Opinion
January 31, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (David Saxe, J.).
The Division of Parole was entitled to await the disposition of the Federal bank robbery charges before lodging the parole violation warrant in this case (see, People ex rel. Cook v Sullivan, 130 A.D.2d 532, lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 607; Matter of Jackson v. State of New York, 127 A.D.2d 595, 596), and the delay between the date of petitioner's conviction and the date the warrant was lodged did not constitute a denial of due process (see, Matter of Maissonett v. State of New York, 130 A.D.2d 578) or a violation of 9 NYCRR 8004.2 (d) (2).
There also is no merit to petitioner's argument that the Division's failure to hold a final revocation hearing within 90 days from the date the warrant was lodged requires vacatur of the warrant, as the adjournments requested by petitioner in order to obtain counsel, and those at petitioner's counsel's request, were not chargeable to the Division (Executive Law § 259-i [f] [i]; People ex rel. McAllister v. Leonardo, 182 A.D.2d 1031, 1033), and petitioner's intervening transfer to Leavenworth, Kansas on February 5, 1992, as well as the evidence submitted by the Division regarding the Federal authorities' unwillingness to make petitioner available for a final parole revocation hearing until after he has completed his Federal sentence sufficiently demonstrated that petitioner was not subject to the practical control of the Division after said date (see, People ex rel. Brown v. New York State Div. of Parole, 70 N.Y.2d 391, 398-399).
Concur — Murphy, P.J., Rosenberger, Ross, Asch and Nardelli, JJ.