Opinion
2013-02-27
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Lucio AMAYA, appellant.
Robert C. Mitchell, Riverhead, N.Y. (Kirk R. Brandt of counsel), for appellant. Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Karla Lato of counsel), for respondent.
Robert C. Mitchell, Riverhead, N.Y. (Kirk R. Brandt of counsel), for appellant. Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Karla Lato of counsel), for respondent.
PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., RUTH C. BALKIN, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Hinrichs, J.), rendered January 4, 2011, convicting him of criminal sexual act in the second degree, sexual abuse in the second degree, sexual abuse in the third degree, and endangering the welfare of a child, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contentions, the trial court did not improperly limit the cross-examination of the complainant. The scope of cross-examination rests largely in the sound discretion of the trial court ( see People v. Mandel, 48 N.Y.2d 952, 425 N.Y.S.2d 63, 401 N.E.2d 185,cert. denied,446 U.S. 949, 100 S.Ct. 2913, 64 L.Ed.2d 805;People v. Abney, 193 A.D.2d 608, 597 N.Y.S.2d 431;People v. Holmes, 138 A.D.2d 630, 526 N.Y.S.2d 770), and we conclude that the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion. Further, the testimony of the People's witnesses did not improperly inferentially bolster the complainant's accusations. The testimony was properly admitted not for its truth but, rather, to explain police actions and the sequence of events leading to the defendant's arrest ( see People v. Tosca, 98 N.Y.2d 660, 746 N.Y.S.2d 276, 773 N.E.2d 1014;People v. Chandler, 59 A.D.3d 562, 872 N.Y.S.2d 283;People v. Wright, 54 A.D.3d 695, 863 N.Y.S.2d 253).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt, of criminal sexual act in the second degree ( seePenal Law § 130.45[1] ), sexual abuse in the second degree ( seePenal Law § 130.60), sexual abuse in the third degree ( seePenal Law § 130.55), and endangering the welfare of a minor ( seePenal Law § 260.10[1] ). In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( seeCPL 470.15[5]; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor ( see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053,cert. denied542 U.S. 946, 124 S.Ct. 2929, 159 L.Ed.2d 828;People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).
The sentence imposed was not excessive ( see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).