Opinion
F071551
12-29-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALEJANDRO ARREDONDO et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Carrie C. McCreary, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant Alejandro Arredondo. Nicholas Francisco Reyes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant David Alejandro Perez. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Clara M. Levers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. Nos. BF148458A; BF148458B)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Kern County. John S. Somers, Judge. Carrie C. McCreary, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant Alejandro Arredondo. Nicholas Francisco Reyes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant David Alejandro Perez. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Clara M. Levers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Levy, Acting P.J., Poochigian, J. and Smith, J.
-ooOoo-
Alejandro Arredondo and David Alejandro Perez appeal from the trial court's denial of their motions to suppress evidence—i.e., a revolver and approximately nine grams of cocaine—recovered from Arredondo's truck when police officers searched it after a traffic stop. Defendants contend the evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We will affirm the denial of defendants' suppression motions.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arose from a traffic stop effected on a truck owned and driven by Arredondo, in which Perez was a passenger. The traffic stop took place on a residential street, approximately a block and a half away from Arredondo's residence (Perez also lived in the immediate vicinity). As a result of the traffic stop, Arredondo's truck was subjected to two successive searches. The first search, which was characterized as an inventory search, led to the discovery of a firearm in the center console of the truck. The second search, which occurred after a narcotics-sniffing dog alerted to the presence of narcotics in the truck's cab, led to the discovery of a bag containing approximately nine grams of cocaine, several empty baggies, and a digital scale. Defendants moved to suppress evidence of the firearm and the cocaine and related paraphernalia in the trial court. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied defendants' suppression motions. Defendants' cases were subsequently resolved by means of plea bargains. Defendants now appeal the trial court's ruling on their motions to suppress evidence.
The factual summary set forth below is based on the evidence presented at the suppression hearing unless otherwise specified. (See People v. Neighbours (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1115, 1120 [when reviewing the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, we consider only the evidence presented to the trial court in connection with that motion].)
On May 10, 2013, at 2:03 a.m., Bakersfield Police Officer Frank McIntyre was on duty in a marked patrol car, en route to a call with K9 Officer Jeff Martin, who was driving another patrol car carrying a narcotics-sniffing dog, Titan. McIntyre was driving southbound on South Union Avenue in Bakersfield; Martin was driving northbound on the same stretch of South Union. South Union Avenue, the "old [Highway] 99" in Bakersfield, is a thoroughfare connecting the northern and southern sections of the city. McIntyre noticed a white 2005 Chevy Silverado two-door truck in front of him. Both McIntyre and the truck were in the No. 2 lane. The truck moved to the No. 1 lane and then back into the No. 2 lane, without signaling. McIntyre decided to pull the truck over. He informed dispatch that he was going to make a traffic stop. Police dispatcher Kelley Mitchell testified, based on dispatch logs that were introduced into evidence, that McIntyre informed dispatch by 2:03:07 a.m. that he was initiating a traffic stop. The dispatch logs also indicated that McIntyre contemporaneously provided the truck's license plate number to the dispatcher, who, also at 2:03 a.m., ran a records check on the plate. Dispatch informed the officers that the "[v]ehicle returned no stops," which meant that "the vehicle [was] not a reported stolen vehicle."
At the preliminary hearing, McIntyre testified that the truck was approximately 44 feet in front of him.
Officer McIntyre testified that he did not know precisely how fast the truck was traveling but believed its speed was "unusually high." McIntyre testified that he was going 45 mph himself and the truck was "pulling away from [him] quickly." McIntyre turned on his emergency lights and sounded a short siren blast. At that point, the truck moved back to the No. 1 lane, enabling it to take a left turn off South Union Avenue and onto Garden Drive, a residential street. The truck pulled over to the right curb and came to a complete stop about 150 feet after turning onto Garden. McIntyre estimated the period from when he turned on his emergency lights until the car parked at the curb on Garden Drive was approximately "five seconds."
At the preliminary hearing, McIntyre estimated that the truck turned onto Garden Drive "probably less than a second" after he saw it make the lane changes. At another point, he estimated it turned on to Garden Drive "a few seconds" after he turned on his patrol car's emergency lights. He testified that the truck stopped about half a block into Garden Drive.
McIntyre testified that when the car moved to the No. 1 lane in order to turn onto Garden, it did so abruptly, such that the driver's side tires scraped the center median. Furthermore, the truck turned so sharply onto Garden that the driver's side tires "lift[ed] slightly off the ground." Upon turning onto Garden, the truck "drift[ed] from side to side." Since it was a residential area, there were cars "parked on the north and south curb line of Garden Drive." The truck "narrowly miss[ed]" or came "[w]ithin several feet" of "one [car] on the south curb line" and "one on the north curb line." After the truck pulled over to the curb and stopped on Garden, McIntyre proceeded to contact the individuals inside the car. The spot where the truck stopped was a block or so from Arredondo's residence.
Officer Martin, who was northbound on South Union Avenue, had turned his car around after hearing McIntyre's transmission, and caught up to McIntyre to assist him. Martin heard McIntyre tell dispatch that McIntyre was observing a failure to yield. When Martin saw the truck, it was traveling at a speed of approximately 35 mph. By 2:03:16 a.m., Martin had informed dispatch that the white truck was yielding or had yielded. Martin saw the vehicle turn onto Garden; the truck did not make any evasive maneuvers on Garden.
Officer Martin turned onto Garden Drive right behind McIntyre and parked his patrol car next to McIntyre's patrol car. Officer Cason showed up seconds later. Officer Cooley also arrived shortly, followed by Sergeant Stratton.
Officer McIntyre initiated a "high-risk vehicle stop," "otherwise known as a felony stop." With Martin and his "canine partner," Titan, on hand, McIntyre told Arredondo to put both hands out of the window, open the door, step out, slowly back up, and get on his knees. Arredondo complied with all commands and was immediately handcuffed. McIntyre followed the same protocol with Perez. Arredondo was arrested for "felony evading" and placed in the back of McIntyre's patrol car. Perez was "detained in handcuffs pending further investigation" and placed in the back of another patrol car. McIntyre described the process of "extracting two people out of a vehicle" as "a very meticulous process," "a slow process."
McIntyre described a "felony stop": "[It is] basically a safety-oriented stop. I'm going to stop a distance away from the vehicle with my gun drawn in a position of safety in ordering the people out of that vehicle."
McIntyre testified that at that point, he was conducting a criminal investigation. However, he could not recall when he obtained the defendants' names; rather, he testified, "At some point in there I got their names." Subsequently, McIntyre testified that he "identified [Perez] immediately after [detaining] him," so dispatch could run a records check on him. He also asked for Arredondo's driver's license and ascertained, by means of a records check, that the license was valid. He did not check the status of Perez's license "due to the fact that it was not his car." McIntyre was aware, at some point after the truck was "cleared" and the defendants secured, that the defendants lived on the 400 block of Sperry Street, which was roughly a block or a block and a half from the location where the traffic stop occurred.
By "clearing" the truck, the officers meant "approach[ing] the vehicle with guns drawn just to make sure that there was nobody else hiding inside the truck."
Dispatch logs in evidence showed that dispatch ran the truck's license plate number at 2:03 a.m., and ascertained that Arredondo was the registered owner of the truck, the truck's registration was current, insurance information was on file, and Arredondo's address was 405 Sperry Street, Bakersfield. McIntyre could not say whether dispatch had informed him of Arredondo's address after running the license plate: "I don't know what the dispatch responded back. My lights and sirens were on. I don't know." He also said that dispatch's practice, in terms of provision of a suspect's address, was "different in different cases"; usually, dispatch would say "'local' or 'from Bakersfield' or something like that." Officer Martin testified regarding license plate records checks, that "[dispatch] will attach the plate [records] to the text of the call, but you have to manually press it for it to pull up to figure out [the details of] the registered owner."
McIntyre testified that the police did not have a warrant to search Arredondo's truck. McIntyre testified, however, that he decided to impound Arredondo's truck because of his arrest, and then authorized an inventory search of the truck pursuant to a Bakersfield Police Department policy requiring that inventory searches be performed on all impounded vehicles. He testified he made the decision to impound the truck and instructed other officers to search it "[i]mmediately after" he arrested Arredondo; the decision to impound the truck was not relayed to dispatch. The decision to impound was made, and the inventory search conducted, before a tow was ordered. Moreover, McIntyre did not order the eventual tow himself; indeed, he was unaware as to when it was ordered or who ordered it. McIntyre did not ask Arredondo whether he wanted his car left, as parked, near his residence; nor did he look into the possibility of Perez taking charge of the truck. McIntyre testified that the only factor he considered in deciding to impound the truck was that Arredondo was under arrest.
McIntyre had the following exchange with Perez's counsel:
[Defense Counsel]: "Okay. Now, from the information on dispatch, you didn't call for a tow truck until almost 3 o'clock, roughly an hour later; isn't that true, sir?
[McIntyre]: Yes.
[Defense Counsel]: So my question to you is: What specific criteria - was it [a] suspended license[] that allowed you to impound the vehicle?
[McIntyre]: California Vehicle Code Section 22651(h)(1) means I can tell -
[Defense Counsel]: Was there a suspended license? [¶]...[¶]
[The Court]: Officer, do you want to finish your answer ....
[McIntyre]: Yes, sir. He asked me what criteria I used to impound the vehicle. I stated California Vehicle Code Section 22651(h)(1). It means when I can take a person into custody or under arrest, I can impound the vehicle pursuant to the driver being arrested. [¶]...[¶]
[Defense Counsel]: We want you [to be] clear. So could you give me clearly what criteria you utilized to establish that you were going to undergo an inventory search.
[McIntyre]: I believe I answered that question. It's the fact that the driver was arrested, and I was going to tow his vehicle for that reason.
[Defense Counsel]: And did any other thing go into your criteria in determining that, sir?
[McIntyre]: No."
In his police report regarding the instant incident, McIntyre also stated that the truck was towed "pursuant to [California Vehicle Code section] 22651(h)(1) - driver arrested." The police report concluded, "Arredondo's vehicle was towed by Barnett's Towing pursuant to [California Vehicle Code section] 22651(h)(1) - driver arrested."
McIntyre's police report was submitted to the trial court along with the People's response to defendants' motion to suppress evidence.
As for inventory searches, McIntyre explained the rationale underlying an inventory search: "Prior to your tow, you conduct an inventory search to find out what's in the vehicle for liability purposes so someone can't complain on you that you stole anything or broke anything and for safety purposes so we don't have a vehicle towed with a bomb in it or something like that, firearms, weapons." McIntyre testified that the Bakersfield Police Department had a written policy regarding the scope of inventory searches, namely policy 510.4. McIntyre testified he did not bring a copy of the policy with him, nor did the People introduce it into evidence. McIntyre did not specify whether policy 510.4 also governed police impounds of private vehicles. His testimony indicated that officers simply exercised their discretion in deciding when to impound a vehicle, considering factors such as the character of the neighborhood in terms of the "types of crimes that occur" there and whether the driver would be under arrest "for an extended period of time." McIntyre testified that although the location where he effected the traffic stop was not his beat, "Southeast Bakersfield in general" was a "high-crime" area. He explained that because the 2005 truck was a "nice vehicle," it was "susceptible to getting broken into, stolen," which was something he considered when he decided to impound it.
By 2:11 a.m., the truck had been searched, a "black revolver with wooden pistol grips" discovered in the center console, and dispatch informed that the gun was found. Officers Martin and Cason conducted the search. McIntyre testified that between 2:03 a.m. (when the stop was effected) and 2:11 a.m. (when the gun was found), he was doing "preliminary interviews, asking [the defendants'] names, identifying information, securing the scene, establishing perimeters."
Officer Cooley arrived on the scene at approximately 2:10 a.m., in response to a failure to yield transmission; within seven seconds of the first transmission, he heard another transmission to the effect that the car was yielding. Cooley conducted a records check on Arredondo and Perez. Dispatch did not provide any information on Arredondo but informed Cooley that Perez was on "juvenile probation, with search terms." The record indicates, more specifically, that Perez was on diversion in a juvenile case.
Officer Martin testified that he and Officer Cason conducted the initial search of the truck, when the latter found the gun in the center console. At that time, McIntyre informed Martin that one of the defendants "was on probation" and for Martin "to utilize [his] dog." Martin described what he did next: "I retrieved my canine partner, conducted an exterior search of the vehicle. During the search the driver's side door was open. As I was conducting my search, I observed my partner put his nose underneath the speaker box and the floor, observed him take several deep ventilations, then sit, indicating to me he was in the presence of a narcotic odor." Martin clarified that the speaker box was a small wooden box containing one speaker; the speaker box was loose (i.e., not attached to the floor) and located underneath the driver's seat. Martin pulled out the loose speaker box and looked inside. He testified: "I located a clear plastic baggie with a white substance that I suspected to be cocaine, several additional baggies, and a scale." Officer McIntyre testified that Perez was arrested "after [officers] found the firearm and the narcotics in the vehicle."
The defendants were booked into jail but, shortly thereafter, were released on bail. An information was filed on October 1, 2013, charging defendants with transportation of cocaine (with gang and gun enhancements), possession of cocaine for sale (with gang and gun enhancements), and carrying of a loaded firearm by a gang member. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, subd. (a), 11351; Pen. Code, § 25850, subd. (c)(3)). Arredondo was charged, in addition, with evading a pursuing police officer (with a gang enhancement). (Veh. Code, § 2800.2.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Arredondo pleaded no contest to carrying of a loaded firearm by a gang member and possession of cocaine for sale (he admitted the gun enhancement allegation associated with the latter charge). Perez, also pursuant to a plea agreement, pleaded no contest to carrying of a loaded firearm by a gang member. The remaining charges and enhancement allegations against both defendants were dismissed. Arredondo was sentenced to five years in prison: two years for possession of cocaine for sale, plus three years for the gun enhancement, and a concurrent term of 16 months for carrying of a loaded firearm by a gang member. Perez was placed on probation for three years, with the condition that he serve one year in county jail.
The gang enhancements were alleged under Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) and the gun enhancements were alleged under Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (c).
DISCUSSION
Arredondo and Perez challenge the two successive searches of the truck—leading, respectively, to the discovery of the gun and the cocaine—on a number of theories. They contend the initial search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, as it cannot be justified as a search incident to arrest or an impound-and-inventory search; nor can it be justified based on the fact that Perez was subject to search conditions pursuant to his pending deferred entry of judgment in a juvenile case. They argue that the evidence seized from the truck is, therefore, the inadmissible fruit of an unreasonable search. (See Wong Sun v. U.S. (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 484-485). We disagree, and, as discussed below, conclude that both searches were justified and constitutionally reasonable. The initial search was a standard inventory search incident to a lawful impoundment and, hence, was valid under the impound-and-inventory exception to warrantless searches. The second search was supported by probable cause and, in turn, was valid under the automobile exception to warrantless searches.
We evaluate challenges to the admissibility of a search or seizure solely under the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1141; People v. Evans (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 735, 742.) When reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, we defer to the trial court's express or implied findings if supported by substantial evidence, but independently assess, as a matter of law, whether the challenged search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 563; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 327.) We will affirm the trial court's ruling if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, even if for reasons different than those given by the trial court. (People v. Evans, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at pp. 742-743; People v. McDonald (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 521, 529.)
Here defendants do not specifically challenge the initial traffic stop or Arredondo's ensuing arrest. Accordingly, we will assume the initial traffic stop was proper and that Arredondo's custodial arrest was supported by probable cause. We next consider, seriatim, whether Officer McIntyre's decision to impound the truck and the ensuing inventory search leading to the discovery of the gun, were constitutionally reasonable, as argued by the People and determined by the trial court. (See U.S. v. Sanchez (1st Cir. 2010) 612 F.3d 1, 4 ["a decision to impound is analytically distinct from a decision to undertake an inventory search incident to a lawful impoundment"] (Sanchez).) Thereafter, we will address the constitutionality of the second search, which led to the discovery of the cocaine and related paraphernalia.
To the extent the defendants have attempted to challenge the initial traffic stop and Arredondo's arrest, we reject these claims because they are improperly presented and inadequately developed. (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408 [conclusory claims of error will fail]; Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 366, fn. 2; Nielsen v. Gibson (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 318, 324; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).)
A. McIntyre's Decision to Impound the Truck
The impoundment of an automobile is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. (Miranda v. City of Cornelius (9th Cir. 2005) 429 F.3d 858, 862 (City of Cornelius).) "A seizure conducted without a warrant is 'per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.'" (U.S. v. Hawkins (9th Cir. 2001) 249 F.3d 867, 872.) The impound-and-inventory exception to the warrant requirement is such a well-settled exception. (See South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364 (Opperman) and Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367 (Bertine).) However, where this exception is invoked, "the action taken must nonetheless be reasonable" under the totality of circumstances. (City of Cornelius, supra, at p. 862.) Indeed, since the Fourth Amendment prohibits only "'"unreasonable searches and seizures[,] [t]he [ultimate] test is [always] ... the reasonableness of the seizure under all the circumstances. The test of reasonableness cannot be fixed by per se rules; each case must be decided on its own facts.'" (Opperman, supra, at p. 373, quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443, 509-510 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting); Florida v. Jimeno (1991) 500 U.S. 248, 250 [Reasonableness is "the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment."].)
In inventory search cases, in assessing whether the underlying impoundment was reasonable, "courts will explore police officers' subjective motivations for impounding vehicles," "even when some objectively reasonable basis exists for the impounding." (People v. Torres (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 775, 787-788 (Torres) ["We have 'never held, outside the context of inventory search ... that an officer's motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment.'"].) The focus is on the reason for the impound, rather than the inventory search, because "'[a]n inventory search conducted pursuant to an unreasonable impound is itself unreasonable.'" (Id. at p. 786.) A defendant meets his initial burden of challenging the constitutionality of a warrantless search or seizure by "simply assert[ing] the absence of a warrant and mak[ing] a prima facie showing to support that assertion." (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 130.) The prosecution then bears the burden of proving that the search or seizure was constitutionally reasonable. (Ibid.)
Torres explains: "Inventory search jurisprudence presumes some objectively reasonable basis supports the impounding. The relevant question is whether the impounding was subjectively motivated by an improper investigatory purpose." (Torres, supra, 188 Cal.4th at p. 791.)
Here Officer McIntyre testified that he relied on Vehicle Code section 22651, subdivision (h)(1), as authority for impounding Arredondo's truck. "While the statute authorizes law enforcement officers to 'remove' a vehicle when they make a custodial arrest of a person 'driving or in control of' the vehicle, this statutory authorization does not, in and of itself, determine the constitutional reasonableness of the seizure." (People v. Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 762 (Williams); City of Cornelius, supra, 429 F.3d at p. 864 ["the decision to impound pursuant to the authority of a city ordinance and state statute does not, in and of itself, determine the reasonableness of the seizure under the Fourth Amendment."]; Sibron v. New York (1968) 392 U.S. 40, 61 ["The question ... upon review of a state-approved search or seizure 'is not whether the search (or seizure) was authorized by state law. The question is rather whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment"]; People v. Trejo (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 460, 462-463 ["compliance with the letter of the law does not shield the officer's conduct from Fourth Amendment challenge if the decision to tow in the particular circumstance is unreasonable"]; U.S. v. Cervantes (9th Cir. 2012) 703 F.3d 1135, 1141-1142 [same]; Cal. Const., art 1, § 24 ["In criminal cases the rights of a defendant ... to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures ... shall be construed by the courts of this state in a manner consistent with the Constitution of the United States"].) Accordingly, our inquiry into the constitutionality of McIntyre's decision to impound the truck does not end with his reference to Vehicle Code section 22651, subdivision (h)(1). We ultimately have to determine whether McIntyre's decision to impound the truck was reasonable under "'all the circumstances.'" (Opperman, supra, 428 U.S. at p. 373.)
One factor we consider in evaluating an impoundment's reasonableness, in terms of its underlying subjective motivation, is whether the impoundment served a "community caretaking function" in addition to facial compliance with a particular state law, here Vehicle Code section 22651, subdivision (h)(1). (See, e.g., Williams, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 763; People v. Shafrir (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1247-1248; U.S. v. Caseres (9th Cir. 2008) 533 F.3d 1064, 1075; City of Cornelius, supra, 429 F.3d at p. 866; U.S. v. Phillips (E.D. Cal. 2014) 9 F.Supp.3d 1130, 1143-1144.) "[C]ourts invalidate inventory searches when the police impound vehicles without serving a community caretaking function, suggesting the impoundings were pretexts for conducting investigatory searches without probable cause." (Torres, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 788.) Whether an impoundment is warranted under the community caretaking doctrine depends on the location of the vehicle and the police officer's duty to prevent it from creating a hazard to other drivers or from being a target for vandalism or theft. (See U.S. v. Jensen (9th Cir. 2005) 425 F.3d 698, 705 ["Once the arrest was made, the doctrine allowed law enforcement officers to seize and remove any vehicle which may impede traffic, threaten public safety, or be subject to vandalism."]; Williams, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 761 [accord]; Torres, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at pp. 787-789 [same].) "An officer cannot reasonably order an impoundment in situations where the location of the vehicle does not create any need for the police to protect the vehicle or to avoid a hazard to other drivers." (City of Cornelius, supra, 429 F.3d at p. 866.)
Defendants contend that the instant impound was unreasonable under the community caretaking doctrine, given that Arredondo, the registered owner of the truck, lived only a block or two away from the location of the traffic stop. Here, Officer McIntyre testified that the area in which Arredondo's truck was parked was "a high-crime area"; he had "served search warrants in that area, made several vehicle stops, arrested several subjects for narcotics sales, firearms possessions." McIntyre further testified that he was concerned about leaving the truck in that area because "it's a nice vehicle" that would be "susceptible to getting broken into, stolen." We agree with defendants that the fact that Arredondo lived in the immediate vicinity of the stop undercuts the safekeeping rationale provided by McIntyre to justify the impoundment. (See Williams, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at pp. 761-763 ["[n]o community caretaking function was served by impounding" car after licensed driver's arrest, when car was parked in front of his own home]; U.S. v. Caseres, supra, 533 F.3d at pp. 1074-1075 ["[t]here was no community caretaking rationale for the impoundment of (the defendant's) car" when "[t]he car was legally parked at the curb of a residential street two houses away from (the defendant's) home, as "[t]he possibility that the vehicle would be stolen, broken into, or vandalized was no greater than if the police had not arrested (the defendant)"]; U.S. v. Squires (2d. Cir. 1972) 456 F.2d 967, 970 ["officers did not have a reasonable basis for concluding that it was necessary to [impound car] in order to protect it," when car was parked in parking lot behind defendant's apartment complex]; cf. People v. Shafrir, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1241, 1247-1248 [impound reasonable where seized vehicle was "brand new Mercedes," traffic stop was in "high crime area," and officer testified he would not have impounded car if it was parked in or near the defendant's "home neighborhood"].) We further note that McIntyre did not testify that he was unaware of Arredondo's address when he made the decision to impound the truck. Indeed, McIntyre was evasive as to when he became aware that Arredondo lived nearby; he simply indicated that it was at some point after Arredondo was secured or arrested.
We also agree with defendants that the rapidity with which McIntyre decided to impound the truck is questionable, since no consideration was given to whether Perez could have driven the truck away, or, in light of the proximity of Arredondo's residence, whether a family member could immediately retrieve the truck. (Cf. U.S. v. Coccia (1st Cir. 2006) 446 F.3d 233, 240 [impound reasonable where no one was immediately available to take custody of a defendant's car as the defendant only called sister in another state and did not inform officers of any other means to remove the car].) Finally, we note that Arredondo was not asked, despite the fact that he lived only blocks away, whether he wanted the truck left as parked on Garden Drive, a residential street on which other cars were parked as well. (See Williams, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 761-762 ["Although a police officer is not required to adopt the least intrusive course of action in deciding whether to impound and search a car [citation], the action taken must nonetheless be reasonable in light of the justification for the impound and inventory exception to the search warrant requirement."].)
To the extent McIntyre was unaware of where Arredondo lived, the latter's address could quickly and easily have been ascertained by asking him, or by referring to his driver license or the truck's registration information retrieved by dispatch.
Ultimately, here, we are not persuaded that the impoundment was unreasonable under all relevant circumstances. The officers had just made a "high risk" or "felony" stop (whereby their focus was on officer safety rather than on processing the defendants' identification and personal information); in light of Arredondo's arrest, the Vehicle Code authorized McIntyre to exercise his discretion in impounding the truck; McIntyre testified that the neighborhood was in a high crime area and that he was concerned about the possibility of theft of, or damage to, the truck; the truck was parked at least a block or two away from Arredondo's house as opposed to directly in front of the house or even on the same street; and there was no affirmative indication that the decision to impound the truck was pretextual. (See People v. Green (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 367, 374 [upholding impound and subsequent inventory search since "[t]here is no indication that the inventory search of the car was merely a 'ruse' to try to discover evidence of criminal activity"]; cf. Torres, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 792 [invalidating impound and subsequent inventory search because "the record shows a concededly investigatory motive and no community caretaking function" as "deputy candidly stated he impounded the truck as a pretext for searching for narcotics evidence"].) In sum, although this is a close issue, the impoundment was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.
B. Inventory Search Incident to Lawful Impoundment
"If officers are warranted in impounding a vehicle, a warrantless inventory search of the vehicle pursuant to a standardized procedure is constitutionally reasonable." (Williams, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 761.) Here, McIntyre testified that after the decision to impound the truck was made, an inventory search of the truck was performed pursuant to a standard Bakersfield Police Department policy authorizing inventory searches of impounded vehicles. The gun was discovered during the inventory search. In light of our conclusion that the decision to impound the truck was constitutionally reasonable and McIntyre's testimony that the inventory search was performed pursuant to departmental policy, the inventory search was, in turn, constitutionally reasonable.
C. The Second Search of the Truck
As for the second search of the truck, which led to discovery of the cocaine, that search was supported by probable cause in light of the discovery of the gun, and hence was valid under the automobile exception. (See People v. Waxler (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 712, 718-719 ["'[T]he Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution permits the warrantless search of an automobile with probable cause.'"]; Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332, 347 ["probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity" justifies "a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found"]; U.S. v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798, 825 ["If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search."].) Moreover, the fact that Officer Martin's narcotics-sniffing dog, Titan, walked around the truck and alerted to the presence of narcotics therein, also gave the officers probable cause to further search the truck. (People v. Stillwell (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 996, 1004, 1006 [the use of a dog sniff does not implicate the protections of the Fourth Amendment and a trained dog's alert provides probable cause to search a vehicle].) In sum, both the inventory search that led to the discovery of the gun and the subsequent search that led to the discovery of the cocaine, were constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. We thus affirm the trial court's denial of defendants' motion to suppress evidence.
Officer Martin and K9 Titan had undergone extensive training and certification in narcotics detection.
Since we have determined that the searches of the truck were justified, we need not address the defendants' challenges to the searches based on other theories. Also, since it is not necessary in light of our resolution of the claims at issue, we have not addressed whether Perez can properly challenge the searches in the first instance. We note, moreover, that Perez has not challenged his initial detention and subsequent arrest. To the extent he has attempted to, we reject the claims because they have not been properly presented or adequately developed. (In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408 [conclusory claims of error will fail]; Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 366, fn. 2; Nielsen v. Gibson, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 324; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).)
DISPOSITION
The trial court's denial of defendants' motion to suppress is affirmed.