Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CC817984
MIHARA, J.
Defendant Mitchell Leslie Battles appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a court trial in which he was found guilty of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1) - count 1), infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a) - count 2), and arson of the property of another (§ 415, subd. (d) - count 3). The trial court also found true the allegations that defendant had one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), and four prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for nine years. On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred in denying his section 1118 motion; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the infliction of corporal injury conviction; (3) the court security and criminal conviction assessment fees must be reduced; and (4) the trial court erred in failing to stay sentence on count 2 pursuant to section 654. We find no error and affirm the judgment.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
I. Statement of Facts
A. Prosecution Case
In September 2008, Norma Rojas had been defendant’s girlfriend for about a year. She loved him and had his nickname tattooed on her body. While she was in jail in 2008, Rojas and defendant wrote letters to each other. Her letters “talked about doing whatever [she] had to do to have a place with” defendant. She indicated that she was even willing to sell drugs, which is what she had done when they previously “stay[ed] together.”
On August 29, 2008, Rojas was released from jail. At that time, she was homeless and stayed “here and there, ” including with a friend in Palo Alto. She carried a backpack, which held her identification, clothing, letters, and legal papers.
On September 5, 2008, Rojas and defendant met at Biebrach Park. Rojas had already drunk a six-pack of beer, and felt “buzzed.” She and defendant drank more beer, and she probably drank about 12 beers that day. After a couple of hours of drinking, she asked him whether he had been seeing anyone else while she was in custody. After he denied it, they began arguing. Defendant also wanted to see who she was staying with in Palo Alto, but Rojas refused his request. Defendant then became upset and “was trying to reverse it on [her], but he was seeing this girl when [Rojas] was in custody when [they] were together, and [she] didn’t meet up with this friend until after [she] got out of custody.” They also argued about her failure to enter a treatment program for her abuse of methamphetamine.
At some point, Rojas and defendant went to her sister’s house where she had left some clothes. After they left the house, they began arguing again. As they were walking through the park toward the light rail station, defendant grabbed some letters out of Rojas’ backpack and burned them. He then lit her backpack on fire as they continued arguing about whether he had been seeing someone else. He put the letters and the backpack in a trash can.
Rojas walked toward the light rail station and defendant continued to follow her. He was yelling at her to stop and talk to him, but she refused to do so. He told her that he would leave her “stuff” at her mother’s house. When they reached the light rail station, defendant grabbed Rojas’ hair, pushed her, punched her chest and arm, and choked her. At some point, she lost and then regained consciousness.
When the train arrived, Rojas boarded it and defendant followed her. Rojas told defendant that she was going to call the police. She tried to get away from him, but defendant pushed her down. They continued arguing. After two stops, Rojas exited the train and boarded another. Defendant continued to follow her. After Rojas and defendant exited the train at the Paseo de San Antonio Station, defendant pushed Rojas onto a bench, hit her, and bit her forehead. He then threw her on the ground, kicked her, and ripped her shirt in half. At some point, he burned her back with a cigarette, grabbed her breasts, and punched her head. After defendant left, a bystander helped her stand up and she walked to a bus stop. The police arrived, and an ambulance took her to the hospital. Rojas sustained scrapes, scratches, a burn, a welt, and a knot on her head. Rojas was in “a lot of pain.”
Deputy Brian Tanaka interviewed Rojas at the hospital. She was intoxicated, but was able to stand on her own and speak in complete sentences. Rojas was reluctant to speak with Deputy Tanaka. Rojas complained of pain to her head and told him that defendant pulled her hair, struck her head with his fists, bit her head, and choked her. Rojas’ blouse was torn. Deputy Tanaka found the burnt backpack and Rojas’ papers in the park.
B. Defense Case
The parties stipulated that an investigation report by defense counsel’s investigator would be admitted into evidence. The report summarized an interview with Maria Sanchez. According to Sanchez, she rented a room to defendant “around” April 2007. Shortly after defendant moved in, Rojas moved in with him. Initially, there were no problems. However, one day, Sanchez heard defendant and Rojas arguing. She went upstairs and saw Rojas’ belongings on the floor. Defendant was trying to get Rojas to move out. Rojas was screaming at defendant, but he did nothing to her. About 20 minutes later, Rojas was still screaming at defendant. After that incident, there were no more problems and they moved out in September 2008.
II. Discussion
A. Section 1118 Motion
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to section 1118. He maintains that there was insufficient evidence that he and Rojas were former cohabitants.
Section 1118 provides in relevant part: “In a case tried by the court without a jury, a jury having been waived, the court on motion of the defendant or on its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more of the offenses charged in the accusatory pleading after the evidence of the prosecution has been closed if the court, upon weighing the evidence then before it, finds the defendant not guilty of such offense or offenses.”
In reviewing the denial of a section 1118 motion, the appellate court “ ‘must determine “ ‘whether from the evidence, including reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is any substantial evidence of the existence of each element of the offense charged....’ ” [Citations.] “[T]he court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence-that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value-such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.] [¶] ‘ “[T]his inquiry does not require a [reviewing] court to ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Original italics.) [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Ceja (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1296, 1301.)
Section 273.5, subdivision (a) defines infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant as “willfully inflict[ing] upon a person who is his or her spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or the mother or father of his or her child, corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition.”
Courts have broadly interpreted the term “cohabitant” as used in section 273.5. (People v. Moore (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1333 (Moore).) This statute “requires something more than a platonic, rooming-house arrangement.” (People v. Holifield (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 993, 999 (Holifield). “ ‘Cohabiting’ under section 273.5 means an unrelated man and woman living together in a substantial relationship-one manifested, minimally, by permanence and sexual or amorous intimacy.” (Holifield, at p. 1000.) “[P]ermanence” refers to “the underlying ‘substantial relationship, ’ not to the actual living arrangement.” (Moore, at p. 1134.)
Courts have found sufficient evidence of cohabitation in various circumstances. In Holifield, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d 993, the defendant stayed with the victim off and on for three months. (Holifield, at p. 996.) They had “ ‘infrequent’ ” sex, and the victim described their relationship as “friends and roommates, ” though she had romantic feelings for the defendant. (Ibid.) The appellate court concluded that the evidence established “an intimacy going well beyond that of ordinary roommates.” (Id. at p. 1002.) In Moore, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th 1323, the defendant and the victim were involved in a sexual relationship for several years, they shared a lease on an apartment, and even after the defendant began spending a significant amount of time with other girlfriends, he retained a key to the apartment, kept his possessions there, and continued to have an intimate relationship with the victim. (Moore, at p. 1335.) In People v. Belton (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 432, the defendant and the victim lived together in friends’ houses, motels, and a car, and the victim paid his expenses. (Id. at p. 435.) Though the victim claimed that she “barely knew him, ” they had a sexual relationship. (Id. at pp. 435-436.) In People v. Taylor (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 11, the defendant and the victim had been dating for five months, were living in the defendant’s car, and the victim was pregnant with the defendant’s child. (Id. at p. 19.)
Here, Rojas had been defendant’s girlfriend for about a year, loved him, and had his nickname tattooed on her body. They had been staying together prior to her incarceration, and defendant still had some of her possessions. While Rojas was in jail, they exchanged letters and Rojas “talked about doing whatever [she] had to do to have a place with” defendant, including selling drugs. Prior to the commission of the charged offenses, Rojas and defendant argued about his possible infidelity. Defendant also became upset when Rojas refused to allow him to “go see who [she] was staying with.” Though Rojas did not testify that their relationship was sexual, the trier of fact could have reasonably inferred that they had been “living together in a substantial relationship, ” which involved “sexual or amorous intimacy” based on defendant’s and Rojas’ intense emotional responses to allegations of infidelity. (Holifield, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 1000.) Thus, the trial court did not err in denying the section 1118 motion.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant next contends that there was insufficient evidence of cohabitation to support his section 273.5 conviction even after the defense case. We disagree.
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, “the court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence-that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)
Here, as previously discussed, the prosecution’s case established that defendant and Rojas were former cohabitants. The evidence presented by the defense confirmed this finding. Sanchez’s statement corroborated Rojas’ testimony that she lived with defendant. According to Sanchez, Rojas moved in with defendant shortly after April 2007, and they moved out in September 2008. Thus, there was substantial evidence to support defendant’s conviction of section 273.5.
Since we conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the section 273.5 conviction, we need not consider defendant’s contention that the court security fee and the criminal conviction assessment must be reduced. (§ 1465.8; Gov. Code, § 70373.)
C. Section 654
The trial court imposed a four-year prison term for aggravated assault and a concurrent four-year term for infliction of corporal injury. Defendant contends that the sentence for infliction of corporal injury should be stayed pursuant to section 654 because the attacks were parts of an indivisible course of conduct and involved the same intent and objective.
Section 654, subdivision (a) states in relevant part that “[a]n act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.”
Section 654 prohibits multiple punishment for a single act or an indivisible course of conduct. (People v. Hicks (1993) 6 Cal.4th 784, 789.) “ ‘Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished... not for more than one [of the offenses].’ ” (People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1208, quoting Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 19.) Whether a defendant held multiple criminal objectives is a factual issue and will be upheld on appeal if it is supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Liu (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1135-1136.)
In the present case, there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s implied finding that defendant held multiple criminal objectives. Defendant initially attacked Rojas because she accused him of seeing another woman while she was in jail and because she failed to enter a treatment program upon her release. He pulled her hair, punched her chest and arm, and choked her. Rojas attempted to get away from him by boarding two separate trains. While on the train, she told him that she was going to call the police. After they exited the train, he attacked her again, pushing her on a bench, hitting her, biting her forehead, throwing her on the ground, kicking her, burning her with a cigarette, and ripping her shirt. Since the trial court could have reasonably concluded that defendant attacked her the first time because she questioned his fidelity and she had failed to enter a treatment program, and he attacked her the second time because she said she was going to call the police, section 654 did not apply.
III. Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P. J., DUFFY, J.