Opinion
11040061
05-29-2014
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff v. Roger BLACKBURN, Defendant.
FOR THE PROSECUTION: SANDRA DOORLEY, ESQ., MONROE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY BY: BENJAMIN SKOMSKY, ESQ., ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY, 47 S. Fitzhugh Street, Suite 832, Rochester, New York 14614 FOR THE DEFENDANT: TIMOTHY DONAHER, ESQ., MONROE COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: DANIELLE PONDER, ESQ., ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER, 10 North Fitzhugh Street, Rochester, New York 14614
FOR THE PROSECUTION: SANDRA DOORLEY, ESQ., MONROE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY BY: BENJAMIN SKOMSKY, ESQ., ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY, 47 S. Fitzhugh Street, Suite 832, Rochester, New York 14614
FOR THE DEFENDANT: TIMOTHY DONAHER, ESQ., MONROE COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: DANIELLE PONDER, ESQ., ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER, 10 North Fitzhugh Street, Rochester, New York 14614
Michael A. Sciortino, J.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The defendant, Roger Blackburn (hereinafter referred to as "defendant"), was charged with violating the following sections of the New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law: § 1192(4) —Operating a Motor Vehicle While Ability Impaired by Drugs; § 512—Operating a Motor Vehicle with a Suspended Registration; § 375(35)—Unsafe Tires; § 401(1)(a)—No Registration; § 1128(a)—Unsafe Lane Change; all in connection with an incident allegedly occurring on April 6, 2011 at or around 12:03 a.m. on West Ridge Road in the Town of Parma, County of Monroe, State of New York. The initial two appearance dates were adjourned at the request of the defendant. The defendant then appeared and was arraigned by this Court on August 2, 2011 and this Court entered a plea of "Not Guilty" on behalf of the defendant and appointed the Monroe County Public Defender's Office as counsel for the defendant pursuant to Monroe County Law § 722(d).
Following the appointment of counsel, the matter progressed forward with various and numerous appearances for the purposes of a screen made by the People and announcement of readiness on multiple occasions, disposition dates, discovery responses, motion and cross-motion argument, pre-trial hearings including a Huntley/Dunaway hearing as well as an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the evidence in the defendant's vehicle was seized pursuant to a valid inventory search, the scheduling of a jury trial for May 31, 2013, and ultimately argument on a motion to dismiss the accusatory instruments on the ground that the defendant has been denied his constitutional and common-law rights to a speedy trial and timely prosecution pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 30.20, § 170.30(1)(e), Civil Rights Law § 12, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The defendant's motion to dismiss was scheduled to be heard on the next available appearance date following the scheduled and adjourned jury trial, June 27, 2013, where the Court heard oral argument on the motion to dismiss.
On June 27, 2013, the defendant argued that the motion to dismiss was not a Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 motion but rather a § 30.20 motion and not based on what time is chargeable to the People but rather takes into account a series of factors the Court must consider including the reason for the delay, the extent of the delay, the nature of the charge, whether there has been an extended period of incarceration, or whether the defense has been impaired by the delay. It should be noted that although the matter was scheduled for a trial by jury at the defendant's request for May 31, 2013, and adjourned by the Court, the basis for the adjournment was that the People were not in possession of the laboratory technician's notes that substantiated and related to the test results that were included on the Laboratory Report which was attached to the Misdemeanor Information corrected by the People as to jurisdictional basis only and filed with the Court on September 27, 2012. The defendant opposed the adjournment in correspondence and argued in sum and substance that the fact that the laboratory packet was not put together and the case was almost two years old, relying upon People v. England, 84 NY2d 1 (1994), one could only conclude that the People's prior announcement of readiness was illusory and the People were not ready for trial at the time they had announced readiness. Counsel for the defendant indicated that the defendant would be asking for a dismissal of the case and would be completing a Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 motion to elaborate.
The People responded in correspondence that the lab report was attached to the Information filed with the Court and that the lab discovery packet which included the laboratory technician's notes that substantiated and related to the test results that were included on the laboratory report were Rosario material which had no bearing on the People's ability to be ready for trial and thus no statement of readiness had been illusory. In reply correspondence, the Court indicated that if the laboratory report was included with the Complaint, which it was, then the accusatory instrument has been arguably facially sufficient and the People were ready for trial when the declarations were made along the way. If the material referred to by the People, the laboratory technician's notes, was Rosario material, then that material should be turned over prior to opening statements at trial and has no bearing on readiness for trial. See, People v. McKenna, 76 NY2d 59 (1990). In response, the defendant further argued in sum and substance that although the material is Rosario material that would be provided prior to opening statements, without that material the People cannot call the laboratory technician to testify and as a result were not ready for trial and the prior announcement of readiness was illusory.
The Court granted the request for an adjournment by the People and four days were chargeable to the People as a result. Certainly, this was no error by counsel for the People, Mr. Skomsky, who had only just inherited the case weeks before the matter was to proceed to trial by jury. The adjournment was granted over the objection of the defendant and in fairness to the defendant, the Court indicated that it wanted the defendant to have an expedited return. Accordingly, the Court offered six dates in an attempt to reschedule the trial by jury for a day certain to occur within 2–3 weeks of the originally scheduled trial date. In separate correspondence, the parties respectively indicated their availability for the proposed dates and the defendant additionally requested the opportunity to file a formal Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 motion to preserve the defendant's rights. When it was noted that the six dates were unavailable to all counsel, the Court indicated it would remove the matter from the jury trial calendar on May 31, 2013 to avoid having counsel pick a jury on that date, start entering proof, and then unable to conclude in one day, be required to return in four weeks for a piecemeal continuation of the trial. That delay in between the presentation of proof to the jury would significantly prejudice both parties. As a result the Court adjourned the entire matter to the June 27, 2013 motion calendar to permit counsel for the defendant to file her motion as requested and also permit the parties to obtain any transcripts necessary for the motion. Both parties indicated their agreement with the Court regarding this proposed course of action by the Court.
However, the underlying motion was made pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 30.20 and not § 30.30 as previously indicated to in correspondence from counsel for the defendant, Ms. Ponder. In the oral argument of the instant motion for reconsideration, Ms. Ponder once again confirmed that the underlying motion was made pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 30.20 and not § 30.30. See, Transcript of October 24, 2013, page 4, line 20. Notwithstanding, counsel argued that the defendant has been prejudiced by the excessive delay and his constitutional rights were infringed upon. The People opposed said motion arguing that the defendant was not prejudiced by any delay. It is unknown whether the laboratory technician notes or any of the alleged Rosario material was produced to the People and in turn forwarded to defendant's counsel for review prior to oral argument of the motion to dismiss for speedy trial violations. Following said argument, the Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instruments pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 30.20 and the authority of People v. Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442 (1975). The Court relied in further support of People v. Virgil, 115 AD2d 286 (4th Dep't. 1985), and said oral decision that was rendered on June 27, 2013 was reduced to an Order dated August 6, 2013. In the oral decision rendered, this Court cited that a twenty-two month delay from when the defendant was first charged and the matter being scheduled for trial was prejudicial to the defendant, and as a result had dismissed the charges.
The People subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal and additionally moved this Court on or around August 14, 2013 pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 2221(d) for an Order permitting re-argument of the Court's decision of June 27, 2013. The Court granted the People's request and the People's motion to reargue was heard on October 24, 2013. Subsequently, the Court received a carbon copy of correspondence dated May 7, 2014 from the People to the Monroe County Court that appellate review of the earlier oral decision rendered by this Court on June 27, 2013 was not required as this Court subsequently granted the People's motion for reconsideration and permitted additional argument on the defendant's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, this Decision, Order, and Final Judgment is submitted in reconsideration pursuant to the People's respectful request and following an opportunity for additional research and extensive deliberation thereon.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The People respectfully request that this Court reconsider its earlier decision and reinstate the charges on the following grounds: 1) The Court failed to apply each of the Taranovich factors; 2) The Court misapplied the fifth Taranovich factor; 3) The Court failed to appropriately weigh the Taranovich factors; 4) The Court erroneously relied on People v. Virgil, 115 AD2d 286 (4th Dep't 1985) ; and 5) Dismissal was unwarranted because the Court found defendant's constitutional rights were only "somewhat impaired". The Defendant argues that the People have failed to set forth any legal basis for reconsideration of the Court's previous decision and argues the following: 1) Taranovich does not require the Court to list each factor when rendering its decision and the record for appellate review has been properly preserved; 2) The fifth Taranovich factor was not misapplied; 3) The Court engaged in a proper weighing of the Taranovich factors; 4) The Court correctly cites Virgil in "further support" of its decision; and 5) Dismissal is warranted as the Court held that the twenty-two month delay "does infringe" on Mr. Blackburn's constitutional rights.
With regard to the first point, the People argue that the Court has failed to apply each of the Taranovich factors and in effect has not preserved a record for Appellate Court review. As the People indicate, the Taranovich analysis has five factors to be considered in weighing whether to grant an Order pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 30.20 dismissing charges on constitutional speedy trial grounds: (1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pre-trial incarceration; (5) whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay. See, Taranovich, 37 NY2d at 445. The People have argued that the Court addressed factors (1), (2), and (5) but the Court did not address factors (3) and (4). The People argue that this constitutes a misapplication of a controlling principal of law because the Court must engage in a sensitive weighing process and preserve a record for Appellate Court review because of the sensitivity of the weighing process. The Defendant argued that Taranovich does not require the Court to list each factor when rendering its decision and that there is no reason to believe that the Court did not consider each Taranovich factor. In the papers submitted in opposition, the Defendant argues that the People cite no authority that suggests that the Court must opine on every factor when rendering its oral or written decision, "but rather the particular case must be considered in light of all the factors as they apply to it." Id. The Taranovich court made no requirement that a decision be given in a certain manner and set "no rigid precepts which apply to each and every instance." Id.
The speedy trial guaranteed by statute and the Federal Constitution serves three primary purposes: It protects the accused, if held in jail to await trial, against prolonged imprisonment; it relieves him of the anxiety and public suspicion attendant upon an untried accusation of crime; and finally, like statutes of limitation, it prevents him from being exposed to the hazard of a trial, after so great a lapse of time that the means of proving his innocence may not be within his reach—as for instance, by the loss of witnesses or the dulling of memory. See, People v. Johnson, 38 NY2d 271, 275–276 (1975) ; see also, People v Prosser, 309 NY 353, 356 ; see also, United States v Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971). But the guarantee also serves a broader, more public, purpose for society too has an interest in seeing that those accused of crimes are swiftly brought to justice. See, Barker v Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972) ; see also, People v Minicone, 28 NY2d 279, 281 (1971) ; People v Blakley, 34 NY2d 311, 314 (1974). The speedy trial requirement not only ensures fair and humane treatment of the accused, but serves, as well, to promote the efficiency of the criminal justice system. See, Johnson, 38 NY2d at 276.
Criminal Procedure Law § 30.20 states in relevant part, "After a criminal action is commenced, the defendant is entitled to a speedy trial." NY Criminal Procedure Law § 30.20 (McKinney's 2014). In furtherance of this constitutional right, the statute also states that "Insofar as is practicable, the trial of a criminal action must be given preference over civil cases..." See id. In assessing whether the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 30.20 has been abridged, a Court must look at the entire period from arrest to trial to determine whether or not the delay is improper. See, People v. Collins, 93 AD2d 981 (4th Dep't. 1983), citing, People v. Johnson, 38 NY2d 271 (1975). The criminal action herein was commenced for speedy trial purposes on April 6, 2011, the date when the Uniform Traffic Tickets and Supporting Depositions were filed with the Court. See, People v. Lomax, 50 NY2d 351 (1980). Subsequently, on or around September 27, 2012, the People filed a Misdemeanor Information with the Court correcting "as to jurisdiction only" the earlier allegations, and also attaching the Forensic Toxicology Laboratory Report from the Office of the Medical Examiner, which was previously certified on May 24, 2011.
There is no per se period beyond which a criminal prosecution may not be pursued. See, Taranovich, 37 NY2d at 445. As the People have argued, each case requires a sensitive weighing process of diversified factors. See id. This Court stated in its oral decision on June 27, 2013, in the transcript at page 5, that this Court must consider the balancing process and specifically outlined each of the above five Taranovich factors in the balancing process. See, Transcript of June 27, 2013, page 5, lines 11–25. The nature of the underlying charge as contained in factor (3) had been specifically and factually developed in the prior evidentiary and pre-trial hearings held before this Court. Certain consideration, and now reconsideration, was given to the nature of the underlying charge as this Court presided over the separate pre-trial and evidentiary hearings-Huntley, Dunaway, and Inventory Search hearings, where the specific facts of the charges and allegations were developed by the fact witnesses who testified. Moreover, the factor of pre-trial incarceration was not an issue in this case as the defendant was not incarcerated for any period of time as assessed in factor (5).
As the defendant correctly states, Courts have engaged in a Taranovich analysis without specifically mentioning each factor. In People vs. Taylor, 189 Misc 2d 313, 314 (2d Dep't. 2001) the Court only addressed factors (1), (2), and (5), as this particular Court did on the record on June 27, 2013, in determining that dismissal was not warranted in that case. 189 Misc 2d at 314. Moreover, in People vs. Persaud, 21 Misc 3d 522, 525 (Kings County Criminal Court 2008), the Court did not engage in an analysis of the fourth Taranovich factor simply stating "the factor of incarceration is not an issue in this case". 21 Misc 3d at 525 (reasoning that a good portion of the delay was attributable to the court's continual adjournments and that while neither side is held responsible for the time during the court's review, without any egregious behavior on the part of a defendant, a case should not be permitted to linger endlessly). Moreover, in People vs. Hankins, 52 AD2d 470, 477 (1976), based on the facts of the case the Court did not find it helpful to engage in a Taranovich analysis and noted that although the first factor weighed heavily in favor of the defendant, the fifth factor is irrelevant. 52 AD2d at 477. In Hankins, the Third Department in relying on the principles in Taranovich, that a defendant need not show specific prejudice and where there has been a great delay, prejudice need not be shown, held that a delay of over three years renders the question of actual prejudice academic. See id. Of particular import is the matter of People v. Johnson, supra, where the Court noted that the five factors set forth in People v. Taranovich are not necessarily decisive individually or in any particular combination, but must be weighed together in the light of the purpose of the speedy trial rule. See, People v. Johnson, 38 NY2d 271 (1975).
The history of this particular case, which was all before this very Court and included the three evidentiary Huntley, Dunaway, and Inventory Search hearings where the Court heard testimony from multiple fact witnesses was considered, and now reconsidered, among all of the Taranovich factors. As additionally indicated above, the defendant was not incarcerated pre-trial for any period of time as a result of these charges. Accordingly, a record for Appellate review has been properly made and can certainly be established by copies of the evidentiary hearing transcripts to render meaningful appellate review. See, Mergl vs. Mergl, 19 AD3d 1146, 1147 (4th Dep't. 2005) ; see also, People vs. Torres, 248 AD2d 167 (1st Dep't 1998) (although the lower court did not make findings of facts and conclusions of law, Appellate Court did not find the case necessary to be remitted since the entire record below provides a fully adequate basis upon which this Court may review the testimony and make its own determination.) In this case, the entire record for Appellate review has been sufficiently preserved in the Court file. The factual content within the transcripts and a review of the procedural history demonstrates a deprivation of defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial.
The People also argue that the Court misapplied the fifth Taranovich factor as to whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay. The People argue that this is a significant factor because a questionable period of delay may or may not be unreasonable depending upon whether or not the likelihood of the defendant's acquittal has been affected thereby. See, Taranovich, 37 NY2d at 446–447. The People further indicate that there is no basis upon which the conclusion that the defendant would suffer prejudice could be based as the Court made no reference to the affect this passage of time has had or would have had on the likelihood of the defendant's acquittal. The People also state that where the Court indicated "I do think that Mr. Blackburn would suffer prejudice" that the issue of prejudice is contingent upon events that have not yet occurred and is premature.
As stated above, in People vs. Hankins, the Court did not find it helpful to engage in a Taranovich analysis and noted that although the first factor weighed heavily in favor of the defendant, the fifth factor is irrelevant. See, People vs. Hankins, 52 AD2d at 477. A defendant need not show specific prejudice and where there has been a great delay, prejudice need not be shown. See, People v. Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442 (1975). The Hankins court held that a delay of over three years renders the question of actual prejudice academic. 52 AD2d at 477. This Court previously considered, and now reconsiders, that the defendant had adequately addressed how he was specifically prejudiced in the original motion filed with the Court on June 4, 2013 in which the People opposed. The defendant stated he has never been convicted of a crime in his 64 years of age. He also stated that his license was suspended pending prosecution preventing him from traveling freely and creating a burden for his family. Certainly, as the People have pointed out in oral argument on October 24, 2013, this Court has a record of the defendant himself requesting adjournments of the case throughout the nearly two years, and the People requested an adjournment on the eve of trial as the Laboratory Technician notes were not prepared, and the Court as well granting adjournments for further conferences, disposition, and consideration. See, Transcript of October 24, 2013, page 3, lines 16–19; see, also, People v. Worley, 66 NY2d 523 (1985) (defendant impliedly consents to any delay by filing defense motions, requests for adjournments, and defendant's absences). Notwithstanding, the defendant did state that the nearly two year delay in this case has negatively affected his mental health and created substantial uncertainty and frustration. Furthermore, as the defendant pointed out in his papers, "an excessive passage of time in a criminal case is likely to result in the dulling of memory by essential witnesses, weakening the ability of the defendant to prove his innocence. See, People v. Anderson, 66 NY2d 529 (1985) (constitutional speedy trial rights attempt to prevent anxiety and public suspicion attendant upon an untried accusation of crime); see also, People v. Watts, 57 NY2d 299 (1982) (acuity of memory, whether that of a defendant or nonparty witness, when dulled by a substantial pre-trial delay, may sufficiently impair a defense so as to warrant a finding of a denial of a defendant's speedy trial right).
The Defendant argues in opposition to this motion for reconsideration that it is not absolutely necessary that the Court address the issue of prejudice and when the delay has been significant the Defendant need not show any proof of prejudice. See, People vs. Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 447 ; see also People vs. Hankins, 52 AD2d 470 (1976) (the Court found the extent of delay to be so great that whether the defendant suffered prejudice or not was irrelevant); compare, People v. Cartledge, 147 AD2d 917 (4th Dep't. 1989) (defendant not deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial as most of delay was caused by defendant's motion practice, court congestion, the engagement of defendant's initial counsel on other trials, and eventual substitution of counsel at defendant's request). This Court should be able to rely upon the affirmed statements of counsel with regard to the prejudice asserted in the original papers and adjudicate as to whether the defendant would suffer or has suffered prejudice if the matter was permitted to continue to trial. In the June 27, 2013 decision, this Court agreed with the defendant and held that the twenty-two month delay was so great that the defendant suffered prejudice. Now on reconsideration, the Court continues to hold that the twenty-two month delay is so great that the defendant suffered prejudice for the reasons articulated by the defendant in the underlying motion papers and now in opposition.
The People also argue that the Court failed to appropriately weigh the Taranovich factors due to the omission of factors (3) and (4), and the misapplication of factor (5). The People argue that the Taranovich Court wrote "no one factor or combination of the factors set forth below is necessarily decisive or determinative of the speedy trial claim, but rather the particular case must be considered in light of all the factors as they apply to it". Taranovich, 37 NY2d at 445. In considering, and now reconsidering, all of the factors as they apply to this specific case, this Court is well aware of the nature of the underlying charge of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(4) —Operating a Motor Vehicle While Ability Impaired by Drugs, and the other Vehicle and Traffic Law violations, having participated in the three evidentiary hearings where specific factual detail was solicited from fact witnesses with regard to the nature of these charges. In addition, the factor of pre-trial incarceration is not an issue in this case as the defendant was not incarcerated at any time during the pendency of this charge. Accordingly, the Court contends that this particular case was considered, and now reconsidered, in light of all of the factors as they apply to it pursuant to the authority of People v. Taranovich. This Court specifically stated "I think the twenty-two month delay does infringe on Mr. Blackburn's constitutional rights". That infringement taken into account with the Taranovich factors discussed in the original decision of June 27, 2013 and herein on this motion for reconsideration, warrant dismissal pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 30.20 and the authority of People v. Taranovich.
The People also state that the Court erroneously relied on People v. Virgil which held that a twenty-two month delay between the defendant's arrest and his trial violated his right to a speedy trial. The People submit that Virgil stands for a broader holding in that it was a relatively simple case involving no complex legal theories. In Virgil, as the People argue, the delay was also aggravated because at the outset of the case the evidence and witnesses were available to the People and the delay was further aggravated by the fact that the Defendant was incarcerated for almost one year. Certainly this case is distinguished from Virgil in that pre-trial incarceration is not a factor in this case; however, the lengthy delay and resulting prejudice to the defendant, as stated above, is similar. Moreover, in Virgil, as in this case, the evidence and witness were available to the People from the outset. The defendant in correspondence with the Court objecting to any adjournment of the trial in effect was arguing that the delay was aggravated by the People's failure to provide the Laboratory Technician's notes which underlie the Laboratory Report that was attached to the Misdemeanor Information filed by the People on September 27, 2012 and that the People were never ready for trial and any announcement of readiness was illusory. See, People v. England, 84 NY2d 1 (1994) ; compare, People v. Wallender, 27 AD3d 955 (3d Dep't 2006) (in arguing a CPL § 30.30 motion, defendant failed to establish that People's announcement of readiness was illusory or that the postreadiness delay was attributable to anything other than court congestion). This Court notes that the People filed a Misdemeanor Information with the Court correcting "as to jurisdiction only" the earlier allegations, and had also attached a Forensic Toxicology Laboratory Report from the Office of the Medical Examiner, which was previously certified on May 24, 2011. As the defendant has raised in earlier correspondence, the evidence and witness were available to the People from the outset. Specifically, Ms. Ponder stated during oral argument on the motion for reconsideration, "we were set to go to trial and three days before, it was the State that said they essentially, in my opinion, were not ready at that point. And Mr. Blackburn has been ready for two years..." Transcript of October 24, 2013, page 7, lines 3–8.
Lastly, the People argue that dismissal was unwarranted because the Court found Defendant's constitutional rights were only "somewhat impaired". As the People correctly state, in order to dismiss on Criminal Procedure Law § 30.20 grounds, a Court, based upon the Taranovich factors, must make a determination of an infringement of a defendant's speedy trial right by the People. See, Taranovich, 37 NY2d at 444. The People state that because the Court found the defendant's constitutional rights were only "somewhat impaired" and not actually infringed upon, the remedy of dismissal was unwarranted. In this Court's oral decision on the record on June 27, 2013, the Court stated "I think the twenty-two month delay does infringe on Mr. Blackburn's constitutional rights." The Court further notes that "Mr. Blackburn's constitutional rights have been somewhat impaired by the lengthy delay." There is no circumventing of the fact that the twenty-two month delay does infringe on Mr. Blackburn's constitutional rights.
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Accordingly, this Court does grant the People's Motion to Reargue. After hearing argument from the parties and further reviewing the evidence presented by the People in the papers submitted in support, and the opposition of the defendant submitted thereto, as well as the relevant sections of statutory authority and case law, and having had a full opportunity to have had due deliberation thereon, this Court has reconsidered its earlier decision of June 27, 2013 dismissing the Vehicle & Traffic Law violations against the Defendant, and for the reasons as stated on the record on June 27, 2013 and for those reasons as stated and further repeated within this Decision, Order, and Final Judgment, does dismiss the Vehicle and Traffic Law violations against the defendant on the ground that the defendant has been denied his constitutional and common-law rights to a speedy trial and timely prosecution pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 30.20 and the authority within People v. Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442 (1975).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, DECREED, AND ADJUDGED, that the record of dismissal entered as and for the defendant remain with regard to each of the following violations of the New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law: § 1192(4) —Operating a Motor Vehicle While Ability Impaired by Drugs; § 512—Operating a Motor Vehicle with a Suspended Registration; § 375(35)—Unsafe Tires; and, § 401(1)(a)—No Registration; § 1128(a)—Unsafe Lane Change.
This constitutes the Decision, Order, and Final Judgment of the Justice Court in the Town of Parma, County of Monroe, State of New York.