Summary
In Abrams the court states: "Driving without a license is a traffic infraction which justifies a police officer's immediate arrest of the unlicensed operator" (supra, 119 A.D.2d, at 683).
Summary of this case from People v. MezonOpinion
April 14, 1986
Appeal from the County Court, Westchester County (Colabella, J.).
Judgments affirmed.
Contrary to the People's assertion, the defendants Morgan and Figueroa had standing to challenge the propriety of the stop of the defendant Abram's car conducted by the police officers which eventually led to the discovery of weapons inside (see, People v Smith, 106 A.D.2d 525). However, their claims fail on the merits since Officer Ruggiero clearly had reason to suspect that the automobile might have been stolen (see, People v. Johnson, 56 A.D.2d 661). Abram's subsequent failure, upon demand by the officer, to produce a driver's license was presumptive evidence that he was not duly licensed (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 507; People v. Griffin, 116 Misc.2d 751, 758). Driving without a license is a traffic infraction which justifies a police officer's immediate arrest of the unlicensed operator (Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 155, 509; People v. Ellis, 62 N.Y.2d 393, 396; People v. Copeland, 39 N.Y.2d 986). Since Officer Ruggiero could have lawfully arrested Abrams based upon this presumption that he was illegally operating a motor vehicle, it was certainly proper and reasonable under the circumstances to require him to report to police headquarters, located a few blocks away, in order to ascertain whether in fact he had a validly issued license. We note parenthetically that a computer check later performed at headquarters ultimately resulted in the discovery that Abrams did not have such a license.
The seizure of a sawed-off rifle was made only after Officer Courtien observed the weapon in plain view on the back seat of Abram's car. The other two weapons were found in the car after the defendants had already been lawfully arrested for possession of the rifle. Under these circumstances, the hearing court correctly ruled that the evidence should not have been suppressed.
We are not persuaded by the defendant Morgan's contention that the testimony of the police officers was so incredible as to warrant a reversal (see, People v. Prochilo, 41 N.Y.2d 759; People v. Gee, 104 A.D.2d 561). Lazer, J.P., Niehoff, Kooper and Spatt, JJ., concur.