Opinion
A160121
12-20-2021
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MOHAMMAD ALNAJJAR, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 05-191531-3
PUBLIC - REDACTS MATERIAL FROM SEALED RECORD
Fujisaki, J.
Following convictions for exhibiting a deadly weapon with intent to resist arrest and resisting arrest, defendant Mohammad Alnajjar was placed on three years' probation. On appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court violated his constitutional right to due process by failing to hold a hearing to determine his competency to stand trial, and (2) his period of probation must be reduced from three years to two in accordance with Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 1950) (Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 2). We conclude the trial court did not err in denying the request for a competency hearing because defendant did not present substantial evidence raising a reasonable doubt about his ability to understand the nature of the proceedings and assist in his defense. However, we agree that defendant is entitled to seek reduction in the length of his probation term in accordance with Assembly Bill No. 1950. Accordingly, we affirm the 1 judgment in part as to defendant's conviction, but reverse and remand for resentencing.
Factual and Procedural Background
We have redacted portions of the public version of this opinion where necessary to protect information under seal and not already in the public domain. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.46(g)(2)(A).) There exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of the public to access the sealed portion of the opinion. That interest supports the partial sealing of the opinion. A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the opinion is not partially sealed. The sealing is narrowly tailored and no less restrictive means exist to achieve that overriding interest. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.46(d)(6), 2.550(d).)
In May 2019, a sheriff's deputy responded to a complaint about defendant at a gas station. The deputy encountered defendant and asked for his identification, but defendant refused to comply, cursed at the deputy, and walked around him. When the deputy tried to grab defendant's hand, defendant pulled away and threw a tray of coffee drinks towards the deputy, hitting the patrol car. Defendant then turned to face the deputy and took a stance as though he was getting ready to fight. After the deputy drew his taser, defendant complied with the deputy's commands and was arrested.
On an evening in July 2019, two sheriff's deputies responded to a domestic disturbance at a residence in El Sobrante. The deputies noticed broken glass and ceramic pieces on the driveway, and defendant's wife sitting on the front steps with two small children. The deputies looked inside the home and saw that the living room was in disarray, with overturned furniture and papers strewn about. After repeatedly announcing their presence, the deputies entered the living room and encountered defendant, who was "extremely agitated" and wearing only his underwear. Defendant was screaming in what one deputy characterized as an "unintelligible 2 language" and ignored the deputies' attempts to deescalate the situation. He then retreated out of their sight, reappearing a few seconds later with a large butcher knife. He refused the deputies' orders to drop the knife and continued to scream "unintelligible words" while "wield[ing] the knife back and forth" in a "stabbing motion." The deputies retreated back to the front door and requested a K-9 unit to assist them. Defendant paced back and forth with the knife in hand, screaming obscenities in English and Arabic, and disappearing and reappearing from behind a wall. During the incident, one of the deputies heard defendant threaten to kill him. At one point, defendant held the knife to his own throat.
Later, defendant retreated from the deputies' view and reemerged with "what appeared to be two superficial lacerations to his torso and stomach area." The marks were "large, long lacerations in an X mark . . . starting from the collar bone down" to his "belly button." The wound was red with a "limited amount of blood," but defendant was not actively bleeding. Eventually, a deputy fired a sponge round from a 40-millimeter impact weapon, and defendant momentarily disappeared from view, but reappeared seconds later and surrendered.
Defendant was arrested and charged with felony exhibiting a deadly weapon to resist arrest (Pen. Code, § 417.8; count 1) and two counts of misdemeanor resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); counts 2 and 3).
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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The case proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted defendant on all three counts. At sentencing, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence on the felony count and placed defendant on probation for three years. As part of his probation conditions, defendant was ordered, among other things, to 3 submit to drug and alcohol testing, to participate in anger management and drug treatment programs, and not to possess firearms or controlled substances.
Defendant appealed.
Discussion
A. Competency to Stand Trial
"[A] person cannot stand trial who is not mentally competent to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist in his or her defense in a rational manner. [Citation.] 'Both the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and state law prohibit the state from trying or convicting a criminal defendant while he or she is mentally incompetent.'" (People v. Johnson (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 267, 274 (Johnson).) "Competence to stand trial requires 'the mental acuity to see, hear and digest the evidence, and the ability to communicate with counsel in helping prepare an effective defense.'" (Id. at p. 276.)
If a criminal defendant comes forward with substantial evidence of mental incompetence to stand trial, he or she is entitled to a competency hearing as a matter of right, and the trial court has no discretion to exercise. (Johnson, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 275, citing Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375 and People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 518.) "Failure to hold a competency hearing when there is substantial evidence the defendant is not competent requires reversal." (Johnson, at p. 275.)
"Substantial evidence is a quantum of evidence that raises a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant's competence to stand trial. [Citation.] The doubt which triggers the obligation to order a hearing is not a subjective one, but rather a doubt determined objectively from the record. [Citation.] Thus, we must determine whether a reasonable jurist, with the 4 benefit of the available information, would have developed a doubt about defendant's mental competence." (Johnson, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 276.) "The trial court's duty to conduct a full competency hearing is not relieved even when the prosecution's evidence is also substantial, is in conflict with the evidence of incompetency, and may seem more persuasive. [Citations.]" Nor do the judge's personal observations obviate the necessity for a competency hearing." (Ibid.) That is because the court in this circumstance is not called upon to determine the ultimate issue of the defendant's competency to stand trial; rather, its" '" 'sole function is to decide whether there is any evidence which, assuming its truth, raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant's competency.'" '" (Ibid.)
"Defense counsel's assessment is entitled to some weight." (Johnson, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 276 .) "Actual suicide attempts or suicidal ideation, in combination with other factors, may constitute substantial evidence raising a bona fide doubt regarding a defendant's competence to stand trial." (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 848 (Rogers).)
Even if substantial evidence does not initially disclose a basis for a competency hearing, "' "[a]t any time that such evidence appears, the trial court sua sponte must order an evidentiary hearing on the competency issue." '" (People v. Tomas (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 75, 89, italics omitted (Tomas).)
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In short, [R EDACTED], the evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt that he lacked the mental acuity to see, hear, and digest the evidence, or that he was unable to assist counsel in his defense. (Johnson, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 276.) Furthermore, defendant advances no contention or citation to the record indicating that subsequent events, such as defendant's 5 behavior in custody or during trial, triggered the trial court's sua sponte duty to hold a competency hearing. (See Tomas, supra, 74 Cal.App.3d at p. 89.)
Because the trial court has the opportunity to observe the defendant in person, its decision on whether or not to hold a competency hearing is entitled to deference. (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 847.) And where, as here, a defendant has not presented substantial evidence to indicate his or her incompetence, the court properly proceeds to trial without such a hearing.
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For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying defense counsel's request to hold a competency hearing.
B. Assembly Bill No. 1950
Defendant contends, and the People concede, that he is entitled to seek a reduction in his probation term under Assembly Bill No. 1950. We agree.
At the time of defendant's sentencing in January 2020, former section 1203.1 "authorized felony probation 'for a period of time not exceeding the maximum possible term of the sentence' but where the 'maximum possible term of the sentence is five years or less, then the period of suspension of imposition or execution of sentence may, in the discretion of the court, continue for not over five years.'" (People v. Quinn (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 874, 879 (Quinn).) Effective January 1, 2021, Assembly Bill No. 1950 amended section 1203.1, subdivision (a), to provide as follows: "The court, or judge thereof, in the order granting probation, may suspend the imposing or the execution of the sentence and may direct that the suspension may continue for a period of time not exceeding two years, and upon those terms and conditions as it shall determine." 6
The statutory exceptions to the two-year probation limit do not apply here. (See § 1203.1, subd. (m)(1) [offenses listed in section 667.5, subdivision (c) or offenses that include specific probation lengths], and (2) [felony convictions under sections 487, subdivision (b)(3), 503, and 532a, where total value of property taken exceeds $25,000].)
Generally, criminal statutes are presumed to apply prospectively. (People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 307.) But where an amendatory statute lessens the punishment for criminal conduct and there is no savings clause, the rule is that the amendment operates retroactively so that the lighter punishment is imposed. (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 627-628.) We agree with the reasoning and conclusions of the courts holding that Assembly Bill No. 1950's felony probation limitation is an ameliorative change in the law that applies retroactively to all nonfinal cases. (E.g., People v. Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 627; People v. Schulz (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 887, 895; People v. Lord (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 241, 245-246; People v. Stewart (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 1065, 1073-1074; People v. Sims (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 943, 963-964; Quinn, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 882-883.) Defendant's case is not yet final. (See People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 876, fn. 5.)
Although the parties agree that Assembly Bill No. 1950 applies, they disagree as to the proper disposition of this appeal. Defendant contends we should modify the probation term without remanding for resentencing. The People respond that doing so will deprive the trial court of the ability to expunge the conviction under section 1203.4 or to modify the probation term in the event a probation violation is shown. Because defendant was subject to various probation conditions, and the record does not disclose his compliance with all such conditions during the probation term, we will remand for resentencing, with directions that the trial court and parties 7 proceed forthwith so that defendant may receive the fullest possible benefit of the reduced probation term.
Disposition
The judgment is reversed in part and remanded for resentencing. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. 8
WE CONCUR: Tucher, P.J., Petrou, J. 9