Opinion
G057731
06-22-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STEVEN AREVALOS, Defendant and Appellant.
Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina, and Lynne G. McGinnis, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. RIF148423) OPINION Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Riverside County, John D. Molloy, Judge. Affirmed. Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina, and Lynne G. McGinnis, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Steven Arevalos appeals from the denial of his petition to vacate his manslaughter conviction pursuant to the resentencing provisions of Senate Bill No. 1437 (Sen. Bill 1437). The trial court denied the petition after determining Sen. Bill 1437 does not apply to manslaughter convictions. Arevalos contends Sen. Bill 1437 applies to his manslaughter conviction because he accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which he could have been convicted of first degree or second degree murder. Along with all appellate courts that have rejected similar contentions, we conclude the resentencing provisions of Sen. Bill 1437 apply only to murder convictions, not manslaughter convictions. (See, e.g., People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428, 435-436 [section 1170.95 does not provide relief to persons convicted of manslaughter]; People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884, 887 ["The plain language of the statute is explicit; its scope is limited to murder convictions"].) Arevalos argues limiting resentencing relief to murder convictions would deny him equal protection under the law. We disagree because the Legislature may distinguish between the two distinct and dissimilar crimes of murder and manslaughter without violating the equal protection clauses of the United States and California Constitutions. Accordingly, we affirm.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2012, Arevalos pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a); all further statutory references are to the Penal Code), and several related charges and allegations. Per the plea bargain, the trial court sentenced him to 14 years, 8 months in prison, including the low-term of three years on the manslaughter count.
In 2018, the Legislature enacted Sen. Bill 1437, which limited liability for murder under the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine by amending sections 188 and 189. (§§ 188, 189.) Sen. Bill 1437 also implemented a procedure allowing persons "convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences theory" to petition the trial court to "have [their] murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts." (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).)
On January 8, 2019, Arevalos filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95, seeking to vacate his manslaughter conviction. The trial court denied the petition on the ground that Arevalos had not made a prima facie case for relief under Sen. Bill 1437 because he was not convicted of murder.
II
DISCUSSION
Arevalos argues section 1170.95 applies to convictions for manslaughter, and equal protection principles required the trial court to grant his section 1170.95 petition. We are not persuaded.
As Arevalos acknowledges, section 1170.95 refers only to murder convictions. Moreover, none of the other sections affected by Senate Bill No. 1437 make any reference to any other crimes. (§§ 188, 189, 1170.95.) "If the plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, [the courts'] inquiry ends, and [one] need not embark on judicial construction." (People v. Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 240, 244.)
Arevalos argues section 1170.95 does not clearly preclude his petition because he accepted a plea to manslaughter in lieu of a trial at which he could have been convicted of first degree or second degree murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. He argues an ambiguity exists since a petitioner who seeks relief under section 1170.95 must establish, among other things, that he or she "was convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder." (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(2), italics added.) Arevalos argues this subdivision allows those charged with murder, but who pleaded guilty to "lesser homicides," to petition for relief. We disagree. The first portion of section 1170.95, subdivision (a), unequivocally requires a petitioner to have been "convicted" of either "felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences theory" in order to be eligible for relief. Subdivision (a)(2), merely clarifies that an eligible defendant who has been convicted of murder—either after a trial or by way of a negotiated plea—may petition for relief under the statute.
Arevalos argues the Legislature intended that Sen. Bill 1437 would apply to manslaughter convictions. He notes the preamble to Sen. Bill No. 1437 states the purpose of the legislation is to provide a means to vacate the conviction and resentence a defendant who "was sentenced for first degree murder or 2nd degree murder or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or 2nd degree murder." (Stats. 2018, Ch. 1015, italics added.) He also cites legislative findings that Sen. Bill 1437 was enacted to uphold the "bedrock principle that a person should be punished . . . according to his or her own level of individual culpability" and to "limit convictions and subsequent resentencing . . . [to] fairly address[] the culpability of the individual and assist[] in the reduction of prison overcrowding." (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subds. (d) & (e).) However, because the language of section 1170.95 plainly and unambiguously refers only to murder convictions, we need not resort to any further legislative materials. (See People v. Anderson (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 587, 592 ["Where [legislative] intent is clear and unambiguous from the language of the statute itself, we need not resort to secondary evidence"].)
We note that in People v. Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th 428, the appellate court extensively reviewed the legislative history of Sen. Bill 1437 and concluded "the legislative history confirms that a defendant who faces murder liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, but pleads guilty to manslaughter in lieu of trial, is not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95." (Id. at p. 438.)
Arevalos further argues denying him the benefit of Sen. Bill 1437's ameliorative provisions would deny him equal protection under the law. We disagree. The United States and California Constitutions guarantee equal protection of the laws. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).) As a threshold matter, to establish a constitutional equal protection claim, a defendant must show "that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner." (In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 530.) However, criminal defendants "who commit different crimes are not similarly situated" for equal protection purposes. (People v. Doyle (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1266.) Here, the Legislature has provided that persons convicted of murder are to be treated differently than defendants convicted of other crimes, such as manslaughter. This legislative judgment does not implicate equal protection principles because these classes of convicted persons are not similarly situated. (See People v. Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 888 [rejecting contention that the failure to include manslaughter convictions in section 1170.95 violates a petitioner's constitutional rights to equal protection and substantive due process].)
III
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order denying Arevalos's section 1170.95 petition is affirmed.
ARONSON, ACTING P.J. WE CONCUR: FYBEL, J. THOMPSON, J.