Opinion
C083257
07-27-2017
In re A.H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.H., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. JV137703)
Appellant, A.H., was the subject of three sustained wardship petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. (§ 602, subd. (a).) Following a contested jurisdictional hearing on the third petition, the juvenile court found A.H. violated Education Code section 32210 that prohibits willfully disturbing a public school.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. --------
A.H. appeals contending insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court's finding he violated Education Code section 32210. He also challenges a residency condition imposed as a condition of probation, arguing it is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the purportedly unreasonable condition. Finding no merit in his contentions, we shall affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A.H. was first declared a ward of the court in January 2016 after he admitted committing multiple residential burglaries. The juvenile court sustained an amended wardship petition as to two felony burglary counts (Pen. Code, § 459 [counts 1 & 2]), dismissed three remaining counts in the interest of justice (Pen. Code, §§ 459 [counts 3 & 4] & 664/459 [count 5]), and granted A.H. probation with various terms and conditions, including that he, "[r]eside in, and not move from Sacramento County and cannot move from this jurisdiction without the advance permission of the Probation Officer or the Sacramento County Juvenile Court." A.H. did not object to the residency probation condition.
Six months later, in June 2016, A.H. fled from a stolen vehicle after being contacted by police. He was eventually apprehended in a nearby residential backyard where he was found screaming. A subsequent wardship petition alleged A.H. resisted, obstructed or delayed a peace officer in violation of Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1). He later admitted to disturbing the peace by loud and unreasonable noise as a reasonably related offense. (Pen. Code, § 415, subd. (2).) The juvenile court sustained the petition, continued A.H. as a ward of the court, and reinstated him on probation with the same residency condition as previously imposed. As before, A.H. did not object to the residency condition.
In September 2016, A.H. was a student at Natomas High School. He was in Vice Principal Jessica Martin's office because she suspected he might possess marijuana. Her office was located next to a classroom. Staff members and other students were outside Martin's office.
A.H. was upset and yelling obscenities. As he tried to leave Martin's office, Martin attempted to stop A.H. by extending her arms out blocking his way. Martin requested urgent assistance from Sacramento County Police Officer Lilia Vasquez, who was working as the school resource officer that day.
When Officer Vasquez arrived from her nearby office, she saw Martin struggling with A.H. A.H. was pushing his body against Martin's arm in an attempt to leave. His hands were clenched and he was loudly yelling profanities. Vasquez ordered A.H. to sit, but he refused to comply. When she told him to calm down, he directed obscenities at her. Vasquez testified A.H.'s conduct was disruptive for the school.
Given the rising tensions, Vasquez was concerned for everyone's safety. She therefore handcuffed A.H., and ordered him to sit down. He initially refused to sit, but eventually complied. Vasquez searched A.H., who was subject to searchable probation, but she did not find any drugs. According to Vasquez, A.H. did not resist being handcuffed.
Philip Nugent, a campus safety specialist, was in the general vicinity and could hear the commotion. He heard loud noises, a voice, and banging. As he approached Vice Principal Martin's office, she asked him to come in because A.H. was being "aggressive." Nugent described A.H.'s conduct as disruptive to the normal school activities.
Martin and Vasquez then walked outside and left Nugent in the office alone with A.H. A.H. called Nugent a "stupid mother fucker," told him he did not know who he was, and said Nugent had better watch his back and not let A.H. "catch [him] slipping." In Nugent's experience, the phrase "catch you slipping" meant something bad would happen to you, including getting beaten up. Nugent testified A.H. seemed to be upset at the situation and not at him.
While standing outside Martin's office, Vasquez could hear conversation behind the door but she could not initially determine what was being said. She then heard yelling, and she and Martin stepped back into the office. Upon opening the door, Nugent informed her A.H. had threatened him. A.H. then yelled, "Why are you snitching?" A.H. stood up and walked toward Vasquez. He again refused to sit down when directed, and was very agitated.
Vasquez therefore escorted A.H. out to her patrol car. While walking through the administrative building to the patrol car, A.H. continued yelling obscenities. The school secretary and other minors were present. After being secured in the patrol car, A.H. kicked the car door. Once A.H. finally calmed down, Vasquez drove him to juvenile hall.
An October 2016 amended wardship petition alleged A.H. had disturbed the peace on school grounds (Pen. Code, § 415.5, subd. (a); count 1), and disturbed a public school. (Ed. Code, § 32210; count 2.) At the contested jurisdictional hearing, Vasquez and Nugent testified. A.H. did not present any witnesses or testify on his own behalf. The juvenile court dismissed count 1 and sustained the petition on count 2. A.H. was continued as a ward of the court and reinstated to probation with generally the same terms and conditions as before, including the same residency condition. A.H. timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I
Sufficient Evidence Supports the Education Code Section 32210 Violation
A.H. contends insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court's finding he violated Education Code section 32210 "because he did not engage in conduct physically incompatible with the peaceful functioning of the campus." We disagree with A.H.'s view of the evidence and conclude substantial evidence supports the court's true finding.
When determining whether there is substantial evidence to support a conviction, we view the record in the light most favorable to the People, resolving all conflicts in the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the conviction. (People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 408.) " 'We may conclude that there is no substantial evidence in support of conviction only if it can be said that on the evidence presented no reasonable fact finder could find the defendant guilty on the theory presented.' " (Ibid.) These same principles apply when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding in a juvenile proceeding that a minor violated a criminal statute. (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809.)
Education Code section 32210 provides, "Any person who willfully disturbs any public school or any public school meeting is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500)." (Ed. Code, § 32210.) In In re J.C. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1394 (In re J.C.), this court interpreted the statute's words "willfully disturb[] any public school" to mean "to act violently or in a manner that incites to violence, or to engage in 'conduct physically incompatible with the peaceful functioning of the campus.' " (Id. at p. 1404.)
In In re J.C., the appellate court held the juvenile court correctly found the minor violated the statute as interpreted. (Id. at p. 1405.) The minor was in a hallway during the lunch hour cursing and disobeying the principal's directives to go to his office. (In re J.C., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1396-1397.) A campus officer called to the scene also instructed the minor to go to the principal's office. (Id. at p. 1397.) The minor complied, but while walking to the office he repeated loudly enough to attract other students' attention that he was going to punch a campus monitor in the face and the monitor "was going to get it." (Ibid.)
Upon arriving at the principal's office and learning he was suspended, the minor continued to make similar comments about punching the campus monitor and also said he would punch the vice principal. (In re J.C., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 1397.) The minor became more irate after speaking with his mother on the phone, screaming and pacing the floor. (Ibid.) He threw the phone down on the table. (Ibid.) He ignored the officer's commands to put his hands behind his head to be detained, and even pulled his arm away from the officer when he tried to put a control hold on him. (Ibid.) The officer held the minor to the floor, handcuffed him, and escorted him out to his squad car. (Ibid.)
A.H. tries to distinguish his conduct from the minor in In re J.C. by arguing he merely engaged in verbal misconduct and did not physically do anything incompatible with the peaceful functioning of the campus. We are not persuaded.
Officer Vasquez testified A.H. was "struggling" with Vice Principal Martin when she first arrived at the office after Martin urgently summoned her. She saw A.H. pushing up against Martin's outstretched arm, attempting to leave the office despite Martin's directions to stay. His hands were clenched and he was loudly yelling obscenities that could be heard throughout the office. Students and other staff members were present in the office area and could hear the commotion that both Officer Vasquez and Nugent described as disruptive to the school.
Like the minor in In re J.C., A.H. disregarded the vice principal's directions to remain in the office and also refused to comply with some of Officer Vasquez's orders. (In re J.C., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1396-1397 [minor disobeyed principal's directions, and complied with officer's order to walk to principal's office but refused to comply with order to put hands behind head for handcuffing].) Officer Vasquez ordered A.H. to sit multiple times, but he refused to comply. While he did eventually allow himself to be handcuffed, A.H. can hardly be described as compliant with the vice principal's or officer's commands during the incident.
When left alone with campus safety specialist Nugent, A.H. called him a "stupid mother fucker" and threatened Nugent by telling him to "watch his back" and he better not find Nugent "slipping," which Nugent understood to mean in street "lingo" that something bad could happen to him. That Nugent did not feel particularly threatened because he believed A.H. was angry at the situation and not at him, does not lessen the foreboding import of the statements. Indeed, such comments are similar to those in In re J.C., where the minor said he wanted to punch another student and the vice principal. (In re J.C., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 1397.)
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment (People v. Campbell, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 408), as we must, we conclude sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court's finding A.H. violated Education Code section 32210. His willful disobeyance of school officials' directions and a law enforcement officer's orders, his loud yelling and threatening comments in the vicinity of other students and staff members, and his physical struggle with the vice principal when trying to leave the office disrupted the peaceful functioning of the campus and disturbed the orderly administration of the school.
II
Probation Condition Concerning Minor's Residency
A.H. challenges a condition of probation, imposed multiple times without objection, that requires him to "[r]eside in, and not move from Sacramento County and cannot move from this jurisdiction without the advance permission of the Probation Officer or the Sacramento County Juvenile Court." In his view, the condition is vague and overbroad, and unconstitutionally infringes on his rights to due process, travel, and association because the words "this jurisdiction" are not sufficiently defined. We disagree.
Preliminarily, we note a minor who does not object to probationary terms risks losing the ability to seek relief from the Court of Appeal. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889 (Sheena K.).) In general, one who "does not challenge an assertedly erroneous ruling of the trial court in that court has forfeited his or her right to raise the claim on appeal." (Id. at p. 880.) But where, as here, a minor contends a probation condition is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, the ordinary forfeiture rule does not apply. (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 879 [minor's constitutional challenge to her probation condition as vague and overbroad not forfeited despite her failure to object on those grounds when condition imposed by juvenile court].) Thus, despite A.H.'s failure to object to the condition below, we consider the merits of his constitutional challenge.
Once a minor is adjudged a ward of the court under section 602, the juvenile court "may make any reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the minor . . . subject to further order of the court." (§ 727, subd. (a).) Under section 730, when a ward is placed on probation, "[t]he court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced." (§ 730, subd. (b).) Section 730 thus grants courts broad discretion in establishing probation conditions in juvenile cases. (In re Christopher M. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 684, 692 (Christopher M.), disapproved on another ground in People v. Gonzales (2013) 56 Cal.4th 353, 375, fn. 6.) " '[T]he power of the juvenile court is even broader than that of a criminal court.' " (Christopher M., at p. 692.)
"A probation condition 'must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him [or her], and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated,' if it is to withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness. [Citation.]" (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) A probation condition that limits a person's constitutional rights, moreover, must be closely tailored to the condition's purpose to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overboard. (Ibid.)
In this case, A.H. contends the probation condition is vague and overbroad because the words "this jurisdiction" are not sufficiently precise. He presumes "this jurisdiction" refers to the City of Sacramento--not mentioned anywhere in the condition--rather than the County of Sacramento that is twice referenced in the condition as written. He is mistaken.
"A probation condition should be given 'the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader." (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382-383.) Applying this interpretive principle to the challenged condition, we conclude a reasonable, objective reader would understand the words "this jurisdiction" that both follow and precede separate references to "Sacramento County" to describe the County of Sacramento.
The word "this" commonly means "the person, thing, or idea that is present or near in place, time, or thought, or that has just been mentioned." (Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dict. (11th ed. 2006) p. 1300, col. 2, italics added.) Here, the words "this jurisdiction" immediately follow the clause stating A.H. must reside in and not move from Sacramento County. Because the condition mentions Sacramento County just prior to "this jurisdiction," the phrase refers back to Sacramento County. And, since the City of Sacramento is not mentioned at all in the condition, it is not reasonably likely an objective reader would understand the phrase "this jurisdiction" to mean the City of Sacramento rather than Sacramento County.
As so read, A.H. must reside in and not move from Sacramento County without the advance permission of the probation officer or the Sacramento County Juvenile Court. A.H. concedes, as interpreted, the condition is not overbroad and any purported vagueness issue is resolved making modification of the condition unnecessary. We therefore reject his vagueness and overbreadth challenges to the probation condition as written.
III
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In a related argument, A.H. contends that because the probation condition was overbroad, his counsel should have objected to the condition when imposed. The absence of an objection below, he asserts, rendered his counsel's assistance constitutionally ineffective.
Having determined the condition as written was not vague or overbroad because a reasonable, objective reader would easily understand the phrase, "this jurisdiction" refers to the County of Sacramento and not the City of Sacramento, A.H.'s counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the condition.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
HOCH, J. We concur: /s/_________
BUTZ, Acting P. J. /s/_________
MURRAY, J.