Opinion
September 24, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Rosato, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that under the facts of this case the hearing court erred in denying that branch of his motion which was to suppress his statements since they were the direct product of an illegal arrest and unlawful search made in his apartment. We disagree.
At approximately 1:30 P.M., on September 8, 1987, two police officers went to the defendant's apartment and knocked on the door. When a woman's voice from inside asked who was there, they identified themselves as police officers and told her to open the door, which she did, stepping aside without saying anything. The officers entered the apartment, arrested the defendant, and advised him of his Miranda rights (see, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475), whereupon he made certain incriminating statements. At the time, the police did not have an arrest warrant. The police transported the defendant to the courthouse at about 3:00 P.M. He was again informed of his Miranda rights. Shortly thereafter, he gave an oral and a written statement to the police.
The facts herein are very similar to those in the case of New York v. Harris (495 US ___, 110 S Ct 1640). In Harris, the police had probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed murder. Three officers went to Harris's apartment to take him into custody without first obtaining an arrest warrant.
When the police arrived, they knocked on the door and identified themselves. Harris let them enter. Once inside the officers read Harris his Miranda rights. He then admitted to the killing. He was arrested, taken to the station house and again advised of his Miranda rights. He then signed a written inculpatory statement. The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice White, held that where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the State's use of a statement made by the defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest made in the home in violation of Payton v. New York ( 445 U.S. 573).
Accordingly, under the circumstances herein, we find that the defendant's inculpatory statement made at the courthouse two hours after his illegal arrest and after he was informed of his Miranda rights twice, was properly admitted in evidence. As to the defendant's contentions regarding the suppression of the oral statement he made at his apartment at the time of his arrest and the physical evidence seized in his apartment, since he failed to raise these challenges before the suppression court, they are not preserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05).
The defendant's argument that he was denied his right to a fair trial due to the introduction of evidence of bad character and uncharged crimes is also without merit. The challenged testimony was admissible either because the defense counsel had opened the door (see, People v. Melendez, 55 N.Y.2d 445; see also, People v Peoples, 143 A.D.2d 780), or as proper rebuttal testimony (see, People v. Ramos, 139 A.D.2d 775).
The trial court impartially and successfully sought to maintain the propriety, orderliness, decorum and expeditious course of the trial (see, People v. Utley, 130 A.D.2d 693), and it did not improperly marshal the evidence when it delivered its charge to the jury (see, CPL 300.10, [2]; see also, People v Saunders, 64 N.Y.2d 665). The prosecutor's behavior during trial was also proper. His comments during summation constituted fair comments upon the evidence and did not exceed the bounds of permissible rhetorical comment (see, People v. James, 146 A.D.2d 712). Those comments did not constitute improper vouching for the veracity of the prosecutor's witnesses, since the challenged remarks constituted permissible responses to the comments in the defense counsel's summation which repeatedly attacked the credibility of the People's witnesses (see, People v. Clink, 143 A.D.2d 838). Bracken, J.P., Lawrence, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.