Opinion
January 6, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Clinton County (Lewis, J.).
Petitioner contends that the indictment upon which he was convicted of the crimes of rape in the first degree and resisting arrest is jurisdictionally defective because it does not contain factual allegations to support every element of the crimes charged. The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus is not generally available to raise issues that could have been raised by way of a direct appeal or by motion pursuant to CPL article 440 (People ex rel. Woodard v. Berry, 143 A.D.2d 457, lv denied 73 N.Y.2d 705). Departure from these traditional orderly proceedings should be permitted only when dictated by reason of practicality and necessity (People ex rel. Keitt v McMann, 18 N.Y.2d 257, 262). The indictment challenged by petitioner uses the statutory language to charge petitioner with rape in the first degree (see, Penal Law § 130.35) and resisting arrest (see, Penal Law § 205.30). CPL 200.50 requires only that the indictment allege where, when and what the defendant did, and it is usually sufficient to charge the language of the statute unless the language of the statute is too broad (People v. Iannone, 45 N.Y.2d 589, 598-599). It is our view that the statutory language charged in the indictment herein is not too broad, and if petitioner required more information he should have requested it in his demand for a bill of particulars (see, People v. La Porte, 184 A.D.2d 803, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 905). The indictment, therefore, is not jurisdictionally defective and the judgment dismissing petitioner's application must be affirmed.
Mikoll, J.P., Mercure, Crew III and Yesawich Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment and order are affirmed, without costs.