Opinion
106150.
04-16-2015
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Michael ALEXANDER, Appellant.
Matthew C. Hug, Troy, for appellant. J. Anthony Jordan, District Attorney, Fort Edward (Brandon P. Rathbun of counsel), for respondent.
Matthew C. Hug, Troy, for appellant.
J. Anthony Jordan, District Attorney, Fort Edward (Brandon P. Rathbun of counsel), for respondent.
Before: PETERS, P.J., LAHTINEN, GARRY and LYNCH, JJ.
Opinion
GARRY, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Washington County (McKeighan, J.), rendered May 6, 2013, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of attempted assault in the second degree.
In April 2012, defendant, an inmate in a correctional facility, engaged in a fight with another inmate (hereinafter the victim). Defendant was charged in a four-count indictment and convicted by a jury of attempted assault in the second degree. County Court sentenced him as a second felony offender to a prison term of 2 to 4 years. Defendant appeals.
Initially, defendant contends that he was deprived of due process by a delay of approximately seven months between the incident and the issuance of the indictment. An unreasonable and unjustified indictment delay violates a defendant's due process rights and may result in dismissal of the indictment, even when no prejudice results (see People v. Lesiuk, 81 N.Y.2d 485, 490, 600 N.Y.S.2d 931, 617 N.E.2d 1047 [1993] ; People v. Morris, 25 A.D.3d 915, 916, 807 N.Y.S.2d 228 [2006], lvs. denied 6 N.Y.3d 851, 816 N.Y.S.2d 757, 849 N.E.2d 980 [2006], 6 N.Y.3d 853, 816 N.Y.S.2d 759, 849 N.E.2d 982 [2006] ). The relevant factors in determining whether a delay was unreasonable are the same as those applied to speedy trial claims, including “the extent of the delay, reason for the delay, nature of the underlying charges, any extended pretrial incarceration and any indications of prejudice or impairment to the defense attributable to the delay” (People v. Garcia, 46 A.D.3d 1120, 1120–1121, 853 N.Y.S.2d 174 [2007], lv. denied 10 N.Y.3d 863, 860 N.Y.S.2d 489, 890 N.E.2d 252 [2008] ; accord People v. Ruise, 86 A.D.3d 722, 722–723, 926 N.Y.S.2d 754 [2011], lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 861, 932 N.Y.S.2d 27, 956 N.E.2d 808 [2011] ; see People v. Vernace, 96 N.Y.2d 886, 887, 730 N.Y.S.2d 778, 756 N.E.2d 66 [2001] ). Here, the People offered no explanation for the delay. However, the seven-month period between the incident and the indictment was not egregiously long (see People v. Staton, 297 A.D.2d 876, 876–877, 747 N.Y.S.2d 603 [2002], lv. denied 99 N.Y.2d 565, 754 N.Y.S.2d 217, 784 N.E.2d 90 [2002] [six months and 21 days]; People v. Diaz, 277 A.D.2d 723, 724, 715 N.Y.S.2d 786 [2000], lv. denied 96 N.Y.2d 758, 725 N.Y.S.2d 284, 748 N.E.2d 1080 [2001] [six months]; People v. Allah, 264 A.D.2d 902, 902–903, 696 N.Y.S.2d 92 [1999] [nine months]; People v. Cooper, 258 A.D.2d 815, 816, 686 N.Y.S.2d 172 [1999], lv. denied 93 N.Y.2d 1016, 697 N.Y.S.2d 575, 719 N.E.2d 936 [1999] [seven months] ). The charges against defendant were serious and, as he was already incarcerated, “the delay did not impose a further burden upon his liberty” (People v. McCormick, 17 A.D.3d 785, 786, 792 N.Y.S.2d 724 [2005] ). As for prejudice, nothing in the record substantiates defendant's assertion that the delay prevented him from determining the identities of other inmates who might have witnessed the incident but could have been released or transferred in the interim (compare People v. Johnson, 38 N.Y.2d 271, 277, 379 N.Y.S.2d 735, 342 N.E.2d 525 [1975] ). Accordingly, we find that defendant was not deprived of his due process rights on this ground.
Defendant next contends that his conviction was not supported by legally sufficient evidence and was against the weight of the evidence. To convict defendant of attempted assault in the second degree, the People were required to prove that he intended to cause physical injury to another person and “engage[d] in conduct which tend[ed] to effect the commission of such crime” (Penal Law § 110.00 ; see Penal Law § 120.05[7] ; People v. Gannon, 301 A.D.2d 873, 873, 754 N.Y.S.2d 107 [2003] ). The testimony established that several correction officers saw two inmates fighting with each other, throwing punches and struggling back and forth. One of the officers testified that he saw a weapon that resembled an ice pick in the right hand of one of the inmates, which that inmate wielded about four times in a downward striking motion toward the other participant; the other participant was making slashing motions from left to right. The officer later identified defendant as the inmate he had seen with the ice pick weapon. Officers interrupted the fight, ordered both inmates to lie on the ground and placed them in restraints. When defendant was assisted to his feet, a sergeant observed a weapon resembling an ice pick on the floor where defendant had been lying. A weapon with a razor blade was found under the victim. Defendant suffered several straight-edged lacerations that were consistent with the razor blade, while the victim sustained multiple puncture wounds and scratches to his head and upper torso that were consistent with the weapon that looked like an ice pick.
Defendant stipulated that he was a previously convicted felon and was incarcerated in a correctional facility when the incident occurred (see Penal Law § 120.05[7] ).
Defendant offered a different account, testifying that he was suddenly attacked by an inmate wielding an ice pick. While defendant attempted to fend off this attack, he felt himself being cut by a different weapon employed by another individual. He was unable to identify either of these attackers, and the inmate with the ice pick ran away when correction officers approached. Defendant turned around and began fighting with the first person he found behind him, who proved to be the victim. Defendant explained, “I [was] already upset. So whoever was behind me [was] getting it.” He stated that he did not possess a weapon, was left-handed and was not ambidextrous. We find that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, is legally sufficient to establish “that defendant intended to cause physical injury to another inmate and engaged in conduct tending to effect commission of that crime” (People v. Gannon, 301 A.D.2d at 873, 754 N.Y.S.2d 107 ; see People v. Hawkins, 290 A.D.2d 812, 813, 736 N.Y.S.2d 775 [2002], affd. 99 N.Y.2d 592, 757 N.Y.S.2d 810, 787 N.E.2d 1156 [2003] ). Further, although another verdict would not have been unreasonable, viewing the evidence in a neutral light and deferring to the jury's credibility determinations, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Chasey, 5 A.D.3d 815, 816–817, 772 N.Y.S.2d 629 [2004], lv. denied 2 N.Y.3d 797, 781 N.Y.S.2d 296, 814 N.E.2d 468 [2004] ; see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987] ). We find no merit in defendant's contention that his state and federal due process rights were violated when he was shackled during trial. Because of the risk of prejudice, a defendant has a right to be free of visible restraints during criminal proceedings unless the trial court states a case-specific reason for their use (see Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 [2005] ; People v. Best, 19 N.Y.3d 739, 743, 955 N.Y.S.2d 860, 979 N.E.2d 1187 [2012] ; People v. Clyde, 18 N.Y.3d 145, 153–154, 938 N.Y.S.2d 243, 961 N.E.2d 634 [2011], cert. denied ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1921, 182 L.Ed.2d 784 [2012] ). Here, County Court failed to state its reasons for requiring defendant to wear leg shackles. However, the record reveals that the restraints were not visible, nor were they otherwise called to the jury's attention. Before trial, the People requested that defendant wear restraints during the trial because of his lengthy disciplinary history and the serious nature of his offense. Defense counsel objected based upon defendant's appropriate behavior during pretrial proceedings. County Court agreed that defendant's conduct had been “ professional” and deferred its decision pending review of his disciplinary history. At the beginning of trial, the People renewed their request and defense counsel repeated his objection. County Court ruled that defendant's hand restraints should be removed but that his leg shackles should be retained, stating that “[t]hey are beneath the desk. The jurors can't see them.” Defense counsel neither objected nor disagreed with the statement that the jury would be unable to see defendant's shackles; instead, he requested that the court require everyone to remain seated when the jury entered and exited the courtroom, so that jurors would not hear the sound made by the shackles when defendant changed position. The court granted this request and, throughout the trial, excused the jury before defendant took the stand, left the stand or was remanded to the custody of correction officers. Nothing in the record suggests that the shackles were ever visible to the jurors or that any other circumstances could have led them to infer that defendant's legs were restrained (compare People v. Cruz, 17 N.Y.3d 941, 944–945, 936 N.Y.S.2d 661, 960 N.E.2d 430 [2011] ; People v. Jenner, 39 A.D.3d 1083, 1087–1088, 835 N.Y.S.2d 501 [2007], lv. denied 9 N.Y.3d 845, 840 N.Y.S.2d 772, 872 N.E.2d 885 [2007] ; People v. Roraback, 242 A.D.2d 400, 403, 662 N.Y.S.2d 327 [1997] ). On this record, we thus find that there is no reasonable possibility that the use of shackles resulted in prejudice to defendant, and he was not deprived of a fair trial on this ground.
Although not revealed in the record, the People state on appeal that the desks in the courtroom are constructed with wooden skirting that blocks any view of their undersides.
County Court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's untimely request for a missing witness charge. A request for such a charge “must be raised as soon as practicable so that the court can appropriately exercise its discretion and the parties can tailor their trial strategy to avoid ‘substantial possibilities of surprise’ ” (People v. Gonzalez, 68 N.Y.2d 424, 428, 509 N.Y.S.2d 796, 502 N.E.2d 583 [1986], quoting McCormick, Evidence § 272 at 806 [3d ed. 1984] ; accord People v. Turner, 73 A.D.3d 1282, 1283–1284, 903 N.Y.S.2d 159 [2010], lv. denied 15 N.Y.3d 896, 912 N.Y.S.2d 584, 938 N.E.2d 1019 [2010] ). Here, the request was not made until after the close of proof and was thus untimely (see People v. Rodney, 79 A.D.3d 1363, 1365, 912 N.Y.S.2d 340 [2010], lv. denied 19 N.Y.3d 1105, 955 N.Y.S.2d 560, 979 N.E.2d 821 [2012] ).
Nor did defendant reveal that the proposed testimony from the two witnesses met the necessary prerequisites to support the charge (see DeVito v. Feliciano, 22 N.Y.3d 159, 165–166, 978 N.Y.S.2d 717, 1 N.E.3d 791 [2013] ).
Finally, defendant contends that the verdict was inherently self-contradictory in that the instructions given to the jury on the charge on which defendant was convicted were identical to those given for a separate charge upon which he was acquitted. As defendant did not raise this assertion before the jury was discharged and County Court had no opportunity to address it, it is unpreserved (see People v. Muhammad, 17 N.Y.3d 532, 541 n. 5, 935 N.Y.S.2d 526, 959 N.E.2d 463 [2011] ; People v. Rodwell, 122 A.D.3d 1065, 1068, 996 N.Y.S.2d 398 [2014] ; People v. Dale, 115 A.D.3d 1002, 1006–1007, 981 N.Y.S.2d 821 [2014] ). In any event, our review reveals that the instructions on the two charges were not, in fact, identical. As charged, “a theoretical defendant” could have been guilty of the first offense, but not of the second (People v. Muhammad, 17 N.Y.3d at 543, 935 N.Y.S.2d 526, 959 N.E.2d 463 ; see People v. Elmy, 117 A.D.3d 1183, 1184, 984 N.Y.S.2d 672 [2014] ). Thus, we find no reason to take corrective action in the interest of justice (see People v. Rolfe, 83 A.D.3d 1217, 1218, 920 N.Y.S.2d 853 [2011], lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 809, 929 N.Y.S.2d 569, 953 N.E.2d 807 [2011] ; People v. Pearson, 69 A.D.3d 1226, 1227, 894 N.Y.S.2d 210 [2010], lv. denied 15 N.Y.3d 755, 906 N.Y.S.2d 828, 933 N.E.2d 227 [2010] ).
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
PETERS, P.J., LAHTINEN and LYNCH, JJ., concur.