Opinion
2000-11294
Argued September 6, 2002.
September 24, 2002.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Marrus, J.), rendered November 21, 2000, convicting him of robbery in the second degree, grand larceny in the third degree, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle in the third degree, and assault in the third degree, after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence.
Lynn W. L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Mae C. Quinn of counsel), for appellant.
Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Jane S. Meyers, and Matthew S. Greenberg of counsel), for respondent.
Before: FRED T. SANTUCCI, J.P., ROBERT W. SCHMIDT, SANDRA L. TOWNES, BARRY A. COZIER, JJ.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the People failed to prove that he used physical force to prevent or overcome resistance by the complainant is without merit. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Santiago, 48 N.Y.2d 1023; People v. Huggins, 228 A.D.2d 241; People v. Brown, 178 A.D.2d 420). "Moreover, resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the trier of fact, which saw and heard the witnesses" (People v. Berberich, 283 A.D.2d 513; see also People v. Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84). The determination of the trier of fact should be given great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see People v. Berberich, supra; People v. Gaimari, supra). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15).
SANTUCCI, J.P., SCHMIDT, TOWNES and COZIER, JJ., concur.