Opinion
B231507
09-27-2011
In re ANTHONY L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANTHONY L., Defendant and Appellant.
Kevin D. Sheehy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon and Joseph P. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. KJ33918)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Merrill L. Toole, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art VI, § 21.) Affirmed.
Kevin D. Sheehy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon and Joseph P. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Minor and appellant Anthony L. challenges a search condition imposed as a condition of parole after the trial court found true one count of committing a forcible lewd act with a child. We find that the search condition was properly imposed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Factual background.
On May 13, 2009, Anthony, Scott, Israel, Luis, and J.V. attended middle school together. J.V. was 12 years old. J.V. was in the band room when Anthony and Scott asked her to come with them because they wanted to show her something. Anthony and Scott led J.V. to the choir room, where Israel waited. Someone closed the door behind J.V., leaving her alone with Israel. Although J.V. told him to stop, Israel touched her breasts and buttocks. J.V. tried to open the door, but it was being held closed. Israel then called, " 'Over here,' " and Anthony, Scott and Luis came into the room. They held J.V. down on the ground, with Scott holding her legs and Anthony and Luis holding her arms. Israel was on top of her, touching her breasts. The incident lasted 5 to 10 minutes, until the lunch bell rang and the boys let her go. J.V. said that the boys were laughing during the incident. Uncomfortable, J.V. didn't tell anyone what happened, but the principal found out and reported it to the police.
II. Procedural background.
On July 9, 2009, a petition was filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging count 1, forcible lewd act on a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1)), and count 2, sexual battery by restraint (Pen. Code, § 243.4, subd. (a)). On March 4, 2011, the court sustained the petition as to count 1 only, count 2 having been previously dismissed. The court found the offense to be a felony, set the maximum time of confinement at eight years, and ordered Anthony home on probation on various conditions, including a search condition.
DISCUSSION
III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a search condition of probation.
As a condition of probation, the juvenile court ordered Anthony to "[s]ubmit person, residence or property under [your] control to search and seizure at any time of the day or night by any law enforcement officer, with or without a warrant." Anthony contends that the condition of probation is unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious and a violation of his federal and state constitutional privacy interests and right against unlawful searches and seizures. We disagree.
Defense counsel did object to the search condition, but the juvenile court overruled it, saying that this was a "typical condition" of probation.
A sentencing court has broad discretion to determine eligibility for and the conditions of probation, and the primary goal of probation is to ensure the public's safety through the enforcement of court-ordered conditions of probation. (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.) To that end, a juvenile court may "impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd. (b); see also, Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (j).) Conditions of probation are reviewed for an abuse of discretion and will not be held invalid unless it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379 (Olguin); People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486; see also In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889-890 [juvenile court's discretion to impose conditions of probation may be broader than " 'adult' " court's discretion].)
In upholding probation conditions, our California Supreme Court has noted that conditions authorizing searches " 'aid in deterring further offenses . . . and in monitoring compliance with the terms of probation. [Citations.] By allowing close supervision of probationers, probation search conditions serve to promote rehabilitation and reduce recidivism while helping to protect the community from potential harm by probationers.' [Citation.] A condition of probation that enables a probation officer to supervise his or her charges effectively is, therefore, 'reasonably related to future criminality.' [Citations.]" (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 380-381 [upholding condition requiring notification of the presence of pets; condition was reasonably related to future criminality because it related to the protection of probation officer supervising probationer's compliance].)
In connection with its discussion of probation search conditions, Olguin cited People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57. In Balestra, the defendant went into her mother's room, shut the door, and told her she wasn't free to leave. For hours, the defendant beat her mother, until the mother escaped. The defendant entered into a plea agreement under which she would receive probation and, as a condition of probation, the trial court imposed a search condition. Balestra found that "warrantless search conditions serve a valid rehabilitative purpose, and because such a search condition is necessarily justified by its rehabilitative purpose, it is of no moment whether the underlying offense is reasonably related to theft, narcotics, or firearms: 'The threat of a suspicionless search is fully consistent with the deterrent purposes of the search condition. " 'The purpose of an unexpected, unprovoked search of defendant is to ascertain whether [the probationer] is complying with the terms of [probation]; to determine not only whether he disobeys the law, but also whether he obeys the law. Information obtained under such circumstances would afford a valuable measure of the effectiveness of the supervision given the defendant . . . .' " [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 67, italics & fn. omitted.)
Under Olguin and Balestra, the search condition imposed on Anthony was justified by its "rehabilitative purpose." Moreover, the search condition was reasonably, logically, and factually related to the crime Anthony committed. We do not just consider in isolation the offense, that is, a forcible lewd act, but we also consider the context in which it took place. Anthony and the other boys lured the victim into a dark, isolated room. While one boy assaulted her, Anthony and the others kept watch and held the door shut so that J.V. could not escape. Then, when he was asked for help, Anthony physically restrained J.V., holding down her arms. The sexual assault thus happened in an out-of-the-way place that the boys knew would allow them some privacy. Viewed in this context, the search condition was reasonably related to Anthony's crime.
For these same reasons, we also reject Anthony's constitutional challenges to the search condition. Certainly, "[a] probation condition that imposes limitations on a person's constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad." (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) As we have said, the search condition, aside from its rehabilitative purposes, was reasonably related and tailored to the crime, especially where, as here, that crime was deliberately committed in an isolated area to facilitate it. (See generally, People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 754 ["Where the search is for a proper purpose, we hold that, even in the absence of particularized suspicion, a search conducted under the auspices of a properly imposed parole search condition does not intrude on any expectation of privacy 'society is "prepared to recognize as legitimate" ' "].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ALDRICH, J. We concur:
KLEIN, P.J.
CROSKEY, J.