Opinion
July 22, 1985
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Starkey, J.).
Judgment affirmed.
Based on a radio communication received by the arresting officers that a brown Buick, New York license plate No. 251 PVY had been involved in a robbery of a grocery store on Ralph Avenue in Brooklyn, the police stopped a brown Buick, New York license No. 251 PBY. The description of the car was provided by one of the complaining witnesses. Under these circumstances, the police were justified in stopping the vehicle with their guns drawn and ordering the occupants to step out of the car. The officers had sufficient information to stop the car, based on the similarities between the car they observed and the description they received, and had reasonable grounds to fear for their safety, justifying their actions ( see, Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1; People v. Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d 14, 21-22, cert denied 449 U.S. 1018; People v. Finlayson, 76 A.D.2d 670, 677, lv denied, 51 N.Y.2d 1011, cert denied 450 U.S. 931). Subsequently, when the officers saw two guns laying in the back seat of the car, they were entitled to seize the evidence in plain view and to arrest the occupants of the car, including defendant. The police were then justified in searching the automobile at the precinct, where they recovered part of the proceeds of the robbery ( see, e.g., People v. Langen, 60 N.Y.2d 170, cert denied 465 U.S. 1028, 104 S Ct 1287). Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying that branch of defendant's motion which sought to suppress physical evidence.
The trial court also properly denied that branch of defendant's motion which sought suppression of identification testimony. The identification procedures utilized by the police were not suggestive ( see, e.g., People v. Love, 57 N.Y.2d 1023; People v Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 241, 249; People v. Mayers, 100 A.D.2d 558; People v. Soto, 87 A.D.2d 618). Moreover, the complaining witness who identified defendant had an independent basis for his in-court identification ( see, e.g., People v. Thompson, 97 A.D.2d 554).
Finally, defendant's mistrial motion on the ground that he was surprised by the testimony elicited on behalf of his codefendant implicating him in the robbery, was properly denied. We note that counsel for the codefendant implied in his opening statement that defendant might be implicated, and defendant's counsel thoroughly cross-examined the witnesses for the codefendant. We have considered defendant's other contention and find it to be without merit. Brown, J.P., Weinstein, Niehoff and Lawrence, JJ., concur.