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People ex Rel. Miranda v. Dalsheim

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Jun 18, 1979
70 A.D.2d 941 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979)

Opinion

June 18, 1979


In a habeas corpus proceeding petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, entered August 30, 1978, which dismissed the proceeding. Judgment affirmed, without costs or disbursements. Petitioner waived a preliminary hearing on parole revocation charges on April 24, 1978. On July 17, 1978 (one day prior to the scheduled final revocation hearing) he signed a form indicating that he wished to be represented by an attorney at the hearing and consenting to a postponement "until such time that I can arrange for an attorney". Petitioner obtained a writ of habeas corpus on July 26, 1978 alleging that the final hearing had not yet been held and that his right to a speedy hearing had been violated. Special Term properly dismissed the proceeding. The record indicates that the final parole revocation hearing was originally scheduled within the 90-day period provided by statute (see Executive Law, § 259-i, subd 3, par [f], cl [i]). Since the hearing was adjourned at petitioner's request there was no violation of his right to a speedy hearing. Hopkins, J.P., Damiani, Titone and Margett, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

People ex Rel. Miranda v. Dalsheim

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Jun 18, 1979
70 A.D.2d 941 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979)
Case details for

People ex Rel. Miranda v. Dalsheim

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ex rel. JOSE MIRANDA, Appellant, v…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Jun 18, 1979

Citations

70 A.D.2d 941 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979)

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