 2012. During their exchange of messages, defendant told Alma she would not be able to sell the house without giving him $100,000. Defendant also sent her a Facebook message about owner financing in January 2013.
Alma allowed the property to revert to the county in 2011 because she could not pay the $60,000 in liens against the property after she lost her job. The property went into five-year tax default in July 2012, and was set for sale in February 2013. The minimum bid for the property, which covered all taxes, fees, liens, and accumulated interest against the property, was $57,000 at this auction. The land was assessed at $23,057 and the home at $5,760.
Before the start of the auction, defendant went to the Sacramento County Finance Department's office that dealt with property tax delinquencies and asked how to remove the property from the list for auction. When asked what was his relationship to the property, defendant said he was the owner. The official told defendant he was not the owner, and that the property would not be removed from the auction unless the taxes were paid in full. Defendant became angry, claiming he had a right to have the property unencumbered and released. He was escorted out of the office by security personnel after he raised his voice and disrupted customers.
At the auction, defendant stood up and yelled out that the property was his and that others should not bid on it. He was removed from the auction by deputies. The property was not sold that day.
Defendant subsequently returned to the finance department office and asked that the property be removed from the May 2013 auction. The official reiterated defendant's options to remove the property from sale; defendant was also informed he would not be allowed to attend the next sale because of his actions at the last one. Defendant became angry and was escorted out of the building.
On April 8, 2013, around 1:30 p.m., defendant filed a mechanic's lien on the property at the Sacramento County Recorder's Office. Defendant listed himself doing business as the "Blackshire Distributors on behalf of Phi Omega Phi Sigma" as the claimant. The lien was for "labor or services or equipment or materials . . . for a work of improvement" at 820 Carmelita Avenue in Sacramento for $100,000, with a due date of March 3, 2013. Defendant identified the resources "furnished" at Oliver's request to include: "Power tools, labor, cleaning tools labor, office tools labor, Products & Services for 2013 contract of record." The lien named Oliver as the property owner and stated that defendant resided at the address. Defendant signed the lien under penalty of perjury and dated it March 8, 2013. Attached to the lien was a proof of service that defendant served a copy and notice to Oliver at the property's address on March 3, 2013, at 3:33 p.m.
The finance department's attempt to serve notice of the tax sale on Oliver at the property was unsuccessful. Oliver was notified of the sale in July 2013.
A district attorney's investigator visited the property on April 29, 2013. Three-foot high weeds surrounded the property and there was much debris outside. All windows and doors were boarded up except for the back door, which the investigator used to enter the home. One bedroom had a dirty mattress and some sleeping bags. There were no tools on the property or any evidence of any kind of construction taking place for years.
Defendant was in line to register for the second auction in May 2013 when he was told that he was not allowed to attend. After he became loud and argumentative, defendant was asked to take the conversation back to the finance department's office, where he was told he was not allowed to attend because of his behavior at the last auction. When his request to talk to a manager was declined, defendant became agitated and was removed by three deputies. Defendant yelled for people not to bid on the property as he was leaving the building. The property did not sell that day.
Following this auction, defendant returned to the finance department office and asked for a waiver of fees and penalties and for the property to be transferred to him. Defendant said he had filed the mechanic's lien on the property, had done the work, and wanted the lien "paid out." The official told defendant the lien was not valid, and advised him that he would not be welcome at the next auction.
Alma testified that defendant never told her about the lien.
After the district attorney's investigator contacted her, Alma sent a Facebook message to defendant on June 16, 2013, in which she told him to get off her property. Defendant replied that Oliver gave him permission to be there. Alma responded that defendant had no right to fix the property, and that Oliver's permission was meaningless as she controlled the property. She told defendant that she and her brother would never sell the property to him, and she blocked defendant from Facebook messaging her.
Oliver testified that he gave control of the property to Alma. He never lived there, and never gave anyone permission to live there.
Defendant had told Oliver that he was cleaning the property's front yard, but Oliver never agreed for defendant to fix the property for $100,000. Defendant asked Oliver to sign something giving defendant ownership of the property, but Oliver refused. He could not recognize or read the mechanic's lien filed against the property, having lost the ability to read when he was shot in the head.
The house was eventually torn down. The property did not sell at the third auction, but sold for $14,200 at the fourth auction. Defendant did not attend either of these auctions.
B
The Defense
Defendant testified that he knew the property was owned by his cousins, and he offered Alma $8,000 to buy the property in 2010 or 2011. She told him that the taxes were too high, the property was uninhabitable, and he would have to talk to Oliver about buying it. He spoke to Oliver some time after the first auction. Oliver agreed for defendant to do work on the property for $100,000. Defendant did not know at the time that Alma had power of attorney over the property. He tried to call Alma about the work, but she would not answer his calls.
Defendant was polite and nice every time he spoke to officials about the property and the lien on it. He tried to explain that the property had been in the family, the taxes appeared excessive, and he had an agreement with his cousin to fix the property. Defendant admitted to standing up at the auction. He never threatened anyone, but merely asked them not to bid on the property. Additionally, he told attendees that the house was haunted, and a lien was pending but he had to talk to his cousin first.
Defendant got the idea for a mechanic's lien from a real estate professional at the first auction. He obtained a lien form from the law library, but did not conduct any legal research on the lien. Defendant admitted filing the lien on April 8, 2013, but did not know that any information on it was fraudulent. He started the work described in the lien, but did not finish it because "Alma said she wanted me to stop." He continued to work on the property until Alma told him to get off.
While in custody following his June 2013 arrest, defendant learned that Oliver was in custody as well. His agreement with Oliver "was a verbal contract previously. And when I got arrested, I seen him in jail and I did a contract." Defendant wrote up a "[s]tatement of facts" for Oliver to verify, the $100,000 mechanic's lien, defendant's responsibility to collect on the lien upon any sale of the property, "and that he knew about me fixing it up, and, you know, he would rather it be maintained than be sold at auction."
Defendant admitted that he did not have a contractor's license, and no one told him that he needed one to file a mechanic's lien. He also was not told that he could not claim $100,000 on the form unless he did $100,000 worth of work. He did not understand proof of service and admitted he did not serve Oliver because he got "locked up before I could take him the paperwork." He intended to mail the form to Oliver but could not get his address, although he said Oliver knew about the lien.
Defendant did not determine an hourly rate or any number of hours worked, just a lump sum. Alma told him to stop working after the lien was filed. He had not yet purchased much of the materials. Defendant kept many of the receipts, but did not have access to them. While working on the property, he put up a fence, cleaned, cleared out broken glass, pulled out the carpet, took the toilet and sink out, provided security, picked up trash, and started weed abatement. Defendant communicated with potential contractors and had sold some cars to raise money for improving the home.
DISCUSSION
I
Instructional Error
Defendant contends the trial court erred in including language from section 125 in its instruction on perjury. The People concede the error, but assert it is harmless. We agree with the People.
The trial court gave the standard jury instruction on perjury, CALCRIM No. 2640, which correctly set forth the elements of the crime: that defendant made a declaration under penalty of perjury, which he willfully stated knowing it was false, the information was material, he knew he was making the statement under penalty of perjury and he intended to declare falsely while under penalty of perjury, and he signed and delivered the declaration to another intending that it be circulated or published as true.
The court's perjury instruction also included the following optional language from CALCRIM No. 2640: "When a person makes a statement, without qualification, that information is true, but he or she does not know whether that information is true, the making of that statement is the same as saying something that the person knows is false." Defendant did not object to the additional language.
"The trial court is charged with instructing upon every theory of the case supported by substantial evidence, including defenses that are not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case." (People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1047.) "The trial court must instruct even without request on the general principles of law relevant to and governing the case. [Citation.] That obligation includes instructions on all of the elements of a charged offense." (People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1311, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 821-822.) We review de novo whether jury instructions correctly state the law. (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) "Instructional error as to the elements of an offense is not waived by trial counsel's failure to object." (People v. Mason (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 818, 823.)
"When an appellate court addresses a claim of jury misinstruction, it must assess the instructions as a whole, viewing the challenged instruction in context with other instructions, in order to determine if there was a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction in an impermissible manner." (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 803.) We also consider the arguments made by counsel "in assessing the probable impact of the instruction on the jury." (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1202.)
Instructional error regarding an element of an offense is reviewed under the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 . (People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 502-503.)
The optional language included in the perjury instruction is taken from section 125, which states: " 'An unqualified statement of that which one does not know to be true is equivalent to a statement of that which one knows to be false. It has long been settled that the Legislature 'intended by this section to declare that when one makes an unqualified statement of a fact as true which he does not know to be true, under circumstances in which a statement by him of a fact as true which he knows to be false would constitute perjury, such unqualified statement will itself constitute perjury.' " (People v. Cook (1978) 22 Cal.3d 67, 90.)
"Section 125 has confused juries, attorneys and judges for more than 100 years, despite our Supreme Court's attempt to explain it. The statute's flaw is that it sometimes leads to the erroneous conclusion a person may be found guilty of perjury based on the person's honest mistake about a fact." (People v. Rutter (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1355, fn. omitted (Rutter).) The statute "only applies to those rare cases in which the evidence would support a finding the defendant asserted the truth of something which might or might not be true but as to which he himself was totally ignorant." (Id. at p. 1357.) "Section 125 of the Code is designed to include those cases where a witness testifies to matters when he knows that he has no knowledge upon the matters as to which he gives testimony, or, as put by some law-writers, he testifies to matters of which he knows himself to be ignorant. The criminality in such cases is found in the fact that the witness absolutely knows when giving his testimony that he does not know anything about the matter to which he is testifying." (People v. Von Tiedeman (1898) 120 Cal. 128, 136 (Von Tiedeman).) It "does not apply to cases in which the defendant unqualifiedly asserts the truth of something as to which he has knowledge but is mistaken -- this is clearly not perjury under section 118." (Rutter, at p. 1357.) "The statute's flaw is that it sometimes leads to the erroneous conclusion a person may be found guilty of perjury based on the person's honest mistake about a fact." (Id. at p. 1355.)
The Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 2640 state: "Give the bracketed sentence that begins with 'When a person makes a statement, without qualification,' on request if supported by the evidence." (Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 2640 (2017 ed.) p. 511; see Rutter, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1358, fn. 21.) No party requested the language from section 125, and more importantly, there is no evidence to support this instruction. The theory of the case was that defendant made false statements within the mechanic's lien as to the existence and date of the alleged contract, Oliver's authorization, the existence and amount of a valid claim, claims regarding various tools, labor, products and services, the owner's address, the proof of service, and all dates on the document other than the date of recording. There is no evidence that defendant did not know anything about the subject matters of those statements in the mechanic's lien. It was error for the trial court to use the language from section 125 in the absence of any supporting evidence.
Relying on Von Tiedeman, defendant argues the instruction relieved the prosecution of its burden of proving specific intent to testify falsely. He additionally claims the error was compounded by the prosecutor's emphasis on the instruction in the closing arguments, and by the trial court's response to a question from the jury regarding the prosecution's argument. Based on these factors, he concludes the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore prejudicial.
The issue in Von Tiedeman was whether it was perjury for the defendant to answer " 'Certainly' " when he was shown a photograph of a woman named Sara Owen and was asked if she was the woman he knew as Harriet Christy. (Von Tiedeman, supra, 120 Cal. at p. 130.) The trial court in Von Tiedeman made numerous attempts to explain section 125, which had the same text as it does now. (See Von Tiedeman, at pp. 132-134.) The trial court essentially instructed the jury that if the photograph was not a photograph of the woman defendant knew as Harriet Christy but " 'the defendant testified unqualifiedly that it was, he thereby made an unqualified statement as a witness of a matter as absolutely true which he did not know to be true, and to make such a statement as that is so far forth to commit the crime of perjury.' " (Id. at p. 133.) The trial court told the jury that the statement's unqualified nature is what made it perjury. " 'A witness may state in a court of justice that he thinks a certain thing is so, that he believes it is so, perhaps that he is informed that it is so -- and of course it is not perjury if he has been so informed, or does believe it or supposes it to be so; but, if a witness undertakes to state, and does state positively and unqualifiedly that a material thing is so, when it is not so, he is necessarily giving false testimony, because he states that he knows something he does not know.' " (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction because the trial court's instruction "absolutely eliminates the whole question of criminal intent; and criminal intent is the vital element in every crime of perjury." (Von Tiedeman, supra, 120 Cal. at pp. 134, 137.) Under these instructions, "[a] man honestly mistaken could be guilty of the crime." (Id. at p. 134.) In effect, the jury was instructed, "to convict the defendant, even though they were fully convinced that he honestly thought and believed that the photograph was that of the woman with whom he had the dealings." (Ibid.)
The trial court's instruction here is distinguishable from the prejudicial instruction in Von Tiedeman. The trial court in this case simply summarized section 125 and instructed the jury that an unqualified statement of fact was false if defendant did not know whether the statement was in fact true. The perjury instruction in this case also correctly informed the jury, "[i]f the defendant actually believed that the statement was true, the defendant is not guilty of this crime even if the defendant's belief was mistaken." The instructions in Von Tiedman contained no such statement. Under the instruction in Von Tiedeman, any mistake regarding an unqualified statement was perjury. The instruction here was therefore less prejudicial than the instruction in Von Tiedeman.
We are also unconvinced by defendant's reliance on the prosecutor's argument or the trial court's response to the jury's question on the argument.
During the closing argument, the prosecutor stated: "One of the things the Judge read to you was when a person makes a statement without qualification, that information is true, but he does -- that the information is true, but he does not know whether the information is, in fact, true. The making of that statement is the same as saying that something that the person knows to be false. [¶] So if you just guess and throw it out there without qualification, it's the same as a false statement. And these amounts clearly were being pulled out of thin air. The dates were being pulled out of thin air."
In the rebuttal, the prosecutor stated, "The defendant willfully state[d] that the information was true, even though he knew it was false. Yes, because he pulled that number again out of thin air. He had a lot of other false statements in that mechanic's lien. You can pick any one of them, but the bottom line is that it's a made-up number.
This is the People's position that nearly every statement other than his name and the recorder's signature, the recorder's stamp, it's just not true."
The jury submitted the following question regarding the prosecutor's closing argument: "In her closing comments, the prosecutor stated that general criminal intent could be determined if the defendant didn't know the answer and 'guessed' or something to that effect. Is this correct? If so, please explain."
Following discussion in chambers with counsel, the trial court replied: "In response to your question pertaining to the DA's closing argument that someone could have 'guessed' information, held it out as true and be held liable for a false statement, the DA's argument pertained to Count 2, Perjury, and specifically the provision under [CALCRIM] Jury Instruction 2640, 'When a person makes a statement, without qualification, that information is true, but he or she does not know whether the information is true, the making of the statement is the same as saying something the person knows is false. [¶] In that your question references 'general criminal intent,' please note that, as set forth in Instruction 252, Perjury is a specific intent crime. As the specific intent required under Perjury, please see Elements 5 and 6 under instruction 2640."
Element 5 of the perjury instruction was "When the defendant made the false statement, he intended to declare falsely while under penalty of perjury. Element 6 stated, "The defendant signed and delivered his declaration to someone else intending that it be circulated or published as true." --------
Defendant argues the prosecutor's remarks "clearly confused the jury as to the required intent for the offense, and as to the quantum of evidence required to support it." He claims the court's response did not adequately clarify the distinction between making a "wildly incorrect" statement and the false swearing without probable cause for belief that is the subject matter of section 125, as interpreted in Von Tiedeman.
The prosecutor argued that if defendant made a statement that was no more than a guess, failing to qualify the statement as a guess is the same as uttering a false statement. That is not the same as stating that a good faith mistake would constitute perjury, as happened in the instruction condemned in Von Tiedeman. The jury's question showed it was confused regarding this part of the prosecutor's argument. Although the trial court's response reiterated the erroneous section 125 language, it correctly informed the jury that perjury was a specific intent crime and referred the jury to the part of the instruction setting forth the specific intent element of perjury.
The jury's verdict on the forgery charge removes any reasonable doubt as to the lack of prejudice. As defendant admits elsewhere in his brief, the forgery and perjury charges are closely related. The jury was instructed that to convict defendant on the forgery of a legal document charge, it must find that defendant falsified the document, the mechanic's lien, and that he "intended to defraud" when doing so. The instruction defined intent to defraud as "intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of money or something else of value or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right." The jury was not instructed on this charge with language from section 125. The jury's guilty verdict on the forgery count showed it found an intent to defraud in the absence of the erroneous language from the perjury instruction.
The potential prejudicial error from instructing with an erroneous use of section 125 language in an instruction is negating the specific intent element of perjury by allowing a jury to convict a defendant based on an honest mistake of fact. Here, the jury was told that an honest mistake of fact was not perjury. Since the jury also found an intent to defraud in the absence of the improper instruction, it is clear that the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
II
Sufficiency Of The Evidence: Perjury
Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support his perjury conviction.
"The elements of perjury are a willful statement, made under oath, of any material matter which the declarant knows to be false." (People v. Trotter (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 436, 439, citing § 118, subd. (a).)
On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether there is substantial evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1251.) Substantial evidence is evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (Ibid.) We presume the existence of every fact in support of the judgment that the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (Ibid.) We will not reverse the judgment for insufficiency of the evidence unless it clearly appears "that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it." (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.)
Defendant argues that the evidence does not show he willfully stated that information on the lien was true while knowing it to be false. He claims the evidence shows he believed the statements on the lien to be true. Relying on his trial testimony, defendant asserts he had never filled out a mechanic's lien before, did so to the best of his ability without benefit of any legal research, and did not intend to lie. Defendant also points out his testimony that he had worked on the property and the prosecution did not prove otherwise. While admitting that Oliver testified that he never entered into an agreement with defendant to fix the property, defendant claims Oliver was not a particularly credible witness who was impeached on other statements, and defendant's belief in the agreement's existence is not an issue for the perjury charge. Admitting that his claim for $100,000 "appears unreasonable and grandiose to an objective observer," defendant asserts "it must be evaluated in the light of his perception of the value of the work he had already completed on the property, in combination with the work he anticipated completing in the future."
Finally, defendant claims the evidence does not support a finding that he harbored an intent to declare falsely under penalty of perjury. Again relying on his testimony, defendant argues that "[h]is motivation for filing the lien was not to declare falsely, but to keep the family property in the family."
"Intent is a state of mind. A defendant's state of mind must, in the absence of the defendant's own statements, be established by the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense." (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 433.)
There is ample evidence that defendant knew the statements on the lien were false and he made those false statements willfully. Both owners of the property testified that they never agreed with defendant to have him do any work on the property. An agreement is critical to defendant's assertions on the lien that he was entitled to money for his expenditures. If the jury believed defendant had no agreement to improve work on the property, it could reasonably infer that his claims on the lien for $100,000 and the supporting statements in the lien were knowingly false. Also, defendant admitted at trial that he never served Oliver, directly contradicting the assertion made in the lien that he had done so.
There is also ample evidence of defendant's motive to commit perjury on the lien. The evidence shows defendant knew as early as 2010 that the property had tax liens against it, and made repeated attempts to obtain the property from Alma years before he filed the lien. Defendant told Alma in a Facebook conversation that took place at least two years before the lien that she would not be able to sell the house unless she gave him $100,000. These actions, coupled with his repeated attempts to disrupt the tax sale of the property, support an inference that defendant filed the lien to frustrate the sale of the property and/or obtain $100,000 through false means. From this, the jury could further reasonably infer that the false statements were made willfully and knowingly.
At bottom, defendant claims the jury should have relied on his testimony rather than the prosecution's evidence. The jury was not required to credit defendant's testimony, and we will not second-guess the jury's credibility finding on appeal. (See People v. Cortes (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 62, 71 [on appeal, we do not resolve evidentiary conflicts or reevaluate witness credibility].) Substantial evidence supports defendant's perjury conviction.
III
Sufficiency Of The Evidence: Forgery
Defendant's final claim is there is insufficient evidence of intent to defraud to support his forgery of a government document conviction.
"Every person who, with the intent to defraud, alters, corrupts, or falsifies any record of any will, codicil, conveyance, or other instrument, the record of which is by law evidence, or any record of any judgment of a court or the return of any officer to any process of any court, is guilty of forgery." (§ 470, subd. (c).) Intent to defraud is a necessary element of forgery. (People v. Pugh (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72.) "An intent to defraud is an intent to deceive another person for the purpose of gaining a material advantage over that person or to induce that person to part with property or alter that person's position by some false statement or false representation of fact, wrongful concealment or suppression of the truth or by any artifice or act designed to deceive." (Ibid.) "Unless the consequential harm of the fabrication is a loss, damage, or prejudice of a legal right, generally a pecuniary or property right, there is no harm of the kind to which the statute is directed and hence no forgery." (Lewis v. Superior Court (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 379, 383-384.)
Our analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence for the perjury claim determines this contention as well. The same circumstantial evidence supporting an intent to make false statements willfully supports a finding of an intent to defraud. The evidence supports a finding that defendant made numerous false, material statements on the lien, did so knowingly and willfully, and made them with the intent either to secure $100,000 for work he did not do or to frustrate the tax sale of a property he wanted to own.
Substantial evidence supports the forgery conviction.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Robie, Acting P. J. We concur: /s/_________
Butz, J. /s/_________
Duarte, J.