Opinion
2012-04-20
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Anthony N. ADAMS, Defendant–Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Niagara County Court (Sara S. Sperrazza, J.), rendered June 10, 2008. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of robbery in the first degree and manslaughter in the first degree.Patricia M. McGrath, Lockport, for defendant–appellant. Michael J. Violante, District Attorney, Lockport (Thomas H. Brandt of Counsel), for Respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Niagara County Court (Sara S. Sperrazza, J.), rendered June 10, 2008. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of robbery in the first degree and manslaughter in the first degree.Patricia M. McGrath, Lockport, for defendant–appellant. Michael J. Violante, District Attorney, Lockport (Thomas H. Brandt of Counsel), for Respondent.
MEMORANDUM:
Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of robbery in the first degree (Penal Law § 160.15[3] ) and manslaughter in the first degree (§ 125.20[1] ). We reject defendant's contention that his waiver of the right to appeal was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered ( see People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 256, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145; People v. Hidalgo, 91 N.Y.2d 733, 735, 675 N.Y.S.2d 327, 698 N.E.2d 46). “The responses of defendant to County Court's questions during the plea colloquy establish that he understood the consequences of waiving the right to appeal and voluntarily waived that right” ( People v. Ruffins, 78 A.D.3d 1627, 1627–1628, 910 N.Y.S.2d 625; see People v. Dunham, 83 A.D.3d 1423, 1424, 919 N.Y.S.2d 258, lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 794, 929 N.Y.S.2d 102, 952 N.E.2d 1097). Further, the court “ ‘describ[ed] the nature of the right being waived without lumping that right into the panoply of trial rights automatically forfeited upon pleading guilty’ ” ( People v. Tabb, 81 A.D.3d 1322, 1322, 916 N.Y.S.2d 567, lv. denied 16 N.Y.3d 900, 926 N.Y.S.2d 35, 949 N.E.2d 983, quoting Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d at 257, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145). The court also “ ‘made clear that the waiver of the right to appeal was a condition of [the] plea, not a consequence thereof’ ” ( People v. McCarthy, 83 A.D.3d 1533, 1533–1534, 921 N.Y.S.2d 755, lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 819, 929 N.Y.S.2d 808, 954 N.E.2d 99).
“The valid waiver of the right to appeal encompasses defendant's contention concerning the denial of his request for youthful offender status” ( People v. Elshabazz, 81 A.D.3d 1429, 1429, 916 N.Y.S.2d 883, lv. denied 16 N.Y.3d 858, 923 N.Y.S.2d 420, 947 N.E.2d 1199; see People v. Harris, 77 A.D.3d 1326, 907 N.Y.S.2d 893, lv. denied 16 N.Y.3d 743, 917 N.Y.S.2d 625, 942 N.E.2d 1050). The waiver, however, “does not encompass his contention with respect to the severity of the sentence ... because the record establishes that defendant waived his right to appeal before County Court advised him of the potential periods of imprisonment that could be imposed” ( People v. Mingo, 38 A.D.3d 1270, 1271, 832 N.Y.S.2d 721). Nonetheless, we conclude that the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.