Opinion
F064690
02-01-2013
Robert J. McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super. Ct. No. JJD064973)
OPINION
THE COURT
Before Levy, Acting P.J., Gomes, J., and Detjen, J.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Hugo J. Loza, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Robert J. McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant appeals from a judgment entered after he admitted allegations that he violated his probation. Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In the early morning hours of July 13, 2011, appellant and four other males were involved in the burglary of one vehicle and the attempted burglary of two others. Appellant was arrested that night in possession of a wallet that was taken from the vehicle that had been burglarized. He also possessed six broken spark plug pieces. Appellant initially provided the arresting police officer with a false name and two false dates of birth.
On July 14, 2011, the district attorney filed a petition charging appellant with second degree burglary (count 1/Pen. Code, § 459), receiving stolen property (count 4/§ 496, subd. (a)), possession of burglary tools (count 5/§ 466), providing false information to a police officer (count 6/§ 148.9, subd. (a)), and two counts of attempted second degree burglary (counts 2 & 3/§§ 664 & 459).
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated.
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On August 15, 2011, the court found all of the allegations true.
On August 29, 2011, the court set appellant's maximum term of confinement at 10 years and placed him on probation on certain terms and conditions, including that he complete a term of 45 to 180 days in the Youth Treatment Center.
On October 25, 2011, appellant was released from the residential portion of the Youth Treatment Center.
On November 17, 2011, the probation department contacted Lovell High School and was informed that appellant was beginning to argue with teachers and act out in class. The school also reported that during a search of appellant, marijuana was found on him which he claimed he was holding for a friend. Appellant was subsequently placed back in the Youth Treatment Center Aftercare Program for 18 days.
On January 12, 2012, appellant was sent to the office at school for attempting to use his cell phone in class.
On January 19, 2012, appellant was given a referral for failing to abide by school rules, talking back and arguing with his teacher, and using profanity.
On January 20, 2012, appellant was expelled from school due to continued aggressive and poor behavior. He was subsequently transferred to the Yettem Community Day School.
On February 7, 2012, appellant's school reported to the probation department that the previous day appellant was argumentative and refused to complete his work.
On February 14, 2012, appellant took the keys to his mother's car without permission and picked up some friends. He was out driving around after his curfew when Tulare County Sheriff's deputies attempted to stop him. Appellant fled and ran three stop signs. After crashing his car, appellant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol.
On February 16, 2012, the probation department filed a Notice of Violation of Probation (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 777) alleging that appellant violated his probation by failing to abide by his school's rules and regulations, being in possession of marijuana, and failing to abide by his court-imposed curfew.
On February 22, 2012, appellant admitted that he violated his probation by possessing marijuana at school on November 17, 2011, and by failing to abide by his school's rules and regulations.
On March 14, 2012, the court committed appellant to the Youth Treatment Center Program for a maximum of 180 days.
Appellant's appellate counsel has filed a brief which summarizes the facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant has not responded to this court's invitation to submit additional briefing. However, in the brief filed in this matter, appellant, through his appellate counsel, asks this court to address whether the court abused its discretion when it committed him to the Youth Treatment Center on March 14, 2012.
"'An order of disposition, made by the juvenile court, may be reversed by the appellate court only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion....' [Citation.] It is not the responsibility of this court to determine what we believe would be the most appropriate placement for a minor. This is the duty of the trial court, whose determination we reverse only if it has acted beyond the scope of reason. [Citation.]" (In re Khamphouy S. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1135.)
In addition to the offenses in the instant petition, appellant had prior adjudications for first degree burglary, second degree burglary, receiving stolen property, and petty theft that were charged in a petition filed on September 30, 2010, and an adjudication for grand theft that was charged in a petition filed on October 13, 2010. Appellant also had one prior violation of probation, he served three commitments to the Youth Treatment Center and its aftercare program, and he had spent a total of 467 days in custody. Given the extent of appellant's criminal behavior, the court acted reasonably and did not abuse its discretion when it determined that another commitment to the Youth Treatment Center was appropriate.
Further, following an independent review of the record we find that no reasonably arguable factual or legal issues exist.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.