Opinion
Court of Appeals No. 19CA1117
04-01-2021
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan Carlos ARGOTT, Defendant-Appellant.
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Kevin E. McReynolds, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Sarah Spears, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Kevin E. McReynolds, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Sarah Spears, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE BERNARD
¶ 1 A "wobbler" statute "usually [creates] a ‘hybrid’ offense that can be charged as either a felony or a misdemeanor." People v. DeBorde , 2016 COA 185, ¶ 1 n.1, 411 P.3d 220 (citation omitted). This case involves a wobbler statute, section 18-1.3-103.5(2)(a), C.R.S. 2020, which wobbles — meaning that it is reduced by operation of law — "from a felony to a misdemeanor upon the defendant's successful completion of the community-based portion of his sentence." DeBorde , ¶ 1 n.1. Subsection 103.5(2)(a) states that, if a defendant pleads guilty to certain enumerated drug felonies, and the defendant successfully completes "any community-based sentence to probation," then the court shall vacate the felony conviction and "enter a conviction for a level 1 drug misdemeanor offense of possession of a controlled substance ...."
¶ 2 In this case, defendant, Juan Carlos Argott, pled guilty to a drug felony that fell under subsection 103.5(2)(a). The trial court sentenced him to probation, but it later twice revoked his probation. Both times, the court resentenced him to probation. Defendant eventually filed a motion alleging that he had completed his probation successfully, and he asked the court to follow subsection 103.5(a)(a) and reduce his felony drug conviction to a class 1 drug misdemeanor conviction. The court declined his request, concluding that its decision to revoke his probation the second time meant that he had not successfully completed his probation.
¶ 3 Defendant appeals. He asks this question of first impression in Colorado: Did the court's decision to revoke his probation, and then to resentence him to probation, prevent the court from later reducing his felony drug conviction to a class 1 misdemeanor drug conviction under the wobbler statute? We answer this question "no." As a result, we reverse and remand for additional proceedings.
I. Background
¶ 4 In April 2016, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to one count of possession of methamphetamine, a controlled substance, which was a class 4 drug felony. The agreement included a stipulation that the court would, at the sentencing hearing, place defendant on probation without imposing a jail sentence.
¶ 5 About a month later, at the sentencing hearing, the court put defendant on supervised probation for one year, and it ordered him to complete a substance abuse evaluation and to comply with its recommendations. The court also told him that, under the wobbler statute, the court would reduce his felony drug conviction to a class 1 misdemeanor drug conviction if he successfully completed his probation.
¶ 6 In November 2016, the court revoked defendant's probation because he had not submitted random urine samples for testing. It decided to resentence him to probation, adding a requirement that he serve ninety days in jail, and it authorized the jail to release him during the day to go to his job.
¶ 7 In April 2018, the court again revoked defendant's probation because he missed two appointments. It resentenced him to unsupervised probation on the condition that he serve 130 days in a community treatment center, allowing the center to release him to go to work.
¶ 8 In 2019, citing subsection 103.5(2)(a), defendant filed a motion asking the court to reduce his felony drug conviction to a class 1 misdemeanor drug conviction. The motion alleged that he had successfully completed his probationary sentence at the community treatment center. The court, in a written order, denied the motion. It concluded that, because it had revoked defendant's probation in April 2018, defendant had not successfully completed his probationary sentence. According to the order, "[t]he fact that [d]efendant was reinstated on probation to complete a sentence" in the community treatment center instead of in prison did not "alter the fact [that] [d]efendant did not successfully complete probation."
II. Discussion
¶ 9 Defendant contends that the court erred when it decided that he was not eligible for relief under subsection 103.5(2)(a) because it had previously revoked his probation. The prosecution concedes this contention, and we agree. We conclude that the subsection's plain language does not bar a court from reducing a felony drug conviction to a class 1 misdemeanor drug conviction after revoking a defendant's probation if (1) the court resentences the defendant to probation; and (2) the defendant successfully completes any subsequent community-based probationary sentence.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 10 We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. McCoy v. People , 2019 CO 44, ¶ 37, 442 P.3d 379.
¶ 11 In construing a statute, we seek to ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly's intent. Id. To do so, we look first to the statutory language, giving its words and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. Id. If the plain language is clear and unambiguous, we apply the statute as written. People v. Burnett , 2019 CO 2, ¶ 20, 432 P.3d 617.
¶ 12 We read the statute's words and phrases in context, construing them according to the rules of grammar and common usage and endeavoring "to effectuate the purpose of the legislative scheme." McCoy , ¶ 38. And we interpret the statute within the context of its broader scheme to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effects to all its parts. Martin v. People , 27 P.3d 846, 851 (Colo. 2001). The context and accompanying legislative policy statements can help us determine a statute's intended meaning. People v. Cross , 127 P.3d 71, 73 (Colo. 2006).
B. Analysis
¶ 13 Subsection 103.5(2)(a) states that, "upon successful completion of any community-based sentence to probation or to a community corrections program," the court shall vacate the drug felony conviction and "shall enter a conviction for a level 1 drug misdemeanor offense of possession of a controlled substance ...." (Emphasis added.) Section 18-1.3-103.5(2)(b) adds that "[w]hether a sentence is successfully completed shall be determined by the court." ¶ 14 In other words, as is relevant to our analysis, subsection 103.5(2)(a) requires a court to reduce a felony drug conviction to a class 1 misdemeanor drug conviction if it finds that the defendant has successfully completed any community-based probation sentence; it does not exclude from its reach defendants who have had courts revoke their probation and whom courts have then resentenced to probation. See DeBorde , ¶ 15 ("The statute contains a single mandate: if the defendant successfully completes his sentence to probation or community corrections, the court must substitute a misdemeanor conviction for the original felony conviction.")(footnote omitted).
¶ 15 In reaching this conclusion, we note that section 18-1.3-103.5(4) sets out certain circumstances in which a defendant is "not eligible for relief under" subsection 103.5(2)(a): (1) when a defendant has a prior crime of violence conviction; (2) when a defendant is ineligible for probation; or (3) when a defendant has two or more prior felony convictions for drug offenses. But what happened in this case — the court revoked defendant's probation and then resentenced him to probation — is not listed as one of the disqualifying circumstances. If the General Assembly had wanted to classify the situation that we face now as a disqualifying circumstance, it easily could have done so. See People v. Diaz , 2015 CO 28, ¶ 15, 347 P.3d 621 ("[W]e must accept the General Assembly's choice of language and not add or imply words that simply are not there." (quoting People v. Benavidez , 222 P.3d 391, 393-94 (Colo. App. 2009) )).
¶ 16 Our interpretation is also consistent with the General Assembly's intent. See Johnson v. People , 2016 CO 59, ¶ 18, 379 P.3d 323 ("[W]e must interpret a statute so as to effectuate the purpose of the legislative scheme.").
¶ 17 For example, we find the General Assembly's intent in section 18-1.3-103.5(1), which states that the wobbler statute is designed to do three things: (1) "to expand opportunities for offenders to avoid a drug felony conviction"; (2) "to reduce the significant negative consequences of that felony conviction"; and (3) "to provide positive reinforcement for drug offenders who work to successfully complete any community-based sentence." See DeBorde , ¶ 19 ("The purpose of the wobbler statute is to allow offenders to ‘avoid ... drug felony conviction[s]’ and [their] concomitant adverse collateral consequences if they successfully complete their community-based sentences.").
¶ 18 The General Assembly's intent is also manifested in section 18-1.3-104.5, C.R.S. 2020. It mandates that a court must exhaust all reasonable sentencing options for certain drug convictions before imposing a prison sentence. § 18-1.3-104.5(2)(a).
¶ 19 Our next task is to apply our interpretation of subsection 103.5(2)(a) the facts of this case:
• Defendant was convicted of a class 4 drug felony, possession of a controlled substance. § 18-18-403.5(1), (2)(a), C.R.S. 2020.
• So, at the time of his initial sentencing hearing, he was eligible to have his felony drug conviction reduced to a class 1 misdemeanor drug conviction if he later successfully completed any community-based sentence to probation.
• Although the court revoked his probation twice, it resentenced him to probation both times.
• A court's decision to revoke a defendant's probation and then to resentence the defendant to probation is not one of the exceptions to subsection 103.5(2)(a)’s coverage.
• The court therefore erred when it concluded that its decision to revoke defendant's probation meant that he was ineligible to have his felony drug conviction reduced to a class 1 misdemeanor drug conviction.
¶ 20 But our conclusion that the court erred does not mean that defendant is automatically entitled to an order reducing his felony drug conviction to a class 1 misdemeanor conviction. As we have previously pointed out, section 18-1.3-103.5(2)(b) directs a court to decide whether the defendant has "successfully completed" his community-based sentence to probation. The prosecution asks us to remand this case to the court so that it can address this question. We agree.
¶ 21 We therefore reverse the court's order denying defendant's motion, and we remand the case to the trial court to determine whether defendant successfully completed his community-based sentence to probation. If the court finds that he did, then it must grant his motion to reduce his felony drug conviction to a class 1 misdemeanor drug conviction. If it finds that he did not, then it must deny his motion. See DeBorde , ¶ 15.
¶ 22 The order is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for the further proceedings described in the previous paragraph.
JUDGE GRAHAM and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.
Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5 (3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2020.
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