Opinion
1-22-0805
06-30-2023
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANKIE BENNETT, Defendant-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 01 CR 23908 Honorable James M. Obbish, Judge presiding.
JUSTICE MITCHELL delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lyle and Navarro concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
MITCHELL JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: We affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition because defendant failed to make a showing of cause or prejudice.
¶ 2 Defendant Frankie Bennett appeals the trial court's denial of her motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. Bennett raises the following issue on appeal: did the trial court err in denying Bennett's motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition when it held that she did not establish cause or prejudice? For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On the night of August 27, 2001, Frankie Bennett met up with friends on the south side of Chicago. Bennett was 19 years old at the time and a member of the Gangster Disciples. Bennett asked her friends for a gun and one friend retrieved a gun for her from a garage. Bennett took the gun and shot and killed Aaron Gibson, a member of a rival gang. After the shooting, Bennett's friends found her standing in front of a house wearing different clothes but with the gun from the garage in her hand. Later that night, Bennett said she shot Gibson because he was a rival gang member. A jury convicted Bennett of first degree murder, and she was sentenced to 20 years in prison for first degree murder plus 25 years for personally discharging a firearm, for a total sentence of 45 years. 720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 2020); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2020). On direct appeal, we affirmed. People v. Bennett, 356 Ill.App.3d 1126 (2005) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 5 Bennett petitioned for postconviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court dismissed the petition and we affirmed. People v. Bennett, No. 1-06-3663 (2008) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). In this case, Bennett moved for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, asserting an as-applied violation of the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The trial court denied Bennett's motion, and this timely appeal followed. Ill. S.Ct. R. 651 (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 6 ANALYSIS
¶ 7 On appeal, Bennett contends that the trial court erred because she has established cause for not bringing the claim in her initial petition and prejudice resulting from that failure. We review the denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition de novo. People v. Mitchell, 2012 IL 100907, ¶ 39.
¶ 8 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act gives individuals the opportunity to assert that their criminal convictions were the result of a substantial denial of their rights under state or federal constitutions. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2020). A petitioner can file one postconviction petition as a matter of right without leave of court. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020). A successive postconviction petition requires leave of court, which is only granted if the petitioner establishes cause for failing to bring the claim in his initial postconviction petition and establishes that prejudice results from that failure. Id. Successive postconviction petitions are "highly disfavored" because they disturb the finality of a conviction and because the legislature generally intended to limit petitioners to one postconviction petition. People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 39 (quoting People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 39, and People v. Flores, 153 Ill.2d 264, 274 (1992)).
¶ 9 On a motion for leave to file a successive petition, the petitioner must plead a prima facie case of cause and prejudice. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 24. A motion for leave to file a successive petition should be denied when it fails as a matter of law or is insufficient to justify further proceedings. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 21.
¶ 10 Bennett contends that she established cause for failing to bring her proportionate penalties claim in her initial petition because of two recent developments: (1) the framework from Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) for considering youth as a mitigating factor and (2) the improved scientific understanding of brain maturity. A petitioner shows cause by identifying an objective factor that impeded his ability to raise the claim in his initial postconviction petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020). The State asserts Bennett failed to establish cause because in light of the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, the unavailability of the Miller precedent did not prevent Bennett from raising this claim.
¶ 11 In Miller, the Supreme Court held that sentencing a juvenile, an individual who was under 18 at the time of the offense, to life in prison without parole violates the eighth amendment. 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012). The Illinois Supreme Court, however, held unequivocally that Miller does not directly apply to young adult offenders. People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 38 ("While some of the reasoning of Miller could support an argument for extending its holding to young adults, the decision in Miller itself makes no such extension. The holding of Miller did not change the law applicable to young adults ***."). The supreme court also held that Miller does not provide cause for young adult offenders to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 40; see also Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 61 ("Miller's announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth amendment does not provide cause for a [juvenile offender] to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.").
¶ 12 Further in Moore, the supreme court held that "[t]he evidence and arguments raised at the sentencing hearings *** show the parties knew Illinois law recognized the special status of young adults, especially those subject to adverse influences, for purposes of applying *** the proportionate penalties clause." 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42. Here, the record demonstrates that Bennett's trial counsel argued at sentencing that the court should consider Bennett's adolescence and mental state as mitigating factors.
¶ 13 Bennett additionally argues that she established cause because Illinois courts only recently began considering mitigating factors related to new scientific understanding of brain maturity. And this, she contends, served as a basis for a 2019 statute providing for parole review for persons who committed first degree murder while under 21. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115 (b) (West 2020). Bennett's argument fails because, as the supreme court reiterated in Moore, Bennett had the "essential legal tools" to raise her proportionate penalties claim when she filed her initial petition. 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42 (quoting Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 93). The 2019 parole law is not an objective factor that impeded Bennett from raising her proportionate penalties claim. The proportionate penalties clause was in effect when Bennett filed her initial petition, and Bennett raised the argument at sentencing. For these reasons, Bennett failed to establish cause.
¶ 14 Separately, Bennett did not establish prejudice. A petitioner establishes prejudice by demonstrating that the claim not raised in the initial postconviction proceedings "so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process." 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020). Bennett contends that she established prejudice because (1) she is serving a de facto life sentence and (2) scientific evidence shows her emerging adult brain was like a juvenile brain at the time of the offense. However, the record shows that the trial court considered Bennett's youth as a mitigating factor at the sentencing hearing in compliance with Miller. Bennett's trial counsel argued that Bennett's sentence should be reduced based on consideration of her age, mental capacity, and immaturity.
¶ 15 CONCLUSION
¶ 16 For the reasons stated above, we affirm.
¶ 17 Affirmed.