Opinion
B310171
01-21-2022
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TYRELL AINSWORTH, Defendant and Appellant.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. NA084832, Laura L. Laesecke, Judge. Vacated and remanded.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
WILLHITE, ACTING P. J.
This is the third appeal in which defendant Tyrell Ainsworth challenges the trial court's refusal to hold a contested sentencing hearing under Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller), before sentencing him to an overall term of 75 years to life for a murder (Pen. Code § 187, subd. (a)) he committed while he was 17 years old and for a prior strike offense under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). Miller requires that a sentencing court "take into account a wide array of youth-related mitigating factors" before imposing the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) on juvenile homicide offenders. (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 275 (Franklin).)
Unspecified references to statutes are to the Penal Code.
During the most recent hearing on remand, the trial court determined that defendant's right to a hearing under Miller had been mooted by the recent enactment of section 3051. That statute requires the Board of Parole Hearings to conduct a "youth offender parole hearing" for eligible persons after they have been incarcerated for 15, 20, or 25 years, depending upon the term of the offender's "controlling offense." (§ 3051, subds. (a) & (b).) However, as the parties point out, defendant is ineligible for a parole eligibility hearing under section 3051, because the statute does not apply when, as here, a component of the sentence the defendant receives is imposed pursuant to the Three Strikes law. (§ 3051, subds. (b)(3), (h).) Thus, the trial court's failure to hold a contested hearing under Miller compels a reversal and remand.
We again vacate defendant's sentence and remand for a contested Miller hearing.
We limit our recitation of the background to the facts relevant to the issue on appeal.
In 2012, a jury convicted defendant of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), with a true finding that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm proximately causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). Defendant committed the offense while he was 17 years old. Prior to sentencing, defendant admitted he had suffered a prior conviction in 2008 for robbery, a qualifying offense under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). Defendant was sentenced to an overall term of 75 years to life, comprised of 25 years to life for murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 190, subd. (a)), which was doubled under the Three Strikes law, plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the personal and intentional discharge of a firearm.
We affirmed defendant's conviction on his direct appeal from the judgment, and remanded for resentencing "because he was a minor at the time of the killing and the court did not consider the factors specified in Miller . . . before imposing a sentence of 75 years to life." (People v. Tyrell Ainsworth (Sept. 13, 2013, B240818) p. 2 (Ainsworth I).) We noted that under Miller, "mandatory life-without-possibility-of-parole sentences for juvenile offenders who commit homicide violate the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment, emphasizing the necessity for 'the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.'" (Id. at pp. 11-12, quoting Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 489.) "Defendant represented himself at [the initial] sentencing and did not present to the trial court any evidence regarding the factors influencing his juvenile criminality . . . . We cannot conclude the trial court recognized the significance for sentencing purposes of defendant's youth in imposing a sentence that was the 'functional equivalent' of life without possibility of parole." (Id. at p. 14.)
On remand in 2013, and outside the presence of defendant and his counsel, the court "'considered the defendant's sentence in light of Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460'" and found "defendant's conduct in this case represents that rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruptions." The court re-imposed 75 years to life.
In his second appeal, defendant argued, and the Attorney General agreed, that the trial court violated his constitutional right to due process by sentencing him without notice or an opportunity to be heard. (People v. Tyrell Ainsworth (July 5, 2017, B269870) pp. 2-3 (Ainsworth II).) Agreeing with the parties, we again remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to hold a noticed sentencing hearing under Miller at which defendant and his counsel would be present and able to introduce evidence. (Id. at pp. 3, 9.)
On October 11, 2019, the trial court called the matter for a hearing on remand, this time with the prosecutor and defense counsel present. The court stated it "had returned [defendant] to state prison" on "his request." The court then stated that section 3051 "makes a Miller hearing moot . . . . I believe the law has changed [since the issuance of Ainsworth II] and that a Miller hearing is no longer required." The court then conducted a hearing under Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261, to make a record of mitigating evidence that would be used at a future youth offender parole hearing in accordance with section 3051, subdivisions (d) through (f). Thereafter, the court re-imposed the original sentence of 75 years to life.
Subdivisions (d) through (f) of section 3051 require the Board of Parole Hearings to conduct a youth offender parole hearing for a juvenile offender who is eligible for release.
DISCUSSION
The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment "guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions." (Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 560.) As applied in juvenile sentencing, the Eighth Amendment prohibits the automatic sentencing of a juvenile who commits a homicide offense to LWOP. (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 465.) Under Miller, "a state may not require a sentencing authority to impose LWOP on juvenile homicide offenders; the sentencing authority must have individualized discretion to impose a less severe sentence and, in exercising that discretion, must take into account a wide array of youth-related mitigating factors." (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 275, citing Miller, supra, at pp. 478-479.) Our high court has extended Miller to juvenile offenders who are "sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP for a homicide offense." (Franklin, supra, at p. 276.) It is undisputed that defendant's 75-years-to-life sentence constitutes "the 'functional equivalent' of life without possibility of parole." (Ainsworth I, supra, at p. 14.)
"Miller discussed a range of factors relevant to a sentencer's determination" whether to impose LWOP on a juvenile offender who commits homicide. (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1388.) Miller requires consideration of the offender's "'chronological age and its hallmark features-among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and the failure to appreciate risks and consequences'"; the family and home environment that surrounds the juvenile "'and from which he cannot usually extricate himself-no matter how brutal or dysfunctional'"; "'the circumstances of the homicide offense, '" including the defendant's participation and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him; whether the offender "'might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth'"; and "'the possibility of rehabilitation.'" (Id. at pp. 1388-1389, quoting Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at pp. 477-478.)
The development of Miller and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has "led to significant legislative and judicial responses in this state." (In re Bolton (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 611, 617 (Bolton).) After defendant's sentencing in 2012, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 260, which became effective January 1, 2014, and added section 3051 to the Penal Code. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 276.) Section 3051 requires the Board of Parole Hearings to conduct a "youth offender parole hearing" for eligible persons after they have been incarcerated for 15, 20, or 25 years, depending upon the term of the offender's "controlling offense." (§ 3051, subds. (a) & (b).) As relevant here, an offender who was convicted of a controlling offense that was committed before the person attained 18 years of age and for which the sentence is life without the possibility of parole "shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing during the person's 25th year of incarceration." (§ 3051, subd. (b)(4).)
Section 3046, subdivision (c) provides in part that "an inmate found suitable for parole pursuant to a youth offender parole hearing as described in Section 3051 . . . shall be paroled regardless of the manner in which the board set release dates." Subdivision (c) of section 4801 requires the Board of Parole Hearings to "give great weight to the diminished culpability of youth as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the prisoner" when reviewing an inmate's suitability for parole. Senate Bill No. 260 also added sections 3046, subdivision (c), and 4801, subdivision (c).
However, section 3051 expressly excludes "cases in which sentencing occurs pursuant to Section 1170.12, subdivisions (b) to (i), inclusive, of Section 667, or Section 667.61, or to cases in which an individual is sentenced to [LWOP] for a controlling offense that was committed after the person had attained 18 years of age." (§ 3051, subd. (h).)
In the wake of Senate Bill No. 260's enactment, our Supreme Court has held that because section 3051 generally affords juvenile offenders serving life sentences a parole eligibility hearing during their 25th year of incarceration, they no longer serve LWOP or its functional equivalent. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 280 [§ 3051 now provides "a meaningful opportunity for release"].) Offenders serving such sentences are no longer subject to the "protections outlined in Miller." (Id. at p. 276.) In other words, the enactment of Senate Bill No. 260 "has rendered moot [a juvenile offender's] challenge to his original sentence under Miller." (Id. at p. 280.)
This "mootness holding," however, is expressly limited. The Court noted that a challenge under Miller is moot only in circumstances in which "section 3051 entitles an inmate to a youth offender parole hearing against the backdrop of an otherwise lengthy mandatory sentence. We express no view on Miller claims by juvenile offenders who are ineligible for such a hearing under section 3051, subdivision (h)." (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 280.)
As the Attorney General correctly notes in this case, defendant is ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing under the current statutory scheme because he was sentenced under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). Thus, his claim under Miller is not moot. (Accord, People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 359 [the holding in Franklin does not apply to juvenile offenders excluded from parole eligibility under § 3051, subd. (h)]; Bolton, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 621 [petitioner's Eighth Amendment claims "are not mooted since the 25-year-to-life term under the three strikes law . . . renders petitioner ineligible for section 3051 parole"] People v. Carter (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 985, 988, 994 [§ 3051 did not render moot the defendant's constitutional challenge under Miller].) We therefore agree with the parties that the case must again be remanded for a contested Miller hearing.
Our Supreme Court has granted review in People v. Williams (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 475, review granted July 22, 2020, S262229, to determine whether section 3051, subdivision (h) "violate[s] the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by excluding young adults convicted and sentenced . . . under the One Strike law (Pen. Code, § 667.61) from youth offender parole consideration, while young adults convicted of first degree murder are entitled to such consideration."
DISPOSITION
Defendant's sentence of 75 years to life is vacated. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to hold a noticed sentencing hearing at which defendant and the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present evidence and argument under Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460.
We concur: CURREY, J., MICON, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.